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  INTRODUCTION   
For those who have difficulty conceiving through natural 
reproduction, using assisted reproductive technology to have 
genetically related children is a very expensive proposition. In 
particular, the average cost per cycle of in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) in the United States is $12,400,1 and it has been esti-
mated that actually producing a live birth through IVF would 
cost an individual (on average) between $66,667 and $114,286.2 
No more than a fifth of employer-sponsored insurance plans 
cover IVF,3 so in the absence of state intervention most indi-
viduals would be forced to cover these high costs out of pocket. 
For many people, therefore, economic realities place this tech-
nology out of reach.  
Given these high costs, should states take steps to improve 
access to reproductive technologies for those who have difficulty 
conceiving through natural reproduction? Should they do so 
 
 1. DEBORAH SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 213 tbl.7-2 (2006).  
 2. Id. (citing Peter Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery 
with In Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 239, 239–43 (1994)).  
 3. Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the “Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes 
About Consent, Genetic Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 175 n.216 (2005). 
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even if the intervention decreases adoptions domestically or in-
ternationally? A number of states have attempted to improve 
access to IVF through their regulatory powers over insurance, 
making IVF a mandated benefit such that health insurers are 
required to cover IVF in their plans, thus cross-subsidizing the 
costs across all insured individuals in the state. These states 
have apparently done so without concern over the possible ef-
fects on adoption. While most scholars have also unabashedly 
favored these mandates and their expansion, a few have ex-
pressed concerns about the mandates’ effects on adoption and 
have assumed (intuitively enough) that making IVF more wide-
ly available will diminish adoptions; that is, they have assumed 
that there is a tradeoff between helping individuals conceive 
and helping children waiting to be adopted. We call this the 
“substitution theory.” 
To help understand whether possible effects on adoption 
provide valid reasons to oppose these mandates, this Article of-
fers the first empirical and normative examination of the sub-
stitution theory.  
It proceeds as follows. Part I provides brief background on 
adoption and reproductive technology usage in contemporary 
America. Part II turns to the normative question of whether 
states ought to improve access to reproductive technologies, 
and describes the main mechanism that some states have used 
to do so—state-level insurance mandates. We first establish 
why a number of different moral theories offer a prima facie 
case for the state to improve access to these technologies. We 
then briefly discuss a number of objections (economic, religious, 
safety, etc.) to the mandates before setting out the particular 
concern that is our focus: the objection that improving repro-
ductive technology access through state-level insurance man-
dates leads to a diminution in adoptions. That claim has both 
an empirical premise, that this effect actually occurs, and a 
normative premise, that the effect is a good reason to oppose 
these mandates. The remainder of Part II clarifies this argu-
ment and challenges some of its normative assumptions. 
In Part III, we shift focus to examine the empirical premise 
behind the substitution theory—that the introduction of these 
mandates is associated with a diminution in adoptions—
through an econometric analysis. We set out our study design 
including descriptions of the state-level mandates, the CDC da-
ta-set we use to measure IVF utilization, and the multiple da-
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ta-sets we use to measure domestic (public and private) and in-
ternational adoptions by U.S. citizens by state. We take advan-
tage of state-level variation in whether a state has an insur-
ance mandate, when the mandate was introduced, and what 
the mandate requires (complete coverage, partial coverage, a 
mandate to “offer,” or a mandate that excludes IVF) to fashion 
a three-part empirical strategy. First, we use a differences-in-
differences methodology to examine the effect of the introduc-
tion of these mandates on IVF utilization. Second, we use the 
same methodology to study the effect of these mandates on 
adoption. Finally, we conduct ordinary least squares and two-
stage least squares analyses to study the effect of IVF utiliza-
tion directly on adoption rates, which we interpret as causal, 
assuming that the introduction of these mandates are exogen-
ous to adoption rates.  
We then present our results and interpret them. This Part 
includes a discussion of several robustness checks, limitations 
of our study, and implications for the policy question. We do not 
find strong evidence that increased access to IVF through state-
level insurance mandates decreases domestic or international 
adoptions. We also discuss the implications of this result for the 
normative and policy questions. Finally, a brief conclusion 
summarizes the work and plots directions for future study. Two 
web-appendices4 reanalyze the econometric results, first 
through slightly different classification of insurance mandates, 
then through a cross-sectional rather than differences-in-
differences methodology. 
 This project, an attempt to better understand the relation-
ship between improved access to reproductive technologies and 
adoption in contemporary America, is important on a number 
of levels: it helps states better understand the tangible question 
of whether these mandates are justifiable, it helps adoption ad-
vocates determine whether they have something to fear from 
expanded access to reproductive technologies such that they 
ought to mobilize resources to oppose it, it helps elucidate some 
of the under-theorized normative claims about the state’s duty 
to promote adoption versus genetic reproduction, and it helps 
us better understand the extent to which cost subsidies can af-
fect individuals’ preferences between having genetically related 
 
 4. Appendix A, is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1707650. Abstract B is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707655. 
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children and adopting. Our chief empirical finding—that while 
the most comprehensive insurance mandates do increase IVF 
utilization, we find little evidence that they diminish adop-
tions—casts serious doubt on the substitution theory as a rele-
vant reason to oppose broadening reproductive technology 
access through these mandates.  
I.  BACKGROUND ON REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
AND ADOPTION   
This Part briefly provides background information on re-
productive technology usage and adoption in contemporary 
America to ground the normative and empirical analyses that 
follow. 
A. INFERTILITY AND IVF IN THE UNITED STATES 
Based on the most recently available data (from 2002), it is 
estimated that in the United States 7.3 million women ages fif-
teen to forty-four (or about 11.8 percent of the population of 
women of those ages) suffer from “impaired fecundity” and have 
used infertility services.5 Among U.S. married women of those 
ages, approximately 2.1 million women (or 7.4 percent of that 
population) meet the medical definition of “infertility”—being 
unable to get pregnant for twelve consecutive months given ef-
forts to do so and the absence of contraception—although this 
number is better understood as an estimate of how many mar-
ried couples are infertile, since infertility can be the result of 
either male or female factors.6 We focus on these populations of 
 
 5. Anjani Chandra et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Reproductive 
Health of U.S. Women: Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 106 tbl.67, 136 tbl.97 (Dec. 
2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.  
 6. See id. at 108 tbl.69, 154; see also SPAR, supra note 1, at 1–2. Male fac-
tors and female factors each account for about a third of infertility cases, with 
some combination accounting for ten percent, and about twenty percent cate-
gorized as unexplained. Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AM. 
SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010); see also Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? De-
ducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1130–35 
(2004). Male-factor infertility includes “disorders related to impaired sperm 
production, maturation, or transfer[;] . . . blocked or absent vas deferens[; and] 
. . . absent or retrograde ejaculation,” and it can result from “hormonal imbal-
ances; genetic disorders; environmental factors; anatomical defects; sexually 
transmitted diseases; spinal cord injuries; and bladder, prostate gland, or tes-
ticular cancer or surgery.” Pratt, supra, at 1130–31 (footnotes omitted). Fe-
male-factor infertility includes “ovulation disorders, blocked fallopian tubes, 
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infertile individuals, in part because they are the beneficiaries 
of most state-level insurance mandates. However, on other def-
initions of infertility, the population is larger still and encom-
passes single individuals and same-sex couples whose infertili-
ty does not necessarily stem from impaired fecundity.7 
Attempts to cure infertility begin very early in recorded 
history, at least as far back as Hippocrates’s use of Egyptian-
inspired recipes containing red nitre, cumin, resin, and honey 
to try to open up the cervix of infertile women.8 Modern as-
sisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), though, began with 
the invention of the microscope in the mid-1600s, which al-
lowed the visualization of sperm and therefore an understand-
ing of its role in fertilization.9 This development led to the first 
artificial insemination of dogs in 1780 (in Italy by the priest 
Lazzaro Spallanzani) and then in humans in 1785 (by the Scot-
tish surgeon John Hunter).10 Artificial insemination using do-
nor sperm occurred for the first time in 1884 by Doctor William 
Pancoast in Philadelphia.11 
Since the 1880s, modern medicine has added a number of 
methods for treating infertility.12 For our purposes, though, one 
method is particularly important: in vitro fertilization, which 
was first successfully used in Oldham, England in 1978 to pro-
duce Louise Brown.13 IVF proceeds in four stages. First, the 
woman who will provide eggs is administered ovulation-
 
cervical disorders, endometriosis, and uterine disorders[,]” and can be caused 
by “hormonal imbalances; autoimmune reactions; genetic disorders; anatomi-
cal defects . . . ; pelvic inflammatory disease[;] venereal disease; scar tissue; 
fibroid tumors; and cancer.” Id. at 1131 (footnotes omitted). In the absence of 
these conditions, female fertility is highest at age twenty-seven and then de-
creases dramatically after age thirty-five. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not 
to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1165 & n.161 (2008) (citing 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 15). This is the result of the combination of multiple 
factors, including ovarian and uterine dysfunction and chromosomal abnor-
malities in their eggs. Pratt, supra, at 1131.  
 7. Lisa Ikemoto refers to these groups as the “dysfertile.” Lisa C. Ikemo-
to, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 
1008–09 (1996). 
 8. JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 25 
(2006). 
 9. Id. at 26–28. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 28. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 40–41 (describing intracytoplasmic sperm injection, 
gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote intrafallopian transfer). 
 13. E.g., SPAR, supra note 1, at 24. 
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stimulating hormones, which cause multiple egg-containing fol-
licles to mature so that up to several dozen eggs can be har-
vested in a single treatment cycle.14 Second, just prior to ovula-
tion the eggs are removed by a minor surgical procedure; today 
this is usually done by an ultrasound-guided needle inserted 
through the vaginal wall into a developed ovarian follicle 
through which, by suction, the egg is harvested.15 Third, sperm 
is introduced into individual culture dishes, each of which con-
tains a culture medium and one egg with the culture dish mon-
itored after the first day to determine if fertilization occurs.16 
Finally, if fertilization occurs, the preembryos are allowed to 
mature in the medium, usually for two to three days after egg 
retrieval, until the preembryos reach the four or eight cell stage 
when some or all of them are transferred into the woman’s 
uterus to attempt implantation.17 Ten to fourteen days after 
transfer, the woman will undergo a pregnancy test to deter-
mine if the transfer was successful.18 IVF can also be done us-
ing frozen eggs (i.e., those frozen between the second and third 
step), or using frozen preembryos (i.e., preembryos frozen after 
the third step but before the fourth step).19 
In 2006, there were 93,866 IVF cycles performed in the 
United States using fresh (i.e., nonfrozen) nondonor eggs.20 Of 
these, only a fraction resulted in pregnancies and live births.21 
 
 14. The CDC describes its cycle measure, which we use in the empirical 
portion of our study, as follows: 
Because ART consists of several steps over an interval of approximately 
2 weeks, an ART procedure is more appropriately considered a cycle of 
treatment rather than a procedure at a single point in time. The start 
of an ART cycle is considered to be when a woman begins taking 
drugs to stimulate egg production or starts ovarian monitoring with 
the intent of having embryos transferred. . . . For the purposes of this 
report, data on all cycles that were started, even those that were dis-
continued before all steps were undertaken, are submitted to CDC . . . . 
CDC, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 4 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf. 
 15. DAAR, supra note 8, at 40–41; Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty 
and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Em-
bryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (1999). 
 16. DAAR, supra note 8, at 41. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; see also Coleman, supra note 15, at 58–59. 
 19. See, e.g., DAAR, supra note 8, at 568–71. 
 20. This figure breaks down as follows: 41,369 cycles for women under age 
thirty-five; 23,376 for women ages thirty-five to thirty-seven; 19,755 for wom-
en ages thirty-eight to forty; and 9346 for women ages forty-one to forty-two. 
CDC, supra note 14, at 89.  
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Using IVF to conceive is extremely expensive, with a per-
cycle cost for IVF in the United States of approximately 
$12,400,22 and an estimated average cost of between $66,667 
and $114,286 per live birth.23 A fifth or fewer of employer-
sponsored insurance plans cover IVF,24 so in the absence of 
state intervention many individuals would be forced to cover 
these high costs out of pocket.25 One response to these high 
 
 21. Specifically, 44.6 percent resulted in pregnancy and 38.7 percent re-
sulted in live births for women under age thirty-five. The figures are, respec-
tively, 37.1 percent and 30.4 percent for women ages thirty-five to thirty-
seven; 27.7 percent and 20.6 percent for women ages thirty-eight to forty; and 
17.7 percent and 10.8 percent for women ages forty-one to forty-two. Id. The 
CDC also reports data for IVF using frozen embryos from nondonor eggs and 
for IVF using donor eggs. Id. We do not reproduce that data here.  
 22. SPAR, supra note 1, at 213 tbl.7-2.  
 23. Id. (citing Neumann et al., supra note 2, at 239–43). The large range 
depends on factors such as the age of the mother. See Neumann et al., supra 
note 2, at 239. The numbers will also vary based on the particular state in 
question. See, e.g., Martha Griffin & William Panak, The Economic Cost of In-
fertility-Related Services: An Examination of the Massachusetts Infertility In-
surance Mandate, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 22, 26 (1998) (estimating that in 
1993 the average cost for a live birth in Massachusetts with IVF was $69,448, 
and over $100,000 for women over the age of forty).  
 24. See THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, UNEVEN & UNEQUAL: 
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 9 tbl.1 (1994) 
(reporting that only fourteen to seventeen percent of employers cover IVF); 
Dolgin, supra note 3, at 175 n.216 (2005); Julie Appleby, Pricey Infertility Care 
Sparks Insurance Clash, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1B, available at http:// 
www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2001-12-19-bcovwed.htm (“Among insurance 
policies offered by large employers, less than 20% cover IVF—and even fewer 
cover more advanced techniques . . . .”); see also Anna Mulrine, Making Babies, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 27, 2004, at 60, 62 (stating that IVF insur-
ance coverage is “a rarity in the United States, where 85 percent of insured 
Americans have policies that will not cover that treatment”). 
 25. Some taxpayers may be able to partially finance fertility treatments 
using the deduction in § 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows a 
taxpayer to deduct expenses for medical care not covered by insurance to the 
extent the expenses exceed 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income 
(AGI). I.R.C. § 213(a), (d)(1) (2006); see also Pratt, supra note 6, at 1137–38. 
This is slated to increase to ten percent in 2013. Affordable Care Act Imple-
mentation Timeline, DEMOCRATIC POL’Y COMMITTEE, 7 (2010), http://dpc 
.senate.gov/healthreformbill/health65.pdf. The IRS has historically taken in-
consistent positions on the deductibility of fertility expenses. See Pratt, supra 
note 6, at 1137–61. While the tax status of costs associated with donor eggs 
and surrogacy still remain uncertain, the IRS has recently clarified in Publica-
tion 502 that expenses associated with IVF are deductible. INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 8 (2009), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf (reporting that deductible 
expenses include procedures to “overcome an inability to have children,” in-
cluding “[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary stor-
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costs has been the introduction of state-level insurance man-
dates covering IVF, which we discuss in-depth below.  
B. ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The use of reproductive technologies constitutes only one 
possible way of coping with childlessness due to infertility. 
Adoption is another alternative. The status of adoption in con-
temporary America is a vast topic involving law, sociology, eco-
nomics, and a myriad of other disciplines, such that a brief de-
scription cannot do it justice. For the purposes of this Article, 
we instead give a basic background on adoption to contextual-
ize the normative and empirical questions we examine. We be-
gin by briefly describing the kinds of adoptions currently taking 
place in America and their historical antecedents, and then dis-
cuss a few important pieces of federal legislation on adoption 
that Congress passed during the time period of our study. 
Modern adoption in the United States traces back to an-
cient Rome where it was used to avoid extinction of the adop-
ter’s family and ensure continuity of the adopter’s religion.26 By 
contrast, early English law was quite hostile to adoption, privi-
leging blood lineage over the interests of children to be 
adopted.27 Early English law prevented the absolute, perma-
nent, and voluntary relinquishment of parental power to third 
persons, preferring instead to use a system of apprenticeships 
 
age of eggs or sperm)”). A recent tax court decision, Magdalin v. Commission-
er, however, suggests the deductibility of IVF services is limited to medically 
infertile, married, opposite-sex couples. See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 491, 492–93 (2008), aff’d No. 09-1153, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. Dec. 
17, 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2388 (2010) (mem.); Katherine T. Pratt, De-
ducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of Magdalin v. Commis-
sioner for Opposite-Sex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Sin-
gle Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1311–25. Even for those able to 
take the deduction for IVF, it is ordinarily a much less powerful way of financ-
ing fertility than is the insurance mandate. To borrow an example from Pratt 
(using 2004 tax rules), if an infertile couple eligible for the deduction makes 
$100,000 per year at a marginal tax rate of thirty percent, and they spend 
$10,000 on fertility services, taking the I.R.C. § 213 deduction only saves them 
$750. Pratt, supra note 6, at 1180–81. By contrast, if an insurance mandate 
that fully covers a cycle of IVF applies and the patient is insured, the patient 
does not pay for the cost of the cycle aside from her general health insurance 
premium. There is also a large (and frankly somewhat shady) market in fertil-
ity loans that has emerged. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financ-
ing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 147, 160–64. 
 26. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive 
Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 400. 
 27. Id. 
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to satisfy child welfare goals.28 In 1851, Massachusetts over-
ruled centuries of English precedent by providing what is 
usually thought of as the first modern adoption law, a system 
for the judicially monitored transfer of rights from the birth 
parents to the adoptive parents, made with due regard for the 
welfare of the child and the parental qualifications of the adop-
tive parents.29 
At the present moment, adoptions in the United States can 
be divided in a few useful ways. At the highest level, we can 
separate U.S. adoptions into agency adoptions (which involve 
parents legally surrendering their child directly to an agency, 
which coordinates the adoption), nonagency or independent 
adoptions (in which birth parents give their consent directly to 
the adoptive parents), and intercountry adoptions.30 A brief re-
view of these three forms of adoption will help frame the dis-
cussion to follow.  
Agency adoptions can involve either a public state-run 
agency or a private agency licensed by the state. To begin an 
agency adoption, the agency counsels the birth parents on their 
options and the legal consequences of the adoption process, and 
after such counseling the parents may voluntarily relinquish 
all legal rights to the child.31 In some cases, a birth mother will 
contact an agency prior to birth and tentatively agree to give 
her child up for adoption, but such prebirth agreements are not 
enforceable, and must be reaffirmed upon birth.32 The father’s 
rights to the child must also be terminated before the child can 
be placed for adoption, which can be accomplished either by 
 
 28. See id.; Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of Modern American Fami-
ly Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1038, 1045–46 (1979). For more on the pre-1851 U.S. experience, see 
generally Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 
1077, 1102–12 (2003). 
 29. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 26, at 401; Stephen B. Presser, The His-
torical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 465 
(1972); Zainaldin, supra note 28, at 1042–45. But see Cahn, supra note 28, at 
1112–13 (arguing that the conventional view exaggerates the extent to which 
the Massachusetts statute breaks with the status quo and that the conven-
tional view also exaggerates the depth of scrutiny the statute gives to child-
ren’s interests). 
 30. See, e.g., David Brodzinsky, Infertility and Adoption Adjustment, in 
INFERTILITY 246, 247 (Sandra R. Leiblum ed., 1997). 
 31. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in 
1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-1, 1-65 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2009). 
 32. Id. 
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consent or by a court order.33 When both parents’ rights have 
been terminated, the child is placed in the custody of the agen-
cy, which may or may not involve the birth parents in the adop-
tion process.34 
In 2002, 53,000 children were placed for adoption with 
public agency involvement, up from 37,000 in 1998.35 Of those 
53,000, just over 51,000 were placed for adoption out of foster 
care.36 In 2002, only twenty-five percent of children waiting to 
be adopted from foster care were removed from their homes be-
fore the age of one.37 Of children placed for adoption with public 
agency involvement in 2002, only two percent, or just over 1000 
children, were under the age of one.38 Another eight percent 
were age one, and eleven percent were age two.39 
In the second major category, independent (or “direct”) 
adoptions, the birth parent(s) directly seek out a prospective 
adoptive parent without the involvement of an agency.40 In 
most states, such a direct placement can be made either alone 
by the birth parent(s) or with the help of an unlicensed inter-
mediary, such as a minister, lawyer, or doctor.41 In the few 
states that do not allow direct placements, the birth parent(s) 
must use an agency for placement, but can generally arrange 
with the agency to be allowed to designate the prospective 
adoptive parents.42 Direct placement is often done with a rela-
tive, but in almost all states it can also be done with unrelated 
prospective parents.43 The Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 re-
quires a preplacement evaluation of any prospective adoptive 
parents, regardless of whether the placement is direct or done 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. The AFCARS Report, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
§ V, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report12.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 36. Id. § III. Most of these children were not relinquished upon birth, but 
were removed involuntarily from their parents for reasons of neglect or abuse. 
Hollinger, supra note 31, at 1-67. The remaining 2000 children were adopted 
with public agency involvement, but were not part of the foster care system. 
The AFCARS Report, supra note 35, § V. 
 37. The AFCARS Report, supra note 35, § IV. 
 38. Id. § V. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Hollinger, supra note 31, at 1-69. 
 41. Id. at 1-70. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
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through an agency.44 It is difficult to say how many private 
adoptions (either direct or private agency placements) are made 
each year because there is no central tracking agency for such 
data. It has been estimated, however, that in 2001 private 
agency and direct placements accounted for approximately for-
ty-six percent of adoptions, or 58,000 children.45 
In intercountry (or “international”) adoption, parents seek 
to adopt a child located in another country. The number of in-
tercountry adoptions has risen dramatically in recent years, 
from 9050 adoptions in 1991, to 19,237 in 2001.46 Of these 
adoptions, forty-six percent are of children under the age of 
one.47 
The cost of adopting varies by the type of adoption. One re-
cent estimate (although contested) suggested that the average 
cost of domestic adoption of a newborn from an agency in 2008 
and 2009 was $30,948, while adoption from foster care cost 
$1,960.48 The same study suggested that the average cost of in-
ternational adoption varied by the child’s country of origin—for 
example, $53,702 for Russia, $35,400 for Korea, $26,531 for 
China, and $24,977 for Ethiopia.49 
 
 44. Id. at 1-71. 
 45. How Many Children Were Adopted in 2000 and 2001?, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 2 (Aug. 2004), http://www.childwelfare 
.gov/pubs/s_adopted/s_adopted.pdf. 
 46. International Adoption Facts, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., 
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/research/internationaladoption.php (last visit-
ed Oct. 3, 2010). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cost of Adoption Update: 2008-2009, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www 
.adoptivefamilies.com/articles.php?aid=2076 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). These 
numbers do not reflect the Federal Adoption Tax Credit, up to $12,150 in 
2009. Adoption Benefits Increased, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www 
.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=177982,00.html (last updated Nov. 26, 2009). 
See also SPAR, supra note 1, at 180 (reporting that as of 2004, domestic infant 
adoptions in the United States cost “between $10,000 and $40,000”); Kathleen 
A. Lamb, Exploring Adoptive Motherhood: Adoption-Seeking Among Hispanic 
and Non-Hispanic White Women, 11 ADOPTION Q. 155, 160 (2008) (citing Costs 
of Adopting, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (June 2004), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costs.pdf ) (suggesting a cost of $2500 
for adoption of special needs children from foster care in the United States, 
$5000 to $40,000 for domestic infant adoptions, and $7000 to $30,000 for in-
ternational adoptions). 
 49. Cost of Adoption Update, supra note 48. These numbers include home 
study costs, travel expenses, in-country adoption expenses, getting the child’s 
visa and passport, etc., and they do not reflect the Federal Adoption Tax Cred-
it, up to $12,150 in 2009. Id.; see also SPAR, supra note 1, at 184 tbl.6-2 (listing 
the 2004 costs for international adoption through several different agencies; 
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In addition to background information about the types of 
adoption, three pieces of federal legislation passed during our 
study period should be mentioned—the Multiethnic Placement 
Act, an amendment to the tax code, and the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act. While these pieces of legislation have altered the 
adoption landscape, as discussed below, one advantage of our 
differences-in-differences methodology is that it can factor out 
national changes unless they have state-specific effects.  
For most of the twentieth century, the majority of children 
available for adoption in the United States were healthy, white 
infants.50 Toward the century’s end, however, large-scale so-
cietal changes had altered that supply; the growing acceptance 
of single parenthood, the ready availability of contraception, 
and the legalization of abortion resulted in a steady decline in 
the number of non-special-needs white babies available for 
adoption.51 According to an estimate Solangel Maldonado of-
fered in 2006, white non-special-needs infants were in such 
short supply that applicants for those children in the United 
States faced waits as long as seven years.52 But despite the rel-
ative scarcity of white non-special-needs infants, up until the 
early 1990s, the majority of adoption agencies strongly favored 
same-race placements, often delaying placements of nonwhite 
babies even when a white family was willing to adopt.53 In re-
sponse to concerns over these practices and the growing num-
ber of nonwhite babies in foster care, Congress passed the 
Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 
(MEPA).54 The initial version of MEPA forbade adoption agen-
cies that received federal funding from making placement deci-
sions solely on the basis of race, but allowed the use of race as a 
 
for example, the Wide Horizons for Children agency charges a base application 
and agency fee of $5700, and country-specific additional program fees of 
$18,240 for adopting from Guatemala, $15,000 for adopting from Russia, 
$7165 from China, $6700 from Ethiopia, and $5000 from India). 
 50. Brodzinsky, supra note 30, at 247. 
 51. E.g., id. at 248; Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences 
in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1432 (2006). 
 52. Maldonado, supra note 51, at 1431–32. 
 53. Douglas R. Esten, Transracial Adoption and the Multiethnic Place-
ment Act of 1994, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1941, 1942 (1995). 
 54. See Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 551, 
108 Stat. 3518, 4056 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)); see 
also Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1807, 110 
Stat. 1755, 1899 (reenacting the pertinent portions of the Multiethnic Place-
ment Act under the Interethnic Adoption Provisions). 
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relevant factor.55 The Act was amended in 1996 to completely 
prohibit consideration of race as a factor.56 There has been con-
siderable debate over whether promoting transracial adoptions 
is desirable, as well as whether MEPA is effective in doing so,57 
but it is clear that the percentage of African American children 
among those waiting for adoption has decreased significantly—
from fifty-three percent in 1998 to forty-two percent by 2002.58 
Second, in 1996 Congress amended the tax code to encour-
age adoptions by adding I.R.C. §§ 23 and 137.59 Section 23 al-
lows adoptive parents to claim a tax credit of up to $10,000 for 
adoption (to use the numbers at the time of enactment).60 Sec-
tion 137 allows the exclusion of up to $10,000 of adoption reim-
bursements from an employer-provided adoption assistance 
program.61 The Code permits both provisions to apply to a sin-
gle adoption but not to the same adoption expense.62 
The third major piece of federal adoption legislation passed 
in our study period was the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (ASFA).63 This legislation was a response to the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), which 
Congress passed to regulate state-run foster care systems.64 
AACWA placed considerable emphasis on reunifying families 
and preventing unnecessary placements of children into the 
foster care system.65 Some commentators criticized the Act for 
requiring that “reasonable efforts” be made to keep together 
 
 55. Esten, supra note 53, at 1943. 
 56. Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1996b (2006).  
 57. See David J. Herring, The Multiethnic Placement Act: Threat to Foster 
Child Safety and Well-Being?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 89, 99–102 (2007) 
(discussing the debate surrounding the MEPA); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991). 
 58. The AFCARS Report, supra note 35, § V. 
 59. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
§ 1807, 110 Stat. 1755, 1899. 
 60. I.R.C. § 23(b)(1) (2006); see also Pratt, supra note 6, at 1179–80. 
 61. I.R.C. § 137(a)(1), (d)(1)(D); see also Pratt, supra note 6, at 1179. 
 62. I.R.C. § 23(b)(3)(A); see also Pratt, supra note 6, at 1179. 
 63. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 64. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
272, 94 Stat. 501 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628, 670–679 (1988)). 
 65. James R. Marsh, Federal Impact on Adoptions, in 3 ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 17-5. 
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families, without focusing on the best interests of the child.66 
Further, while the number of children in foster care initially 
decreased after passage of the AACWA, the number increased 
from 262,000 in 1982, to 445,000 in 1993, and to a high of 
567,000 in 1999.67 
In response to these concerns, Congress passed ASFA to 
“shift the pendulum of the child protection system away from 
what many saw as an unreasonable emphasis on family preser-
vation and towards permanency, and thus health and safety, 
for the children.”68 Congress attempted to accomplish this goal 
in several ways. First, ASFA requires that the health and safe-
ty of the child be the “paramount” consideration in any effort to 
reunify his or her family.69 While states are still required to 
make “reasonable efforts” to prevent a child from being re-
moved from his or her family, ASFA contains a number of ex-
ceptions, including a consideration of whether a parent had 
subjected the child to “aggravated circumstances” as defined by 
state law.70 
Second, ASFA requires a permanency hearing (formerly 
known as a dispositional hearing) to be held within thirty days 
of a judicial finding that one of these exceptions applies or with-
in twelve months of a child entering foster care.71 At the hear-
ing, a “permanency plan,” such as referral for adoption, guard-
ianship, or placement with a relative, must be established.72 
The list of such goals had previously included long-term foster 
care, but no longer does.73 Third, ASFA then requires states to 
make reasonable efforts to place the child in a permanent situ-
ation in a timely manner.74 
Finally, ASFA requires states to file for a termination of 
parental rights and seek an adoptive family when a child has 
been in foster care for fifteen out of the past twenty-two 
months, or when a child is abandoned as an infant, or when the 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and 
ASFA, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 224 (2009). 
 69. Marsh, supra note 65, at 17-6. 
 70. Id. at 17-3 to -6. 
 71. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (2001). 
 72. Marsh, supra note 65, at 17-5 to -8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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parent commits certain criminal acts.75 This requirement can 
be waived for children in the care of a relative, if the agency 
fails to provide reunification services to the child’s family, or 
when upholding the requirement would not be in the best in-
terest of the child.76 The majority of states have passed legisla-
tion to comply with ASFA.77 
With the foregoing background on reproductive technology 
and adoption in mind, we can now focus on the primary ques-
tion of this Article: the relationship between these two modes of 
forming families in the United States. 
II.  THE POLICY DEBATE OVER STATE-LEVEL 
INSURANCE MANDATES COVERING IVF: DO STATES 
HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES EVEN IF IT 
DECREASES ADOPTIONS?   
In this Part we explain why, according to a number of 
normative theories, there is a prima facie case for a state obli-
gation to improve access to reproductive technologies. We then 
examine a series of objections (religious, libertarian, safety, 
etc.) that might be marshaled in opposition to the state doing 
so. We next focus on one objection in the set, an objection high-
lighted by Elizabeth Bartholet, Peter Neumann, and others: 
that these mandates should be opposed because they will lead 
to a diminution in adoptions. After setting out this objection 
more fully, we draw out and put pressure on some of its norma-
tive assumptions. We do this not so much to refute it conclu-
sively, but to identify its many unstated and contestable prem-
ises and to argue that it requires a stronger theoretical 
foundation than that which has been put forward in favor of it.  
A. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
As discussed, a number of states have adopted insurance 
mandates covering reproductive technologies as the primary 
method of improving access to such technologies. While not the 
only possible method,78 they are perhaps the most powerful 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Other possible methods of subsidizing reproductive technologies would 
include a more generous tax deduction for infertility medical expenses or a tax 
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method currently in place.79 The deep normative question is 
whether state action here is desirable. On a number of moral 
and political theories the answer seems to be, in principle, 
“yes.” 
Some theorists reach this conclusion because they believe 
in a more general duty of the state to promote the health of its 
population, and conclude that genetic reproduction is an impor-
tant part of health. For example, Martha Nussbaum, writing 
from a more aretaic (i.e., Aristotelian, focusing on character 
and virtue) perspective, has argued that the state’s role is to 
enable human flourishing by raising people above the threshold 
level on a number of “capabilities.”80 She describes one of these 
capabilities, “bodily health,” as “[b]eing able to have good 
health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nour-
ished; to have adequate shelter,” and another, “bodily integri-
ty,” as including “having opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
 
credit for these expenses. States could, at least theoretically, also subsidize 
these treatments through direct payments to health care providers in this sec-
tor or investments in technology development. They could also include the ser-
vice in the list of services for which Medicaid reimburses. 
 79. These mandates are powerful, especially the complete mandates, be-
cause they defray so much of the costs of using IVF. That said, as a mechan-
ism for improving access, state-level insurance mandates have two clear limi-
tations. First, because they determine the content of what must be included in 
an insurance policy, they are only effective at improving access for those who 
are or will be insured. Second, because of ERISA preemption, employers that 
self-insure are not bound by these mandates in insuring their population. See 
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006); Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance 
Regulation of Providers that Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 380 (1996). 
Precise statistics on the number of self-insured firms in each state are un-
available, though a study using 1997 data from seven states found that thir-
teen percent of all firms, fifty-six percent of firms with 500 or more employees, 
twenty-five percent of firms with 100–499 employees, and three percent of all 
employers with fewer than 100 employees, were self-insured. M. Susan Mar-
quis & Stephen H. Long, Recent Trends in Self-Insured Employer Health 
Plans, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 1999, at 161, 163. A more recent study us-
ing a different methodology suggests this number has grown significantly in 
the past decade, estimating that fifty-five percent of all workers and seventy-
seven percent of workers in large companies are now covered by self-funded 
plans that escape the mandates. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH 
& EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 148 
tbl.10.3 (2004). As discussed in more depth below, in our empirical analysis we 
follow the literature by attempting to control for the population in each state 
that is covered by self-insured employers and track these changes over time. 
 80. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 76–78 (2006). See 
generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000) (articulating the 
capabilities-functionings view). 
  
502 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:485 
 
and for choice in matters of reproduction.”81 On this view, sub-
sidization of IVF via insurance mandates is a welcome step to-
ward realization of health capabilities. 
Norman Daniels, coming from a more Rawlsian tradition 
(i.e., a liberal tradition focused on promoting liberty and dis-
tributive justice through giving priority to the worst-off), 
grounds the state’s role in promoting health in the obligation, 
as a matter of political justice, to ensure access to the “normal 
opportunity range” to pursue the “array of life plans reasonable 
persons are likely to develop for themselves.”82 From this foun-
dation, Daniels concludes that “infertility is a departure from 
normal functioning that reduces an individual’s fair share of 
the normal opportunity range and gives rise to claims for assis-
tance” because infertility interferes with “basic functions of free 
and equal citizens, such as reproducing themselves biologically, 
an aspect of plans of life that reasonable people commonly pur-
sue.”83 On this view, as well, one should welcome increased 
access to IVF through insurance mandates. 
Interestingly, as a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court 
has taken a similar approach in its case law by treating the in-
ability to reproduce as a disability, and discrimination on that 
basis as protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). In Bragdon v. Abbott, an HIV-positive patient sued a 
dentist who refused to treat her cavity outside of a hospital set-
ting (where she would pay extra costs) under the ADA for dis-
criminating on “the basis of disability in the . . . enjoyment of 
the . . . services . . . of any place of public accommodation by 
 
 81. NUSSBAUM, supra note 80, at 76 (emphasis added).  
 82. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 43 
(2008); see also id. at 29–60 (outlining Daniels’s theory of the “special moral 
importance of health”). 
 83. Id. at 59. It is worth emphasizing that both of these theories do a bet-
ter job justifying classifying infertility treatment as the meeting of health 
needs for partnered individuals with impaired fecundity, rather than single 
individuals or same-sex couples (the “dysfertile”). It may be possible to con-
struct an argument on Daniels’s framework for covering infertility of these 
groups as well, based on the notion that failing to do so would unfairly deny 
these groups access to the “normal opportunity range” to pursue the “array of 
life plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves” on the basis 
of marital status or sexual orientation, in a way that is inappropriate in a lib-
eral society. Id. Doing so, though, would require Daniels to de-emphasize his 
biological conception of “normal functioning.” Id. These are difficult questions, 
but ones we are able to sidestep in this Article because the state mandates in 
question largely target the reproductive needs of married individuals of child-
bearing age with medical infertility. 
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any person who . . . operates [such] a place.”84 In holding that 
HIV was a disability within the statutory meaning, that is a 
“physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of [an individual’s] major life activities,”85 the Supreme Court 
noted its effect on the reproductive capacity of the individual 
and held that “[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase ‘ma-
jor life activity’” because “[r]eproduction and the sexual dynam-
ics surrounding it are central to the life process itself,” and “re-
production could not be regarded as any less important than 
working and learning,” which clearly were covered by the 
ADA.86 Thus, for ADA purposes, the Supreme Court has 
treated infertility as a health deficit amounting to a disability 
equivalent to other more typical examples of disabilities such 
as blindness, deafness, or epilepsy. 
State action to improve access to reproductive technologies 
may also be justified on more welfarist-consequentialist moral 
theories (i.e., those that evaluate the morality of a policy based 
solely on the consequences for human welfare). Infertile indi-
viduals who want to reproduce genetically may face a major 
setback to their welfare,87 as studies showing high levels of de-
pression in the infertile population demonstrate.88 Reducing 
the impediment to successful reproduction may diminish these 
negative effects.89 
These mandates may also be justified by narrower health 
outcomes or on dollars and cents grounds. Empirical studies 
have suggested that the enactment of insurance mandates cov-
 
 84. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(a) (1994)). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 86. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638–39. 
 87. We put to one side disagreement as to what welfare consists of—for 
example, whether it is best thought of as pleasure and the absence of pain 
(hedonism), or the satisfaction of desire, see generally L.W. SUMNER, 
WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996) (exploring these divisions), because 
we believe that the capacity to reproduce would be valued on any variant.  
 88. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Discrimination Out of Dismissiveness: The 
Example of Infertility, 85 IND. L.J. 143, 154–56 (2010) (collecting studies); 
Pratt, supra note 6, at 1128 & n.22. 
 89. It remains an open question whether the negative effects of being de-
nied genetic reproduction could successfully be reduced by widespread at-
tempts to de-emphasize the importance of the genetic connection in parenting. 
For more on the malleability of preferences about genetic parenthood and the 
law’s expressive function in shaping them, see Cohen, supra note 6, at 1142, 
1151, 1189–90. It bears noting, though, that at least in the foreseeable future 
such preference reprogramming seems unlikely. 
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ering IVF may diminish the rate of multiple births.90 One poss-
ible mechanism that has been proposed to explain this effect is 
that in the absence of mandates, the large per cycle cost of IVF 
prompts individuals to keep the number of cycles attempted per 
successful childbirth as low as possible. In order to do so, indi-
viduals tend to implant a larger number of preembryos as part 
of IVF to increase the chance that one preembryo will success-
fully implant.91 But implanting larger numbers of preembryos 
leads to higher rates of multiple births, especially of three or 
more infants,92 an outcome worth preventing as multiple births 
are associated with health risks to infants and to gestating 
mothers.93 Further, the extremely high medical costs associated 
with multiple births94 mean that if these mandates reduce mul-
 
 90. See Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro 
Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 665 (2002); Barton H. Hamilton & 
Brian McManus, Infertility Treatment Markets, The Effects of Competition 
and Policy 26 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://apps 
.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/hamiltonb/wpapers/Infertility%20Treatment%20Markets 
.pdf (correlating a decrease in multiple birth rates with Universal insurance 
mandates). But see Melinda B. Henne & M. Kate Bundorf, Insurance Man-
dates and Trends in Infertility Treatments, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 66, 73 
(2008) (noting research supporting this relationship, but observing uncertainty 
about the correlation’s strength); Meredith Reynolds et al., Does Insurance 
Coverage Decrease the Risk for Multiple Births Associated with Assisted Re-
productive Technology?, 80 FERTILITY & STERILITY 16, 22 (2003) (finding that 
while state-level insurance mandates were correlated with decreased multiple 
embryo transfer rates, there was no conclusive evidence that they actually de-
creased the number of multiple births). 
 91. See Jain et al., supra note 90, at 665. 
 92. See id.; Hamilton & McManus, supra note 90, at 27. But see Henne & 
Bundorf, supra note 90, at 71 (suggesting that existing data cannot rule out a 
different possible mechanism whereby more individuals with poor prognoses 
now seek IVF due to the mandate, thus decreasing the multiple birth rate not 
because of reduced embryo transfer, but because more patients unlikely to 
conceive are added into the denominator for multiple birth rate); Reynolds et 
al., supra note 90, at 22 (suggesting that insurance mandates may at the same 
time increase the number of individuals attempting ART who but for mandates 
would not have, but that these individuals can only afford a single procedure 
due to co-pays and uncovered expenses, resulting in additional multiple births). 
 93. The risks to children from a multiple birth include stillbirth, physical 
and developmental disability, respiratory distress syndrome, intracranial hem-
orrhage, cerebral palsy, and blindness—all risks associated with premature 
birth. Jain et al., supra note 90, at 665. The maternal risks include premature 
labor and delivery, pregnancy-induced hypertension, gestational diabetes, and 
uterine hemorrhage. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., id. (citing Tamara L. Callahan et al., The Economic Impact of 
Multiple-Gestation Pregnancies and the Contribution of Assisted-Reproduction 
Techniques to Their Incidence, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 244 (1994)) (noting that 
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tiple births, they may actually reduce overall health care costs 
for patients, insurers, and/or the state.95 
All of this amounts to a good prima facie argument for 
state action to improve access to reproductive technologies.96 
Indeed, most legal scholars who have discussed the issue 
strongly support these mandates and argue for their expan-
sion.97 This argument is, however, only a prima facie case, be-
cause apart from the possible negative effects on adoption we 
discuss in Part III, there may be other countervailing norma-
tive arguments against improving access to particular repro-
ductive technologies or against particular mechanisms for en-
suring access. The next section explores these arguments. 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDING ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH MANDATES 
One might object to state action expanding access to IVF 
through insurance mandates on a number of grounds. These 
objections might sound in health, religion, or political ideology. 
To contextualize our critique of the substitution theory, this 
section explores some of the more salient objections not related 
to adoption that one might raise. 
 
hospital charges for twin birth and triplet births were four and eleven times as 
high as singleton births, respectively, according to 1991 data). 
 95. See DAAR, supra note 8, at 296 (discussing this possibility). But see in-
fra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (suggesting some countervailing 
health concerns from using IVF). 
 96. While many of these theories would support improving access to IVF 
as a prima facie matter, we cannot go so far as to say there is a universal over-
lapping consensus involving all possible moral theories on the point. In partic-
ular, nonutilitarian but liberal theories that either do not regard health as a 
primary good or do regard health as a primary good but reject infertility as a 
bona fide health care need, would not support the claim. We examine the 
question of whether infertility is a health care need in more depth below. 
 97. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisi-
ble Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 42–43 
(2008) (supporting these mandates as attempts to deal with cost and racial 
barriers to infertility access, but expressing concerns about their effective-
ness); Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Ex-
clusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 343–44 (2005) (supporting 
these mandates as a way of ending discrimination against the infertile, but 
suggesting they be federalized to avoid the problem of ERISA preemption); 
Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 50 (2009) (noting that “[p]oor, infertile people suf-
fer twice as a result, first from the inability to conceive for free and then from 
the unaffordability of assisted reproduction,” and supporting expansion of 
state-level insurance mandates covering IVF). 
  
506 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:485 
 
One set of objections to IVF mandates centers on health 
concerns. Some worry that children conceived via IVF are less 
healthy than children born through natural conception and ob-
ject to subsidizing IVF on that ground. A 2002 New England 
Journal of Medicine study found that the use of IVF appears to 
roughly double the risk of having a singleton with low birth 
weight or a child with a major birth defect, even when one con-
trols for multiple birth, maternal age and parity, the sex of the 
infant, and correlation between siblings.98 Still, “the majority of 
couples who require assistance with reproduction will not be af-
fected, [because] the likelihood of having a term singleton in-
fant of normal birth weight is about 94 percent, and the likeli-
hood of having an infant who is free of major defects is about 91 
percent.”99 
Moreover, there are hard questions regarding how a state 
should value such “harm” to the child when the counterfactual 
to the use of IVF is that the child would otherwise not exist.100 
Others may object that government programs to expand 
access to IVF have the problematic expressive effect of reinforc-
ing the centrality of biological ties for family, or will further 
undermine the self-worth of infertile women who try IVF and 
fail.101 This critique can stand alone or be understood as part of 
radical feminist critiques of IVF more generally.102 
 
 98. Michèle Hansen et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects After Intracy-
toplasmic Sperm Injection and In Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
725, 729 (2002); see also Allen A. Mitchell, Infertility Treatment—More Risks 
and Challenges, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 769 (2002) (analyzing the study). 
 99. Mitchell, supra note 98, at 769. 
 100. This idea is associated with Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, 
which states that a particular child cannot be harmed by being brought into 
existence unless a given life is not worth living, for the child’s counterfactual is 
not existing at all. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (rev. ed. 
1987). This problem raises a host of complex and interesting issues discussed 
in great depth in prior and forthcoming work by one of this Article’s authors. 
See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and 
Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008); I. Glenn Cohen, Well What 
About the Children?: Best Interests Reasoning, the New Eugenics, and the 
Regulation of Reproduction (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 101. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE 
POLITICS OF PARENTING 93 (1999) (noting social preference for adoption of bio-
logically similar children). See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (1995) (discussing the negative social consequences of 
the emphasis put on the genetic ties between parents and children for the in-
fertile and for racial discrimination). 
 102. See, e.g., GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 3 
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A very different kind of objection comes from some reli-
gions that oppose IVF because it separates the unitive and the 
procreative elements of reproduction within a marriage.103 
Others offer religious or nonreligious objections to IVF because 
it frequently leads to the destruction of preembryos.104 
Still others might object on more political or ideological 
grounds. Some would object to direct government subsidy of 
any health care on libertarian grounds,105 and for this reason 
would also object to direct government subsidy of reproductive 
technology, although they may be somewhat mollified by more 
limited forms of government intervention such as insurance 
mandates.  
Others argue on more economic grounds that including IVF 
coverage in every insurance policy will drive up the cost of in-
surance, and therefore price more people out of the health in-
surance market. While a 1995 study suggested that including 
IVF coverage would increase the cost of the average insurance 
premium by only $3.14 per year,106 that estimate may not re-
 
(1979) (“What is the real meaning of a woman’s ‘consent’ to in vitro fertiliza-
tion in a society in which men as a social group control not just the choices 
open to women but also women’s motivation to choose?”); Barbara Katz Roth-
man, The Meanings of Choice in Reproductive Technology, in TEST TUBE 
WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 23, 31 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 
1984) (“[A]ll of the new treatments for infertility have also created a new bur-
den for the infertile—the burden of not trying hard enough. Just how many 
dangerous experimental drugs, just how many surgical procedures, just how 
many months—or is it years?—of compulsive temperature-taking and obses-
sive sex does it take before one can now give in gracefully?”). For an excellent 
history of radical and liberal feminist depictions of infertile women in legal 
and nonlegal scholarship, see Jody Lyneé Madeira, Common Misconceptions: 
Reconciling Legal Constructions of Women in the Infertility and Abortion Con-
texts 6–26 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565172.  
 103. See, e.g., Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s 
Rights: The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 79 
(2006); Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, U.S. 
CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2010) (“Homologous artificial fertilization (that is, any tech-
nique used to achieve conception using the gametes of the two spouses joined 
in marriage) is prohibited when it separates procreation from the marital act 
in its unitive significance (e.g., any technique used to achieve extra-corporeal 
conception).”). 
 104. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 15, at 66; Ethical and Religious Direc-
tives for Catholic Health Care Services, supra note 103. 
 105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997). 
 106. See Jain et al., supra note 90, at 666 (citing John A. Collins et al., An 
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flect changes in technology, availability, and insurance plan 
structure in the intervening decade and a half. A 2007 estimate 
(without supporting data) published in Fertility and Sterility 
suggested a range of $0.87 to $10 increase in premiums per 
member per month (or $10.44 to $120 annually) for policies 
that cover IVF.107 Whether an increase in premiums is a good 
reason not to adopt these insurance mandates might depend on 
where precisely in that range the cost increase falls, whether 
one views infertility as a health deficit on par with other medi-
cal needs, and more general views about how much health in-
surance should be a situs for redistribution and solidarity.  
Still others might strongly favor government action to 
maintain access to reproductive technology as part of the 
state’s obligation to promote health, but they would argue that 
in the grand scheme of health needs infertility ought to be 
ranked fairly low, such that a government of limited means 
ought to facilitate access to reproductive technology only after 
achieving other health care goals. Such a position might be pre-
sented either as an attack on satisfying infertility-related needs 
when other health care needs judged more important go un-
met,108 or as a claim that treatment for infertility should not be 
 
Estimate of the Cost of In Vitro Fertilization Services in the United States in 
1995, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 538 (1995)). 
 107. K.R. Omurtag & T.L. Toth, The Cost Effectiveness and Health Out-
comes of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) as a Mandated Benefit, 88 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY (SUPPLEMENT 1) S122, S122 (2007). 
 108. Whether such an argument succeeds may depend on the theory giving 
rise to the state’s obligation in the first place. On Nussbaum and Daniels’s ap-
proaches, for example, the treatment of infertility would appear to have equal 
standing as the treatment of other health states. See supra notes 80–82 and 
accompanying text. 
Daniels, at least, has built in to his theory a form of this objection in his 
notion that right claims to health care are “system-relative,” and just because 
an individual may have a claim to health does not mean all societies will be 
unjust if they do not satisfy all elements of his health need. As he puts it, 
“[t]ypically, not all health needs can be met under reasonable resource con-
straints. Deciding . . . what resources are to be used – both within and outside 
the health sector – requires careful moral judgment and a wealth of empirical 
knowledge about the effects of alternative allocations.” DANIELS, supra note 
82, at 146. Ultimately, “[t]he right to health can yield entitlements only to 
those needs that we can reasonably try to meet.” Id. 
By contrast, Nussbaum’s account seems to reject the notion that justice 
can dictate satisfying some health needs before others. In Nussbaum’s view, 
“all ten of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements of justice, 
at least up to the threshold level,” NUSSBAUM, supra note 80, at 175, such that 
“the capabilities are radically nonfungible: lacks in one area cannot be made 
up simply by giving people a larger amount of another capability.” Id. at 166–
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considered a health need at all but only the satisfaction of a 
lifestyle choice. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the 
Oregon Health Plan Medicaid experiment of 2002 (which ra-
tioned care based on marginal benefit through Quality Ad-
justed Life Years), like many state Medicaid plans, excluded 
IVF from the list of covered treatments.109 
There may be other kinds of objections as well. For the 
purpose of this Article we self-consciously put each of these ob-
jections to one side, acknowledging that if the argument we of-
fer here succeeds, these objections will nonetheless persist and 
their persuasiveness will have to be evaluated in further work 
in order to determine the ultimate question of whether expand-
ing IVF access through insurance mandates is desirable. Here 
we instead focus on an objection from a perspective otherwise 
open to promoting access to health care goods and reducing in-
equality—the objection that focuses on the negative effects 
these mandates have on adoption. The next section offers a 
thorough exposition of this objection and puts pressure on its 
normative foundations. 
C. THE SUBSTITUTION THEORY AND ITS NORMATIVE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
An advocate pressing the substitution theory might sug-
gest that the argument for state subsidization of IVF, as so far 
stated, adopts far too limited a view of whose interests we 
ought to consider. While state actions to increase reproductive 
technology access may very well improve the lives and health 
outcomes of those who are infertile, they exacerbate a different 
kind of inequality: the interests of children waiting for adoption 
 
67. As a result, her “theory does not countenance intuitionistic balancing or 
tradeoffs among them,” but instead “demands that they all be secured to each 
and every citizen, up to some appropriate threshold level.” Id. at 175. She rec-
ognizes that “[i]n desperate circumstances, it may not be possible for a nation 
to secure them all up to the threshold level, but then it becomes a purely prac-
tical question what to do next, not a question of justice”; that is, “[t]he question 
of justice is already answered: justice has not been fully done here.” Id. at 175. 
For more explicitly welfarist-consequentialist models this objection may 
be easier to ground: within the health sector the state should satisfy health 
needs that make larger contributions to welfare before those that make small-
er contributions. Evaluation of this objection may also turn on the form of gov-
ernment action increasing availability in question (direct subsidy, tax deduc-
tion, insurance mandate, etc.).  
 109. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 169. We discuss a related issue 
in more depth below. See infra text accompanying notes 125–29. 
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are set back, because with greater access to reproductive tech-
nology, fewer individuals will adopt. Indeed, the incentive to 
use IVF instead of adoption that these mandates provide is 
even greater than it first appears, because not only do these 
mandates in whole or in part eliminate the costs associated 
with IVF, but if parents choose to use these technologies they 
also potentially avoid the costs associated with adoption, which 
can be substantial.  
We call the assumption that increased access to reproduc-
tive technologies causes a diminution in adoptions “the substi-
tution theory” because of its conjecture that prospective adop-
tive parents substitute away from adoption when reproductive 
technologies become more financially available.  
Commentators have advanced arguments rooted in the 
substitution theory for many years. A few leading scholars in 
the field, such as Peter Neumann and Elizabeth Bartholet, 
have informally put forth the substitution theory, both as an 
empirical claim that adoptions diminish when IVF access is ex-
panded and as a normative claim that this serves as a valid 
reason to oppose state-level insurance mandates. Neumann ad-
dresses the issue in an article on the wisdom of IVF insurance 
mandates, noting the concern “that IVF can ensnare couples in 
an obsessive and often physically and psychologically damaging 
pursuit for a child, despite long odds of success, when they 
might otherwise consider adoption,” and if IVF fails they may 
be precluded from adopting because they are “too old and with-
out the financial or emotional resources.”110 Speaking more 
generally about the reproductive technology versus adoption 
tradeoff in her elegant and passionate book Family Bonds, 
Elizabeth Bartholet argues that “[t]he infertile are potentially a 
significant resource for children in need of homes, but at 
present only a limited number of them adopt,” because 
“[s]ociety drives the infertile away from adoption and toward 
efforts to reproduce with a wide array of conditioning mechan-
isms and regulatory structures.”111 She suggests “[i]t makes no 
sense for a society that thinks of itself as sane and humane to 
 
 110. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and 
Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1225–26 (1997). Neumann’s pre-
ferred solution on this front, though, is not to reduce IVF mandates but to in-
crease support for adoption by employers, as well as through tax credits. Id. at 
1232–33. 
 111. BARTHOLET, supra note 101, at 30. 
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be driving people in the direction of child production rather 
than adoption” when a large number of children “will grow up 
without homes unless they are adopted.”112 In short, a “sane 
and humane society should encourage people to provide for 
these existing children rather than bring more children into the 
world.”113 In the course of offering a widespread indictment of 
the fertility industry and social pressures toward genetic re-
production, as well as a call to act in ways “correcting the bias,” 
Bartholet specifically critiques moves toward expanding health 
insurance coverage for infertility given the lack of comparable 
support for adoption.114 Others have made similar claims.115 
 
 112. Id. at 35. 
 113. Id. at 35–36.  
 114. Id. at 35–37. 
 115. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 26, at 410–21 (comparing the regimes 
governing reproductive technology and adoption and concluding that “for those 
intent on adding a child to the family without sexual reproduction and without 
adoption’s difficulties and intrusions, the law of ARTs should not present an 
obstacle” such that in “the main, the existing legal treatment of ARTs across 
the United States makes adoption a less attractive alternative for meeting the 
interests of those with fertility problems and a desire to have children”); Mad-
elyn Freundlich, Supply and Demand: The Forces Shaping the Future of In-
fant Adoption, 2 ADOPTION Q. 13, 14–20 (1998) (discussing how the increased 
success rates of IVF and expansion of access to IVF through insurance man-
dates is likely to cause a reduction in the number of adoptions); Joan Heifetz 
Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Non-
coital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 865, 926–28 (1985) (arguing 
that reproductive technologies present “an altogether different category of po-
tential harm: the risk of indifference to the many thousands of children, in-
deed, to the hundreds of thousands, who are already born but in desperate 
need of parents to raise them,” and that without more resources committed to 
support adoption, “the worlds of adoption and of noncoital reproduction will 
grow farther and farther apart, and those who resort to the laboratory to con-
ceive a child will be symbolically, if not actually, diminishing the role of adop-
tion in our society”); Jacoby, supra note 25, at 153 (claiming that IVF insur-
ance mandates “steer some intended parents toward assisted reproduction 
who might otherwise have seriously considered adoption”); Kimberly D. Kra-
wiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 203, 211 (2009) (arguing that “prospective parents determined to have 
a child may be forced into the next best substitute, say adoption, when their 
first reproductive choice, say ART, has been fully exhausted without success or 
becomes otherwise unavailable”). Martha Field has offered a parallel critique 
as to surrogacy: 
It would be a real social harm for surrogacy to substitute for adoption. 
Surrogacy allows creation of new, made-to-order children, but only at 
the expense of children who already exist and who need homes. Some 
answer that it is hard to adopt the healthy, white infants that many 
desire. But the shortage of newborns we have experienced in this coun-
try lately has resulted in many children being adopted who once would 
have been hard to place. Children we used to label “unadoptable” are 
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While the substitution theory seems intuitively quite 
plausible, as we discuss below, none of these authors has mar-
shaled empirical evidence for the theory. But even if the empir-
ical portion of these authors’ claims is validated, there are mul-
tiple missing steps between empirically demonstrating the 
effect and normatively concluding it should influence states’ 
policies on IVF insurance mandates.116 In the remainder of this 
Part, we make explicit some of those steps and the controver-
sial issues they raise.  
The high-level normative question is what position (if any) 
the government should take in encouraging adoption versus re-
productive technology usage as a way of having families. At the 
threshold one might ask if it is “even possible for the state to 
remain neutral on this decision?” Here we can see a baseline 
problem of a kind familiar in law: the difficulty of specifying a 
truly neutral point of reference. While from one vantage point 
states that refuse to de facto subsidize reproductive technolo-
gies through insurance mandates are the neutral ones, from 
another they appear tilted toward adoption because they fail to 
balance the pro-adoption subsidization efforts of the federal 
adoption tax credit, which does not have a direct infertility 
equivalent.117 From another vantage point one might argue 
 
finding adoptive homes these days, and the surrogacy system threat-
ens to reverse that trend. This would be a real social cost of promoting 
surrogacy. While there is room for argument that this alone should 
not be a controlling consideration, it surely is wrong to evaluate the 
surrogacy system without at least taking account of the interests of 
existing children. Their interest must be taken into account, along 
with the interests of existing childless couples and others in society. 
Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts–Gestational and Traditional: The Ar-
gument for Nonenforcement, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (1991); see also Elizabeth 
S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 91 
(1990) (“Leaders of the surrogate industry have proclaimed that commercial 
surrogacy may replace adoption as the method of choice for infertile couples 
who wish to raise families. But we should be wary of the racist and eugenic 
motivations which make some people rally to the surrogate industry at the ex-
pense of children who already exist and need homes.”).  
 116. For what it is worth, we have seen no evidence that states adopting 
these mandates have even considered the possible effect on adoption, though 
the poverty of state legislative histories makes that conclusion somewhat un-
certain. Of course, if these authors are right (both normatively and empirical-
ly) in their claims, the issue then becomes one of reforming laws for states 
with mandates, and dissuading those states that might adopt these mandates 
in the future from doing so. 
 117. While the general I.R.C. § 213 tax deduction for medical expenses and 
fertility loans may be helpful for some individuals, it is not usually as valuable 
as a tax credit like the one available for adoption. See supra text accompany-
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that large swaths of the law (related to family law recognition, 
trust law inheritance, etc.) already privilege genetic connected-
ness such that the adoption tax credit is a mere drop in an 
ocean of state support for having genetically related children. 
Still a different vantage point might suggest that for the state 
to permit insurers to exclude coverage of infertility in health 
insurance plans is a move away from neutrality, a move that 
these insurance mandates correct. Such a view might follow 
from the argument of Daniels, Nussbaum, and others (includ-
ing, indirectly, the U.S. Supreme Court)118 that infertility is as 
much a health problem as a heart attack, and one the state is 
as responsible for correcting. We examine the normative claims 
of the substitution theory first on the assumption that infertili-
ty treatments serve genuine health care needs, then by examin-
ing the case if that assumption is relaxed. On both routes, we 
find reasons to question the normative claims the substitution 
theory makes. 
First, let us imagine that one accepts the frame of infertili-
ty treatment as a full bona fide health care need. One then fac-
es hard questions of when it is ethically justifiable to take into 
account indirect benefits and costs in allocating resources to 
meet health care needs. Just as many ethicists believe it would 
be unethical to allocate an organ as between two individuals in 
need on the basis of “indirect benefits” (e.g., one is an indus-
trialist who if given the organ is likely to create 5000 new 
jobs),119 one might wonder whether it is ethical to deny infertile 
 
ing notes 25 and 62. Thus, as Pratt concludes, “tax law currently favors adop-
tion over fertility treatment, even if fertility treatment expenses are character-
ized as medical expenses.” Pratt, supra note 6, at 1180. To use Pratt’s illustra-
tive example (using 2004 tax law rules): 
Lee and Shannon are infertile. They are deciding whether to adopt a 
foreign child or do a cycle of IVF. The cost of either option is $10,000. 
Assume that their gross income for the year is $100,000 and their 
marginal tax rate is 30 percent. If they adopt, they can claim a § 23 
credit of $10,000. The credit saves them $10,000 in taxes and reduces 
their net adoption cost to zero. If they do the IVF cycle and take a 
§ 213 medical expense deduction, the deduction will be $2,500 (their 
$10,000 medical expense less $7,500, which is 7.5 percent of their 
gross income). The $2,500 deduction will save them $750 ($2,500 de-
duction multiplied by the 30 percent tax rate) in taxes. Their net cost 
for the IVF procedure is $9,250 ($10,000 less $750 tax savings). 
Id. at 1180–81.  
 118. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638–39 (1998). 
 119. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefits, COST 
EFFECTIVENESS & RESOURCE ALLOCATION (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.resource 
-allocation.com/content/pdf/1478-7547-1-4.pdf. 
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individuals access to reproductive technologies because of indi-
rect costs as to children going unadopted or being delayed in 
their adoption. To put the point more forcefully, suppose (for 
purely hypothetical, fanciful, and illustrative purposes) we de-
termine that requiring insurers to cover hip replacements leads 
to a diminution in domestic adoptions. Would that serve as a 
good reason to deny such insurance coverage to many Ameri-
cans who desperately want hip replacements? If the answer is 
no, as we think it would be, then it seems impermissible to de-
termine whether to provide insurance coverage for a particular 
health need based on indirect benefits and costs (at least as to 
adoption). What is true of hip replacements should be equally 
true of infertility.  
Consider another hypothetical: suppose we have mandato-
ry organ donation in our country. If a fifty-year-old accident 
victim comes into the emergency room and seeks emergency 
care—emergency care that we believe he has a justified moral 
claim to receive—would it be wrong to deny him that care 
merely because we could thereby ensure that seven individuals 
would benefit from his donated organs? If the answer is yes, as 
we think many would believe it ought to be, then again it seems 
wrong to deny emergency care based on the expected benefit to 
others if that care is denied. Why should infertility treatment 
be any different? Indeed, notice that in some ways the emer-
gency care case is a more compelling one for denying care in 
that the benefits to others are within the “same sphere”—
health care benefits—as the benefit denied to the individual pa-
tient. In this respect, the argument for denying infertility 
treatment because of concerns about adoption faces an addi-
tional hurdle, not present in the emergency hypothetical, be-
cause it requires trading-off benefits between spheres—from the 
health care sphere (IVF) to the family structure sphere (adop-
tion).120 Of course, one might respond by saying that hip re-
placements and emergency care are “real” health needs unlike 
infertility treatments such that we should be free to consider 
indirect benefits and costs in determining coverage only for the 
latter. That response illustrates clearly that the permissibility 
of considering indirect benefits here turns on the premise that 
 
 120. If one viewed infertile individuals as a particularly vulnerable group, 
then the denial of infertility treatments to promote adoption might also seem 
worse than the denial in the hip replacement case because it involves a kind of 
emotional blackmail. 
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treatments of infertility do not meet “real” health needs. As 
discussed above, however, that premise is one that authors like 
Daniels and Nussbaum and many welfare-consequentialists 
would reject;121 it is also a premise that might be hard to main-
tain on a more statistical (focusing on deviation from popula-
tion norms)122 or biological view of health (focusing on the exis-
tence of physiological dysfunction).123 
One sophisticated reformulation of the claim might suggest 
that while infertility is a “real” health need, not all “real” 
health needs are created equal, and the analogy to emergency 
care (and perhaps also hip replacements) is therefore less pro-
bative. On this theory there exist “second-class” health needs, 
and infertility is one of them. This theory would then suggest 
that for “second-class” health needs (but not “first-class” ones 
such as emergency care), it is permissible to deny care to 
achieve other indirect benefits, especially when those benefits 
are particularly important. To be clear, this is a different objec-
tion than the one we discussed (but bracketed) earlier that in-
volved satisfying other health needs before satisfying infertility 
needs, that is, prioritizing health needs.124 Here, by contrast, 
the suggestion is that there are some health needs where the 
effect on indirect benefits can be considered (infertility) and 
others where it cannot (such as emergency room care and hip 
replacements). Thus, even if we had enough resources to satisfy 
all health needs, this objection is the separate claim that we 
would be entitled not to satisfy infertility-related ones because 
of the indirect benefits of letting the population go untreated.125 
What should we make of this reformulation of the objec-
tion? One might have at least two grounds for resisting it. 
First, there is a bit of a “just-so story” air to that approach. One 
might be tempted to ground the “second-class” status of infertil-
ity treatments in the observation that unlike “first-class” 
health care goods like emergency care where everyone is 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
 122. See DANIELS, supra note 82, at 36–42. 
 123. See DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 55 (Free Press 2d ed. 1978). 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09. 
 125. See, e.g., Brock, supra note 119, at 4–6 (explaining how direct and in-
direct benefits may impact health care resource prioritization and suggesting 
that “[i]t is unfair when prioritizing health care resources, . . . to favor one 
group of patients over another, or some health care needs over others, solely 
because treating them is instrumentally valuable in producing indirect non 
health [sic] benefits for third parties”). 
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troubled by the dysfunction they seek to cure, many people vol-
untarily choose not to procreate in the sense of becoming genet-
ic parents. It is a mistake, however, to equate the fact that not 
everyone wants to make use of a particular health state with 
the idea that achieving that health state is therefore a “second-
class” health need or not a health need at all. This idea comes 
up most directly in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s dis-
tinction between capabilities and functionings; enabling the 
former (what an individual is in a position to do), not the latter 
(the choices individuals make as to what to or not to do with 
those opportunities), is the goal of their theory of justice.126 As 
Nussbaum points out, “if we were to take functioning itself as 
the goal of public policy, pushing citizens into functioning in a 
single determinate manner, the liberal pluralist would rightly 
judge that we were precluding many choices that citizens may 
make in accordance with their own conceptions of the good.”127 
Just as providing hip replacements to individuals who want to 
be able to walk meets a health need even if there exist some in-
dividuals who never wanted to walk, so treating infertility for 
those who want to reproduce meets a health need even if there 
exist some individuals in society who choose not to reproduce.  
A second objection is that such an approach may have some 
implications we would reject when tested in other examples. 
Suppose we grant for the sake of argument that infertility is a 
“second-class” health status. This position seems to imply that 
we would be right to deny care to women experiencing some-
thing like pelvic inflammatory or venereal disease, which caus-
es female-factor infertility,128 in order to get the adoption bene-
fit. We think most would find that result intuitively 
unacceptable, and are skeptical of accounts that try to distin-
guish this case from treating infertility by claiming that the 
former is “treatment” or “prevention,” while the latter is “en-
hancement.” Even if one thought the enhancement-treatment 
 
 126. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 86–96 
(2000); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 80, at 79–80; AMARTYA SEN, 
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 4–5 (1992). 
 127. NUSSBAUM, supra note 126, at 86–96. 
 128. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 6, at 1131. After all, infertility is usually a 
“symptom” of something, be it a germ-model disease, a congenital dysfunction, 
or something else. If pelvic inflammatory disease is bad and demands treat-
ment because it causes infertility, then it seems we have the same reason to 
prevent it as we do to correct other kinds of infertility—unless one accepts a 
strong treatment-prevention distinction that we reject for the reasons stated 
in this paragraph. 
  
2010] IVF AND ADOPTION 517 
 
distinction has moral weight—which is far from clear—the 
most plausible accounts of drawing the line suggest that treat-
ments are correcting deviations of species-typical normal func-
tioning,129 and under that criteria IVF falls comfortably within 
the realm of “treatment.” Nor does the mere fact that the assis-
tance or correction is to some extent not “internal” seem rele-
vant. A wheelchair is just as much an intervention that meets a 
health need as is spinal surgery to correct paralysis. To be sure, 
we do not paint our claims here as conclusive. It could be the 
case that there is an argument out there we have not antic-
ipated that clearly shows that infertility is not a health need (or 
is at least a “second-class” health need). What we hope our 
analysis does show, however, is that those arguing for such a 
premise face an uphill battle, and that this is a premise on 
which the substitution theory’s normative component inexora-
bly depends.  
Separate from this issue, one might also wonder whether it 
should matter for the normative analysis and for states’ policy 
decisions whether the children available for adoption differ in 
particular ways (beyond mere genetic relatedness) from the 
kind of children parents would seek to have through reproduc-
tive technologies. For example, should it be relevant whether 
the child available for adoption is an older child rather than a 
newborn, or whether the child is developmentally delayed or 
psychologically scarred from early rearing in difficult condi-
tions? What if the difference is that the child does not match 
the race of the parents?130 Does it matter where that preference 
comes from—for example, if the preference only reflects a de-
sire to “pass” as a genetically related family rather than one in-
 
 129. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 82, at 149. That said, it is possible that 
there are subcategories of IVF users (for example, women over fifty for whom 
their normal functioning would not include fertility) for whom IVF is arguably 
an enhancement and not a treatment—access by gays and lesbians would be a 
closer case. However, as we suggested above, the fact that the vast majority of 
these mandates do not cover IVF for these subpopulations makes a determina-
tion as to this question less relevant for our claims in this Article. See supra 
note 83. 
 130. These distinctions are significant since the vast majority of children 
available for adoption in America do not meet these criteria. See, e.g., SPAR, 
supra note 1, at 176–77 (pointing out that children in foster care who are eli-
gible for adoption “are older, often scarred by a difficult past, and frequently 
children of color”); Maldonado, supra note 51, at 1434–38 (explaining that 
many children adopted internationally are likely to have serious medical prob-
lems or developmental delays). 
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volving adoption, a kind of privacy interest on behalf of the 
parent and/or in the interests of the child?131 
There is also a further question of whether the preference 
for genetic children carries forward after adoption, or, as has 
been demonstrated with quality of life measures related to dis-
ability, whether individuals instead “adapt” their evaluations 
to some extent.132 Does that adaptation occur for all potential 
adopted children, or is it less likely to occur with, for example, 
special needs children? If preference “adaptation” does take 
place to some extent, which set of preferences should policy 
makers “count,” the adapted or unadapted ones? An analogous 
problem has proven perplexing in the context of allocation de-
bates for scarce health resources to prevent disability, that is, 
whether we should allocate resources based on unadapted or 
adapted quality of life estimates for people with disabilities.133 
Finally, there is the question of whether the negative effects of 
being denied genetic reproduction could successfully be reduced 
by widespread attempts to de-emphasize the importance of the 
genetic connection in parenting. Given the long history of this 
preference and its centrality in many religious traditions, we 
think such preference reprogramming is unlikely in the fore-
seeable future.134 
We have so far assumed fertility to be a bona fide health 
care need. Now suppose one rejects the classification of infertil-
ity treatment as part of “health,” or—contrary to Daniels, 
Nussbaum, and others—rejects the premise that government 
has any special obligations to further the health of its citizens. 
Even on this route the substitution theory faces some serious 
 
 131. See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Race and Market Value in Domestic Infant 
Adoption, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1707–08 (2010) (explaining the view of some 
child welfare advocates “that children of color adopted by white families may 
experience discomfort and a sense of alienation as they age, struggling to feel 
a sense of belonging with their cultures of origin”).  
 132. See, e.g., Paul Menzel et al., The Role of Adaptation to Disability and 
Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Normative Analysis, 55 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 2149, 2149 (2002) (“[I]ll and disabled patients generally rate the 
value of their lives in a given health state more highly than do hypothetical 
patients imagining themselves to be in such states.”). But see MARK S. STEIN, 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY: UTILITARIANISM AGAINST EGALITAR-
IANISM 25–30 (2006) (arguing that accounts of adaptation are exaggerated). 
 133. See Menzel et al., supra note 132, at 2156–57 
 134. For more on the malleability of preferences about genetic parenthood 
and the law’s expressive function in shaping them, see Cohen, supra note 6, at 
1142, 1151, 1189–90.  
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challenges. At the threshold, we might push substitution theor-
ists on what model they are implicitly advancing for how the 
state should balance the interests of adopted children and in-
fertile parents.  
One possible model is strictly utilitarian, such that it mere-
ly compares the sizes of welfare gains and losses to the would-
be genetic parents and children waiting for adoption and treats 
each individual’s welfare as counting equally, aggregating wel-
fare gains and losses from each of them. Survey evidence sug-
gests that, when polled ex ante, most individuals have a pref-
erence for genetic over adopted children.135 Proponents of the 
substitution theory might plausibly argue that the welfare defi-
cit of children left unadopted (or whose adoption is delayed) due 
to the mandate outweighs this setback to the interests of pro-
spective genetic parents.  
This claim, however, raises some interesting and hard 
questions. For one, we need to aggregate the interests of both 
prospective parents against the interest of each adopted child, 
such that even if the child’s welfare gain is greater one might 
ask whether it is plausibly twice as great. Further, even if the 
child’s welfare gain really was twice as great, we would need to 
know how many additional individuals get access to reproduc-
tive technologies from the mandates versus how many fewer 
children are adopted in order to determine the merits of the ob-
jection from a utilitarian point of view. At some point, larger 
numbers of smaller welfare gains to prospective genetic parents 
when aggregated ought to outweigh smaller numbers of larger 
welfare gains to adopted children. The empirical tests we con-
duct below are crucial to actually answering these questions, in 
part because proponents of the substitution theory do not ap-
pear to consider the relevant numbers tradeoff, which may be 
far from 1:1. That is, if these mandates significantly expand 
IVF access to a large number of people but cause only a small 
reduction in adoptions, then a state may favor the mandates 
even if we assume that each child who goes unadopted (or 
whose adoption is delayed) because of the mandate loses more 
 
 135. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 28, at 1153; National Adoption Attitudes 
Survey: Research Report, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 6, 36 (June 2002), http://www 
.davethomasfoundationforadoption.org/html/resource/Adoption_Attitudes.pdf 
(noting that nearly a quarter of those polled did not believe it was “very likely” 
that adoptive parents love their children as much as they would have loved 
their biological children). Here too the aforementioned issues of preference 
adaptation and their malleability might be relevant. 
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(in welfare terms) than each parent whose genetic reproduction 
the mandate enables gains (in welfare terms). 
 The substitution theory’s normative claim would be easier 
to support on a moral theory approach that is not utilitarian, 
such as one that is explicitly prioritarian and thus would “not 
give equal weight to equal benefits, whoever receives them,” 
but would instead give “[b]enefits to the worse off . . . more 
weight.”136 If it is the case that children waiting to be adopted 
are worse off than those who are infertile, on the prioritarian 
view the state may favor adoption in the reproductive technolo-
gy/adoption tradeoff. Even if the combined interests of prospec-
tive genetic parents were greater than the interest of the 
adopted child, because the child is less well-off, prioritarians 
might give his or her interests extra weight, which could make 
up for the difference.  
A government could also be sufficientarian, a moral theory 
that focuses not on improving the lot of the least well-off (or 
maximizing welfare irrespective of distribution), but instead 
hews to an absolute duty to raise those falling below a thresh-
old of primary goods before it satisfies the needs of those above 
the threshold.137 Depending on how the threshold is defined, 
this might lead a government to think that adopted children 
are below threshold while infertile would-be parents are above 
it, such that the government again ought to favor adoption in 
the tradeoff.138 Of course, adopting a prioritarian or sufficien-
 
 136. Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 81, 101 
(Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000). 
 137. See Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21–22, 
34–35 (1987) (explaining that rather than attaching moral significance to eco-
nomic inequality, or even extreme poverty, a doctrine of sufficiency focuses on 
allocating resources to meet people’s most urgent needs); see also Roger Crisp, 
Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 758 (2003). 
 138. Whether this follows depends not only on empirical facts about the 
world, but on further specifications of the sufficientarian theory. First, if the 
threshold is set too low we might find that both children waiting for adoption 
and the infertile are above it such that neither deserves preference. If we set 
the threshold too high, both groups may be below it, in which case we face a 
problem of how to make below-threshold tradeoffs. Second, is the threshold 
based on a monistic currency of justice—welfare, for example—or do we in-
stead think there are multiple thresholds (health, family, happiness, etc.) for 
each of which all individuals need to be raised above? The existence of mul-
tiple thresholds complicates the inquiry and raises the question of how to treat 
between-threshold tradeoffs. See, e.g., Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, 
Disability and the Social Contract, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1615, 1638 (2007) (dis-
cussing this problem under Martha Nussbaum’s approach); Mark S. Stein, 
Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 496 (2009) (“Nuss-
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tarian moral theory would have serious and systematic conse-
quences as to how the state should tax its well-off and spend on 
programs for its worst-off, requiring changes that some would 
find unwelcome.139 
Thus, resolution of the adoption-reproductive tradeoff (as-
suming it exists) depends not only on estimating the magnitude 
of welfare benefits/losses to parents who want genetic children 
versus children waiting for adoption, and on considering how 
many benefit and lose, but it also depends on which of several 
rival forms of welfare-consequentialist moral theories (utilitar-
ian, prioritarian, or sufficientarian) a government adopts.140 
Furthermore, the way we have formulated the case thus 
far (as involving tradeoffs between parental and adopted child 
welfare) may be overly generous to the proponents of the sub-
stitution theory in that we have been implicitly assuming that 
the welfare of the children who come into existence through 
IVF because of these mandates count for nothing in the equa-
tion. If the interests of these resulting children count for some-
thing, the question becomes increasingly complex—raising is-
sues about welfare and potential populations that one of this 
Article’s authors has discussed elsewhere.141 Still, taking into 
 
baum has no principle for the resolution of conflicts among above-threshold 
interest . . . [or] below-threshold.”). 
 139. How significant the changes adopting a prioritarian or sufficientarian 
model would portend and how unwelcome those changes would be depends in 
part on how much priority the worst-off get and what counts as sufficient to 
meet thresholds on particular articulations of these theories. One conceivable 
way to avoid this result would be to argue for a prioritarian or sufficientarian 
approach in this domain, but a more utilitarian approach in other state deci-
sions. Such an argument, however, would bear the burden of justifying why a 
special approach is warranted in this context and not elsewhere. 
 140. Adding in nonconsequentialist moral theories as possible contenders 
would further complicate the picture, and it would raise interesting questions 
of whether children waiting for adoption might make rights claims that could 
count as side constraints and whether there are any countervailing rights 
claims on the part of parents.  
 141. See Cohen, supra note 100, at 361 n.44; Cohen, supra note 100 (un-
published manuscript). Without sidetracking the main discussion too much, 
the point goes as follows. Take the following purely illustrative and skeletal 
facts about the population to be true:  
Hypothetical 1: There exist three children (Alvin, Simon, and Theodore) 
waiting for adoption, each with welfare four. If IVF mandates are not in place, 
they will be adopted, and their welfare will increase by three to seven. If, by 
contrast, the mandates are in place, none of them will be adopted (and their 
welfare will remain at four), but three new children (Huey, Dewey, and Louis) 
will come into existence with welfare seven. Should a utilitarian consequen-
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tialist government that purely seeks to maximize welfare support the man-
dates under this circumstance?  
This utilitarian government could have two different maximization rules. 
It could be a total utilitarian, which determines the best state of the world by 
summing up the welfare of all individuals in existence. Or, it could be an aver-
age utilitarian, which would add together the utility of all individuals in the 
population and then divide that sum by the number of individuals in the popu-
lation. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 139–43 (rev. ed. 1999). 
On the total utilitarian view, opposing the mandate is preferable because the 
total with the mandate in place is 33 (4 + 4 + 4 + 7 + 7 + 7) while the total with 
it not in place is 21 (7 + 7 + 7). On the average utilitarian view, supporting the 
mandate is not preferable because the average utility with the mandate in 
place is 7 ((7 + 7 + 7) / 3) versus 5.5 with the mandate in place ((4 + 4 + 4 + 7 + 
7 + 7) / 6). On these numbers, it appears the choice of total or average utilita-
rianism as the maximization rule would be dispositive.  
In fact, though, things are much more complicated for four reasons. First, 
this conclusion is to some extent dependent on the numbers we have chosen. 
In the first hypothetical, we have assumed that adopted children “catch up” 
fully (in utility terms) when adopted to the children born under IVF to begin 
with. This need not necessarily be so. Many studies suggest welfare outcomes 
may be dependent on the age at which the children were adopted. See, e.g., D. 
Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adop-
tion: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 394 (2005). Consider in 
this regard a different way the world might work: 
Hypothetical 2: There exist three children (Larry, Moe, and Curly) waiting 
for adoption, each with welfare four. If IVF mandates are not in place, they 
will be adopted, and their welfare will increase by one unit to five. If, by con-
trast, the mandates are in place, none of them will be adopted (and their wel-
fare will remain at 4), but three new children (Jan, Marsha, and Cindy) will 
come into existence each with welfare nine. The total utilitarian still favors 
the mandate since 39 (4 + 4 + 4 + 9 + 9 + 9) is greater than 15 (5 + 5 + 5). But 
now the average utilitarian would also favor the mandate since 6.5 ((4 + 4 + 4 
+ 9 +9 + 9) / 6) is greater than 5 ((5 + 5 +5) / 3). To be sure, we could present 
different sets of numbers that would have the opposite implication (making 
total utilitarianism oppose the mandate). The broader point is that how this 
tradeoff works out is dependent on other facts about the world, namely the 
utility boost that children waiting for adoption get as compared to the utility of 
children born from IVF.  
Second, the situation is still more complex for the utilitarian in that we 
have thus far been assuming that the presence of the mandate means that we 
are trading-off improving the life of one adopted child versus bringing into ex-
istence one new child from IVF. That need not be the case, and there is no rea-
son to believe the world should be so neatly 1:1, as we suggested above. If, in 
fact, the mandate increases the number of children born through IVF more 
than the number of children adopted, things should look better for the 
mandate on either total or average utilitarian grounds. Along these lines, con-
sider this variation on the first hypothetical:  
Hypothetical 3: There exist three children (Alvin, Simon, and Theodore) 
waiting for adoption, each with welfare four. If IVF mandates are not in place, 
only Alvin will be adopted, and his welfare will increase by three to seven. If, 
by contrast, the mandates are in place, none of the three children will be 
adopted (and their welfare will remain at four), but three new children (Huey, 
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account these interests seems to make the case for the substi-
tution theory still less plausible. But even in this expanded 
form our lens may be too narrow, and expanding our calculus 
 
Dewey, and Louis) will come into existence with welfare seven. The total utili-
tarian favors the mandate because 33 (4 + 4 + 4 + 7 + 7 + 7) is greater than 15 
(7 + 4 + 4). The average utilitarian now also favors the mandate because 5.5 
((4 + 4 + 4 + 7 + 7 + 7) / 6) is greater than 5 ((7 + 4 + 4) / 3). 
Third, we have been engaging in the opposite simplification that we used 
in the main text, now trading-off child welfare between adopted and IVF-born 
children but ignoring parental welfare from IVF. It can be the case under ei-
ther total or average utilitarianism that the combination of the welfare im-
provement to parents who want to have genetically related children plus the 
welfare of the new children who come into existence together is greater than 
the welfare loss to children awaiting for adoption. On the flip side, we would 
have to consider things like welfare losses to prospective parents who attempt 
but do not succeed in their IVF usage. 
Fourth, to the extent average and total utilitarianism conflict, there is al-
so the further problem of which rule to adopt in population-changing cases, or 
whether to adopt a mixed rule. This introduces a host of other complications 
relating to choosing between what Derek Parfit has called “the Repugnant 
Conclusion” and “the Mere Addition Paradox.” PARFIT, supra note 100, at 388–
90, 419–21; see also, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: 
GENETICS AND JUSTICE 254–55 (2000); Cohen, supra note 100 (unpublished 
manuscript). There are also further questions of whether our obligations to 
improve the lot of existing individuals (who can be harmed if their lives go 
badly) ought to take precedence over creating new people (who will not be 
harmed if not brought into existence) as opposed to merely considering the to-
tal or average welfare of two possible populations. For sophisticated argu-
ments that we ought not ignore the welfare of individuals who will come into 
existence, see, for example, LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 387–90 (2008); John Broome, Should We Value Popula-
tion?, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 399, 406 (2005); Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for 
Bad Genes?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1369–88 (2002). Broome suggests that 
while the welfare of these not-yet-existing children should count in evaluating 
the goodness of a state of the world, it may not create a responsibility to pro-
duce these children, thus avoiding the problematic suggestion that there is a 
duty to reproduce in a way that maximizes total utility. Broome, supra, at 
412–13. That may be true, but that qualification does not necessarily apply to 
the question of what steps the state should take in facilitating reproduction 
through IVF access among other means. 
All this constitutes further considerations that the proponents of the sub-
stitution theory—to the extent they are understood as making a consequen-
tialist case for their antimandate position—would need to speak to in order to 
make good on their normative claim. We do not pretend to have answers to all 
of these points—one of the reasons why we frame this Part as concerns with 
the substitution theory’s claim rather than as a strong statement of the oppo-
site claim—but they do require an answer before the substitution theory 
(again assuming the truth of its empirical proposition) can entail the norma-
tive conclusion its proponents assign to it. 
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wider still would add more complexity but also more indeter-
minacy.142 
Even if a government concludes that the interest in provid-
ing homes for adopted children trumps the interests of those 
who want to have genetically related children, it faces the fur-
ther question of whether it is fair for the solution to fall on the 
shoulders of the infertile rather than being shared equally 
among all members of society. On egalitarian or prioritarian 
grounds, one might think it particularly unfair to single out 
those who are infertile, and already worse off in that respect 
compared to society at large, to shoulder such an obligation; in-
stead, perhaps they ought to be the first to be relieved of that 
obligation.143 The large number of children in need of adopted 
 
 142. In focusing on the prospective-parent/adopted-child/potential-child-
from-IVF triad, we have thus bracketed many externalized costs and benefits 
from the decision of whether to favor reproduction versus adoption. Among 
other things, a true global utilitarian calculus would have to factor in the in-
terests of prospective grandparents and other relatives in the parents having 
genetic children, the welfare benefit to doctors who have greater demand for 
IVF services (and the increased tax revenue stemming from it), and the wel-
fare gains of the foster parents who retain children for longer periods of time 
without the mandates. On the other side of the ledger, the state would have to 
consider the social cost of the delays in the adoption of these children in do-
mains such as the state’s subsidization of foster care, the decrease in these 
children’s future earning potential (and thus tax revenue) or increase in pro-
pensity toward delinquency, and so on. Trying to anticipate, assign values to, 
and then compare totals on each of the thousands of variables relevant to this 
truly global utilitarian question is an impossible task, and thus the public pol-
icy analysis will have to draw the line somewhere. Wherever that line is 
drawn, though, our point above about the ratio of IVF births facilitated to 
adoptions delayed or prevented, and the important empirical question of effect 
size we discuss below, will be crucial. 
 143. To be sure, Bartholet at least would clearly want to increase adoptions 
by all elements of society and her focus on reproductive technology access is 
likely pragmatic as a promising point of influence. Cf. BARTHOLET, supra note 
101, at 29–30.  
A further normative problem in attaching weight to the reproductive 
technology-adoption tradeoff stems from what are sometimes called “agent-
centered prerogatives.” In responding to the critique that consequentialism 
impermissibly alienates an agent from his own life projects, some have urged a 
modification in which we recognize that in some cases an individual may per-
missibly depart from his duty to produce the “best overall state of affairs” in 
order to pursue important life projects necessary for the integrity of the per-
son. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 5–6, 20–
23 (1982). On a theory that made room for such prerogatives, one might make 
the case that having genetically related children is so important to one’s life 
projects that even if failing to adopt diminishes overall welfare, one is justified 
in making that choice. That claim may be controversial—especially for those 
discussed above who think that insurance mandates covering IVF are part of 
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homes is a tragedy, but it is not a tragedy the infertile are, in 
particular, causally responsible for creating, and the fertile are 
just as capable as the infertile of acting to correct the tragedy. 
Still, pragmatically, given normative and constitutional protec-
tions for a noninterference (negative) right to procreate (at 
least through coitus), and thus the state’s likely inability to 
limit natural reproduction to promote adoption, controlling 
access to reproductive technologies (at most a matter of a posi-
tive-liberty right to procreate) may be the only potent lever 
available to the state to induce choices away from reproduc-
tion.144 
However, the mere fact that this may be the only way for-
ward does not answer the question of whether it is just to im-
pose the burden selectively on the infertile. Often we conclude 
that a duty to avoid acting unjustly appropriately constrains us 
from pursuing welfare-maximizing initiatives. Here, however, 
the situation is more complex in that the question is not merely 
doing injustice to improve welfare, but instead choosing be-
tween failing one of two groups to whom we owe duties of jus-
tice. To put it crudely, should one act unjustly to avoid doing a 
potentially “greater” injustice? That is, should one decline to 
meet the health needs of the infertile—because they are in-
strumentally useful as a mere means to get more adoption—to 
avoid failing to meet the needs of children waiting for adoption? 
That is a difficult question that resists a domain-general an-
swer; among other things, it depends on having a theory of how 
to compare the “size” of injustices (which may be further com-
plicated when, as here, the injustices impinge on different 
spheres) as well as some views about one’s causal role and re-
sponsibility in bringing about different kinds of injustices (i.e., 
is the state more responsible for failing to meet the needs of in-
fertile individuals by not passing insurance mandates than it is 
for the fact that children are waiting to be adopted?). Filling in 
those ideas in a defensible way is something the substitution 
theory must do to overcome this objection.  
 
the social construction of genetic parentage as an important life goal rather 
than serving as a way of satisfying an already existing goal—but it represents 
another difficulty with the normative side of the substitution theory. 
 144. For a further discussion of distinctions between positive and negative 
liberty conceptions of a right to procreate in normative and constitutional 
thinking, see, for example, I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights 
Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1139–46 (2008). 
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A different response to the potential injustice problem 
would be for the substitution theory to claim we all do already 
collectively bear some of the burden of adoption through the tax 
system—the tax credits for adoption-related expenses reduce 
the general revenue raised through the taxes we all pay145—
and it is not clear that we have an obligation to bear that bur-
den “in kind” rather than through redistributive finances. This 
response, however, leaves open the question of where our col-
lective obligation ends and whether we have done enough. For 
example, the current adoption tax credits are quite small and 
one might wonder whether a more potent adoption tax credit, 
or other forms of support for parents who choose to adopt, 
might mitigate concerns about diminishing adoptions due to in-
creased reproductive technology access.146 Thus, proponents of 
the substitution theory must explain why we do not bear an ob-
ligation to try measures like a larger adoption tax credit whose 
cost we all share in as a way to improve adoption rates before 
rationing access to reproductive technologies to achieve that 
same goal.147 
D. DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS 
Thus far we have discussed adoption writ large in the nor-
mative sense. But the introduction of these mandates may have 
 
 145. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 146. A 2000 Treasury Report to Congress on the adoption tax credit sug-
gested it was not clear how much the credit (as it then existed) affected adop-
tions. It did suggest its role in promoting special needs adoptions (because 
those adoptions are already heavily subsidized) was unlikely and its role in 
promoting foreign adoptions was likely. Report to the Congress on Tax Benefits 
for Adoption, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, 3–5 (Oct. 3, 2000), http://www 
.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/adoption.pdf; see Pratt, supra note 6, at 
1178–80. This does not, of course, answer the question of what effect a much 
more generous set of tax credits for adoption might have. 
At least theoretically, another possibility would be for the state to refuse 
to aid individuals in achieving medical care for infertility for the instrumental 
purpose of improving adoption rates, but then attempt to compensate those 
individuals for the setting back of that interest. As a practical matter, it is not 
clear this would work since as long as the compensation is fungible with cash 
it might offer an alternative way to finance infertility treatments. At a theo-
retical level, such singling out might also counterproductively increase the 
stigma of being infertile and reinforce the way in which the state has selective-
ly chosen the infertile as its instruments to improve adoption rates. 
 147. Improvements to the foster care system might also somewhat mitigate 
these concerns, although the United States’ historical record on this score should 
make us less sanguine about this prospect. Cf. SPAR, supra note 1, at 176–78 
(describing the relationship between adoption and the foster care system). 
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differential effects on international adoptions versus domestic 
adoptions. Indeed, given the higher expenses involved in inter-
national adoptions and the larger pool of available infants,148 
one might make an arm-chair prediction that international 
adoptions would be the main margin of substitution. In the 
next Part we go beyond the arm chair and examine the ques-
tion with real data. In this section, though, we discuss the addi-
tional normative complication of whether the substitution 
theory ought to consider diminutions/delays in international 
adoptions as good a reason to oppose these mandates as dimi-
nutions/delays in domestic adoptions. We briefly discuss two 
reasons why the answer might be “no,” the second of which em-
broils us in debates between different approaches to interna-
tional justice. The purpose of this discussion is not to conclu-
sively answer the question, but rather to demonstrate the ways 
in which the domestic versus international adoption distinction 
further complicates the normative case for the substitution 
theory—a case that we have argued has yet to be fully defended 
even in the domestic context. 
The first reason why the international adoption context 
may be different is that the U.S. government may conclude that 
decreased international adoption by U.S. citizens (as opposed to 
domestic adoptions) is actually a desirable effect. A number of 
authors have suggested that international adoption is rife with 
abuse and is a form of exploitation or cultural theft that makes 
these children, their families, and their countries worse off.149 
Others passionately disagree and critique these claims.150 We 
do not purport to resolve these contentious issues here, but ra-
ther merely flag them as reasons why U.S. policy makers may 
not find any possible negative effect on international adoptions 
a cause for concern, even if they believe that diminutions in 
domestic adoptions are worrisome. 
Second, even if one were to conclude that, all things being 
equal, international adoption furthers the welfare of children 
abroad waiting to be adopted, there may be reasons why the 
 
 148. See Pratt, supra note 6, at 1178–80. 
 149. See, e.g., Bernie D. Jones, International and Transracial Adoptions: 
Toward a Global Critical Race Feminist Practice?, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & 
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 43, 44 (2004); Richard F. Storrow, Quests For Conception: 
Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 
295, 322–23 (2005).  
 150. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the 
Human Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 177–91 (2007). 
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U.S. government might still choose to privilege the interests of 
their own citizens to become genetic parents over the interests 
of foreign children in being adopted. To put the point forcefully, 
while it is evident why the U.S. government should care about 
the welfare of American children waiting for adoption, it is less 
clear whether it should care about negative effects on the life 
prospects of those waiting for adoption internationally. In other 
words, as a matter of political philosophy, a government could 
believe that its obligations of distributive justice end at its na-
tional border; that is, it may take a statist rather than a cos-
mopolitan view of international justice obligations. It might al-
so adopt an intermediate view wherein the interests of those 
abroad count for something, but less than the interests of com-
parable U.S. citizens. Let us say more about each of those fami-
lies of views and their implications in this setting. 
If U.S. states adopted a cosmopolitan view, such as that 
urged by Martha Nussbaum and Charles Beitz, the interests of 
individuals count equally whether they are members of the na-
tion-state or outside of its borders,151 and the analysis is the 
same whether the diminution in adoptions occurs domestically 
or internationally. Such a view often stems from the desire to 
avoid moral arbitrariness in the distribution of the things we 
value by not treating “national boundaries as having funda-
mental moral significance,” and/or from a recognition that the 
increasing interdependence of today’s world erodes the case for 
limiting redistributive duties to within the nation-states.152 
On the other extreme, if the U.S. government adopted a 
statist view of international justice, such as the ones espoused 
by John Rawls or Thomas Nagel on distributive justice con-
cerns,153 the interests of the states’ citizens in this regard will 
 
 151. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 143–53 (1979); NUSSBAUM, supra note 80, at 291, 313–20 (offering 
a cosmopolitan view based on the Capabilities/Functioning approach); Charles 
R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 360, 373–83 
(1975) (offering a cosmopolitan Rawlsian view). 
 152. BEITZ, supra note 151, at 151; see also THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING 
RAWLS 247 (1989) (arguing that the country into which one is born “is just one 
further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social 
class), one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are 
. . . present from birth,” and that allowing one’s entitlement to primary goods 
to depend on this fact would be morally arbitrary); Beitz, supra note 151, at 
367, 373–76. 
 153. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 30–64, 93 n.6, 107–20 
(1999); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
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trump (whether one’s approach to distributive justice is utili-
tarian, prioritarian, or sufficientarian); that is, given a choice, 
one should favor increasing the welfare of American would-be 
genetic parents through increased reproductive technology 
access even though it comes at the cost of reducing internation-
al adoptions and therefore diminishing the welfare of foreign 
children waiting to be adopted. This is so because the interests 
of those living abroad do not count for distributive justice pur-
poses. Statist views of this sort are premised on the idea that 
an obligation toward distributive justice depends on the exis-
tence of a scheme of social cooperation that involves reciprocal 
benefits and burdens and mutual coercion, and while that 
structure is present among nation-states, it is absent in the in-
ternational order.154 That said, while these theories recognize 
no distributive-justice based duties to those living abroad, they 
continue to endorse a duty to aid burdened states155 and hu-
manitarian duties to those living abroad.156 It might be possible 
 
113, 118, 127–30 (2005). 
 154. See generally RAWLS, supra note 153, at 34–35 (explaining that 
people’s reasoning and rationale for “accepting functional social and economic 
inequalities in their liberal society” leads to people offering to others “fair 
terms of political and social cooperation”); Nagel, supra note 153, at 128–30 
(explaining that “we are assigned a role in the collective life of a particular so-
ciety” and that “our active cooperation . . . cannot be legitimately done without 
justification—otherwise it is pure coercion”). 
 155. Rawls has in mind a duty to assist “burdened societies” whose “histor-
ical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered 
regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult if not impossible.” RAWLS, supra 
note 153, at 90. Burdened societies, as Rawls uses the term, “lack the political 
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the ma-
terial and technological resources needed to be well-ordered,” but with assis-
tance can over time become able to “manage their own affairs reasonably and 
rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered 
Peoples.” Id. at 106, 111. Being a well-ordered society requires having a “de-
cent scheme of political and social cooperation,” meaning that the state se-
cures “a special class of urgent [human] rights, such as freedom from slavery 
and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of eth-
nic groups from mass murder and genocide,” and a right to formal equality. Id. 
at 66, 79. This further requires that citizens view their law as imposing duties 
and obligations “fitting with their common good idea of justice” and not “as 
mere commands imposed by force,” and that officials believe that “the law is 
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice,” not “supported merely by 
force.” Id. at. 66–67. For more on this concept and its boundaries, see, for ex-
ample, Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Pref-
erence for Persecuted People, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 413, 432 (2006), and Mathias 
Risse, What We Owe to the Global Poor, 9 J. ETHICS 81, 109 (2005). 
 156. Nagel suggests that “there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow 
human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and early 
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to ground concerns over the effects of IVF mandates on interna-
tional adoption in such duties, though we are skeptical that the 
duty to aid burdened states can serve as an adequate founda-
tion for such concerns,157 and cautious about any attempt to 
ground the concern in the duty to provide humanitarian aid.158 
 
death from easily preventable diseases” such that “some form of humane as-
sistance from the well-off to those in extremis is clearly called for quite apart 
from any demand of justice, if we are not simply ethical egoists.” Nagel, supra 
note 153, at 118. Although he is self-admittedly vague, he thinks “[t]he norma-
tive force of the most basic human rights against violence, enslavement, and 
coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate 
danger, depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other people’s shoes.” 
Id. at 131. He speaks of obligations to relieve others, whatever their state, 
“from extreme threats and obstacles to [the freedom to pursue their own ends] 
if we can do so without serious sacrifice of our own ends.” Id. In a similar vein, 
Michael Blake suggests a duty to provide “access to goods and circumstances” 
to enable people “to live as rationally autonomous agents, capable of selecting 
and pursuing plans of life in accordance with individual conceptions of the good,” 
and singles out “famine, extreme poverty, crippling social norms such as caste 
hierarchies” as the kinds of things against which we have obligations to inter-
vene notwithstanding the citizenship of the victim. Michael Blake, Distributive 
Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257, 271 (2001). 
 157. Locating an obligation as to international adoption in the duty to aid 
burdened states faces at least two problems. First, such an obligation would 
only attach to a subset of source countries for international adoptees who meet 
the definition of “burdened states,” which may include some, but certainly not 
all, of the countries from which international adoptees come. Second, and more 
critically, the kind of institution-building assistance Rawls has in mind as part 
of the duty to aid burdened states—that is, assisting the state “to realize and 
preserve just (or decent) institutions,” RAWLS, supra note 153, at 107—seems 
like a poor fit for a duty toward international adoptions. Whatever it may do 
for the actual children being adopted, it is hard to see this international adop-
tion as helping to build just institutions in the state these children leave behind. 
 158. The duty toward humanitarian aid emphasized by Nagel is more 
promising in fit, but will likely apply only to a subset of international adoption 
cases. While the life prospects of many children waiting for adoption abroad 
are poor, it is unclear whether they are subject to “extreme threats” such as 
“starvation or severe malnutrition and early death from easily preventable 
diseases[.]” Nagel, supra note 153, at 118, 131. For some sending countries 
there is a plausible argument that the answer will be “yes,” but for many oth-
ers the answer will be “no.” We ought to be cautious in specifying the level of 
deprivation needed to trigger these humanitarian duties since the resulting 
duties are not adoption-specific; that is, if we decide a particular kind of depri-
vation is enough to trigger our duty to rescue these children waiting for adop-
tion, we will bear a comparable duty to all citizens of that foreign country in 
comparable conditions. Too expansive a conception of the humanitarian duty 
will result in few meaningful differences between obligations of humanitarian 
and distributive justice and may have significant implications for issues like 
our general immigration policy that Nagel (and others) have sought to avoid. 
See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 153, at 129–30 (discussing immigration). One 
might also wonder whether such a duty, if it exists, is better discharged 
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Finally, on intermediate positions on international justice, 
such as those put forth by Joshua Cohen, Charles Sable, and 
Norman Daniels, the interests of those outside of the coercive 
structure of the nation-state count for something in distributive 
justice terms, but they do not count the same as the interests of 
those within it.159 The authors call these duties of “inclu-
sion.”160 While conceding to the statists the importance of “joint 
authors[hip] of the coercively imposed system,” for full-blown 
duties of distributive justice, these authors argue that lesser 
duties of inclusion might attach under less demanding circum-
stances.161 Cohen and Sable suggest they may be triggered in 
part by the actions of international bodies such as the WTO. 
That is, “[e]ven when rule-making and applying bodies lack 
their own independent power to impose sanctions through coer-
cion,” they still shape conduct “by providing incentives and 
permitting the imposition of sanctions.”162 And since “with-
drawing from them may be costly to members (if only because 
 
through financial aid to those in distress abroad rather than setting back the 
interests of our own citizens who would like access to IVF. 
In any event, pursuing this path would suggest at least three steps of 
analysis going forward. First, we would have to make a determination as to 
whether the plight of children from particular sending countries is severe 
enough to activate humanitarian duties. Second, we would have to determine 
what effect IVF mandates have on adoptions from those particular countries—
our approach below does not attempt to offer country-by-country analysis, nor 
could it have done so with the econometric frameworks we use given the small 
sample size that would result from splitting by country. Finally, we would 
have to determine whether noncoverage of IVF as a humanitarian duty would 
entail a “serious sacrifice of our own ends,” to use Nagel’s term, id. at 131, an 
analysis that would presumably depend on not only the answers to the two 
prior questions (How bad is the deprivation these children are saved from? 
How many of the worst deprived children would be affected by abolishing the 
IVF mandates?), but also to the more fundamental questions discussed above 
as to whether we think the State has an obligation to assist in fertility as part 
of ensuring the health of its citizenry, and on whom the obligations to assist 
those waiting for adoption justly fall. 
 159. See DANIELS, supra note 82, at 346 (proposing an approach that “fo-
cus[es] on a middle ground between strongly statist claims that egalitarian 
requirements of social justice are solely the domain of the nation-state and its 
well-defined basic structure and strong cosmopolitan claims that principles of 
justice apply to individuals globally, regardless of the relations in which they 
stand or the institutional structures through which they interact” (citations 
omitted)); see also Joshua Cohen & Charles Sable, Extra Rempublicam Nulla 
Justitia?, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 147, 154–70.  
 160. DANIELS, supra note 82, at 345–54; Cohen & Sable, supra note 159, at 
147, 154–55. 
 161. Nagel, supra note 153, at 128–30. 
 162. Cohen & Sable, supra note 159, at 165. 
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of the sometimes considerable loss of benefits),” it follows that 
in some “attenuated but significant way, our wills—the wills of 
all subject to the rule-making authority—have been implicated, 
sufficiently much that rules of this type can only be imposed 
with a special justification.”163 Daniels suggests that certain 
kinds of international independencies may also give rise to du-
ties of inclusion. He gives the example of medical migration 
(“brain drain”), and argues that the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) requirement that countries like Cameroon make 
severe cutbacks in their publicly funded health care systems in 
order to reduce deficits resulting in poorer working conditions 
for medical personnel (a “push” factor), combined with the at-
tempt by the U.K. and other OECD countries to recruit medical 
personnel from developing countries (a “pull” factor), combine 
to give rise to a duty on the part of Western countries and the 
IMF to address the ill-effects of this migration.164 Under this 
framework, we would face two sets of questions before we could 
determine what weight the U.S. government should give to po-
tential diminutions in foreign adoptions. First, we would need 
to determine whether any of the triggering conditions for these 
lesser duties of inclusion are met in this context. General inter-
dependence is not enough on this framework; instead, we would 
need to determine whether there is quasi-coercive or interde-
pendence in the adoption (or at least the family formation) con-
text specifically. Second, if those triggering conditions are met, 
we would need to determine the content of the duties of inclu-
sion, including how much to count the interests of those abroad, 
how much children abroad benefit from adoption, and how 
much would-be genetic parents benefit from access to these 
technologies. Until one can answer these complex questions, it 
is not clear what weight to attach to international adoptions on 
this intermediate framework.  
We do not pretend to offer a choice between these three ap-
proaches to international justice in this Article, nor do we 
present this list of theories as exhaustive. Instead, we merely 
want to emphasize how this extranormative question may po-
tentially differentiate the issue of diminution of international 
adoptions from diminution of domestic ones due to IVF subsidi-
zation. 
 
 163. Id. at 168. 
 164. DANIELS, supra note 82, at 338–39.  
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More generally, our goal in this Part has been to show that 
all of these normative considerations stand between an empiri-
cal finding that insurance mandates covering IVF are asso-
ciated with diminutions in domestic or international adoptions 
and the normative conclusion that those mandates are there-
fore problematic. What we have said here does not stand as a 
full condemnation of that normative conclusion, but rather an 
acknowledgment of the numerous moral theory questions pro-
ponents of this position would have to defend to reach the con-
clusion they have urged. To put the point another way, after an 
empirical showing of the substitution effect, there are many 
ways to “get off the bus,” leading to the conclusion that state-
level insurance mandates should be condemned. 
All of this has departed from the assumption that the sub-
stitution theory is, in fact, empirically sound. Does the in-
creased access to reproductive technologies actually decrease 
the number of adoptions? We now turn to that question. 
III.  THE EMPIRICAL QUESTION: IS THE INTRODUCTION 
OF IVF INSURANCE MANDATES ASSOCIATED WITH 
DECREASES IN ADOPTION?   
This Part focuses on the empirical claim central to the 
substitution theory—that the introduction of insurance man-
dates covering IVF is associated with a decrease in adoption. 
We begin by discussing the intuitive appeal of this claim and 
the qualitative interview and survey results that seem to sup-
port it. We then describe our study design, which uses several 
econometric frameworks and several data-sets to measure the 
effect of the introduction of state mandates on IVF utilization 
and adoption, as well as the relationship between increases in 
IVF utilization and adoptions. Our primary finding is that 
while the introduction of the most comprehensive mandates is 
associated with an increase in IVF utilization, we do not find 
strong evidence that the introduction of comprehensive man-
dates is associated with a decrease in either domestic or inter-
national adoptions of nonrelative children, the substitution 
theory’s central claim.165 
 
 165. See supra Part II.C. 
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A. THE INTUITIVE APPEAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION THEORY 
Intuitively enough, scholars like Bartholet and Neumann 
have assumed that increased access to IVF through state-level 
insurance mandates leads to a diminution in adoptions.166 Al-
though these authors do not explicitly explain why that as-
sumption might be reasonable, one explanation stems from 
what we know from prior empirical examinations of the rela-
tionship between infertility, adoption, and reproductive tech-
nology use.167 Several studies show that infertility, and prior 
attempts at fertility treatments, are associated with consider-
ing adoption or actually adopting.168 And while not all adoptive 
parents are motivated by infertility, a 1996 study that surveyed 
2589 adoptive parents in California found that sixty-nine per-
cent said they had adopted because they were unable to have a 
biological child, while only twenty-seven percent identified hu-
 
 166. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
 167. Pushing slightly in the other direction is a literature in sociology and 
economics on peer effects and reproduction, which suggests that individuals’ 
preferences as to the number of children they have may depend on their ob-
servation of the number of children others have. See Susan Cott Watkins, 
From Local to National Communities: The Transformation of Demographic 
Regimes in Western Europe, 1870-1960, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 241 
(1990); Ilyana Kuziemko, Is Having Babies Contagious? Estimating Fertility 
Peer Effects Between Siblings (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://www.princeton.edu/~kuziemko/fertility_11_29_06.pdf. This view 
might suggest that increased reproductive technology use among one part of 
the population might stimulate increased adoption rates in the other. 
 168. For example, drawing on data from the 1995 National Survey of Fami-
ly Growth (NSFG), a survey done on a national sample of 10,000 American 
women ages fifteen to forty-four seeking information on adoption attitudes 
among other subjects, Anjani Chandra and her colleagues found that having 
considered adoption, having taken steps toward adoption, and having actually 
adopted was more common among women who had suffered some fertility im-
pairment and who had previously used fertility services. See ANJANI CHANDRA 
ET AL., ADOPTION, ADOPTION SEEKING, AND RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 6–7 tbls.2 & 3 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ad-
vance Data Report No. 306, 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
ad/ad306.pdf. Specifically, the study found that 44.9 percent of women who 
had ever considered adoption reported impaired fecundity and 41.1 percent re-
ported having tried infertility services, for those currently seeking or planning 
to adopt the equivalent numbers were 54.8 percent and 59.4 percent. Id.; see 
also Numbers and Trends: Persons Seeking to Adopt, CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY, 2–3 (Mar. 2005), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_seek.pdf (ex-
plaining the data from the 1995 NSFG). A similar study using the 2002 NSFG 
data also found that “infertility, infecundity, and using infertility services 
were highly significant predictors of having sought to adopt” among both His-
panic and non-Hispanic white women. Lamb, supra note 48, at 166–69 tbl.2. 
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manitarian and/or religious reasons for adopting.169 Studies us-
ing qualitative interview methods paint a similar picture. For 
example, in a 2003 interview study of thirty-nine couples who 
had adopted, Judith Daniluk and Joss Hurtig-Mitchell found 
that all but two couples suggested they saw adoption as a 
“backup plan” if infertility treatment failed, but indicated it 
was a reality they expected never to face.170 The couples also 
repeatedly stressed their need to try everything to have geneti-
cally related children before trying adoption.171 As Susan Ap-
pleton has aptly observed in interpreting and summarizing the 
results of these kinds of studies, “most couples turn to medical 
treatment when first experiencing a fertility problem, reinforc-
ing the ‘second best’ or ‘last resort’ status of adoption.”172 
Perhaps because of this kind of data and the intuitive na-
ture of the claim, no one has yet investigated the empirical bo-
na fides of the substitution theory’s contention that increasing 
access to reproductive technology will lead to a diminution in 
adoptions. Further, even if increased reproductive technology 
access is associated with a statistically significant decrease in 
adoption, a public-policy maker must also consider how large 
the effect size is,173 a question that has also gone unexamined.  
 
 169. Marianne Berry, Preparation, Support, and Satisfaction of Adoptive 
Families in Agency and Independent Adoptions, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. 
WORK J. 157, 161, 165 tbl.2 (1996). Those seeking to adopt children from Haiti 
in the aftermath of the recent disaster give a poignant reminder that some 
who adopt do so out of humanitarian impulses rather than as a way of build-
ing a family in the face of infertility. See, e.g., U.S. Works to Expedite Adop-
tions of Haitian Children, CNN.COM (Jan. 18, 2010, 9:57 PM) http://www.cnn 
.com/2010/US/01/18/haiti.us.orphans/index.html. 
 170. Judith C. Daniluk & Joss Hurtig-Mitchell, Themes of Hope and Heal-
ing: Infertile Couples’ Experiences of Adoption, 81 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 389, 
392 (2003). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Appleton, supra note 26, at 427; see also Frank van Balen et al., 
Choices and Motivations of Infertile Couples, 31 PATIENT EDUC. & 
COUNSELING 19, 19–20, 22 (1997) (showing in a 1992 study of 131 infertile 
couples in the Netherlands that ninety-five percent of these couples considered 
and eighty-six percent actually used medical help when faced with infertility, 
compared to only thirty-five percent who considered and five percent who ac-
tually used adoption). 
 173. To use an obviously slanted example purely for illustrative purposes, 
even if one could say that a measure increasing access to reproductive technol-
ogy had a statistically significant effect on adoption at the p = .01 level, some 
would not be dissuaded from favoring the measure if, per year, it enabled 
10,000 additional women to conceive children through reproductive technolo-
gy, but only resulted in a decrease of five children being adopted. This is just 
  
536 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:485 
 
In the remainder of this Article, we examine these empiri-
cal questions, which must be resolved before evaluating possi-
ble policy approaches to improving access to reproductive tech-
nology. We study the question by considering an important 
mechanism of improving access to reproductive technologies in 
the United States—state-level insurance mandates. Contrary 
to the assumption of the substitution theory and the consensus 
in the literature, we do not find substantial evidence that re-
productive technology subsidies (at least in the form of state-
level insurance mandates) diminish domestic or international 
adoptions. In some ways, the findings as to international adop-
tions (where we have the most data) are the most striking blow 
against the substitution theory because, as we alluded to above, 
from an arm-chair economics perspective one would have 
guessed that this was the margin along which substitution was 
most likely both because such adoptions are more expensive 
and because there are too few healthy, white, and very young 
children available for domestic adoption to meet that demand, 
such that many have turned to international adoption.174 
B. STUDY DESIGN 
In this section we set out the key features of our study, in-
cluding descriptions of the state-level mandates, the data-set 
we use to measure IVF utilization, the multiple data-sets we 
use to measure domestic (public and private) and international 
adoptions by U.S. citizens by state, and our three-pronged em-
pirical strategy. 
Our study design builds methodologically on a number of 
prior studies that examined the effect of reproductive technolo-
gy access on IVF utilization rates and found that the introduc-
tion of mandates increases utilization. Tarun Jain and coau-
thors studied the differences in utilization rates for IVF based 
on whether a state had an insurance mandate covering IVF 
(and of what type) for a single year, 1998, and found that IVF 
utilization rates were higher in states with comprehensive in-
surance mandates.175 Melinda Henne and M. Kate Bundorf ex-
 
to state the obvious fact that for most public policy decision makers effect sizes 
matter, not just statistical significance. See also Kathleen McCatney & Robert 
Rosenthal, Effect Size, Practical Importance, and Social Policy for Children, 71 
CHILD. DEV. 173, 178 (2000). As suggested above, on many plausible moral 
theoretical approaches to this problem, effect sizes also matter. 
 174. See supra notes 48, 49, 130 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Jain et al., supra note 90, at 663 (finding that complete coverage 
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amined differences between states with and without insurance 
mandates over a decade and also found that utilization rates 
were higher and increased most rapidly in states that have 
adopted comprehensive insurance mandates.176 Schmidt used 
differences in the enactment of mandates across states and 
over time and found that mandates significantly increased 
first-birth rates for women over thirty-five.177 Two later studies 
by Marianne Bitler and Lucie Schmidt found that the effects 
were largest for the use of ovulation-inducing drugs and artifi-
cial insemination and that insurance mandates did not amel-
iorate infertility disparities by race or education.178 In an un-
published study, Barton Hamilton and Brian McManus found 
that new IVF technologies diffused faster in states with more 
comprehensive insurance mandates.179 
None of these studies used adoption data to look at the ef-
fect of reproductive technology access on adoption rates, the 
main contribution of our study. In the course of this investiga-
tion, we also found that these studies may have somewhat 
overestimated the effect of these mandates in increasing IVF 
utilization. 
1. Division of State Mandates 
In the last twenty-five years, fifteen states have introduced 
state-level insurance mandates pertaining to IVF and other re-
productive technologies.180 But not all mandates are created 
equal; we would expect that mandates offering more generous 
coverage of reproductive technologies should have a greater 
positive impact on reproductive technology usage, and therefore 
a greater negative impact on adoption.181 We therefore divide 
 
mandates are associated with a 177 percent increase in IVF utilization, while 
partial coverage mandates are associated with a twenty percent increase in 
IVF utilization). 
 176. Henne & Bundorf, supra note 90, at 70. 
 177. Lucie Schmidt, Effects of Infertility Insurance Mandates on Fertility, 
26 J. HEALTH ECON. 431, 437 (2007). 
 178. Marianne Bitler & Lucie Schmidt, Health Disparities and Infertility: 
Impacts of State-Level Insurance Mandates, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 858, 
861–64 (2006). 
 179. Hamilton & McManus, supra note 90, 27–29. 
 180. Id. at 3. 
 181. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Substitution Theory, which sug-
gests that IVF takes the place of adoption in some cases); supra notes 175–79 
and accompanying text (discussing other studies indicating a correlation be-
tween insurance mandates and IVF utilization). 
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these mandates into four types: complete, partial, offer, and 
non-IVF. In a complete coverage state the mandate requires 
HMOs and other private insurers to cover the cost of infertility, 
including IVF. In Illinois, for example, all health insurance pol-
icies must cover at least four attempts at oocyte retrieval.182 
A partial coverage state also covers IVF, but does so less 
generously. The mandate in Hawaii, for example, requires all 
insurance policies to cover IVF only when the patient has a 
greater than five-year history of infertility, and then it requires 
covering the cost of only one IVF cycle.183 Mandate to offer 
states require insurance companies to offer one insurance poli-
cy that covers IVF to employers but does not require employers 
to adopt that policy.184 Texas is an example of a state that has 
such a mandate.185 A few states, such as Louisiana, have 
enacted reproductive technology mandates that specifically ex-
clude IVF but cover other reproductive technology services.186 
We call these non-IVF mandates. 
 
 182. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m(b)(B) (West 2008). Not all complete 
coverage states are exactly the same; there is heterogeneity in the exact terms 
of coverage. For example, in Rhode Island insurers can impose up to a twenty 
percent copayment and a lifetime cap of $100,000 in coverage. R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 27-18-30 (2008); see Jain et al., supra note 90, at 662. The authors are happy 
to share the survey of these laws prepared for this Article if contacted directly.  
 183. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (West 2005); see Jain et al., supra 
note 90, at 662. 
 184. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 177, at 432. 
 185. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.002–.004 (2009); see Schmidt, supra note 
177, at 433. 
 186. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1036(A) (West 2009) (“Any health in-
surance policy . . . , shall not exclude coverage for diagnosis and treatment of 
. . . infertility. This . . . shall not be construed to require coverage of the follow-
ing: [f ]ertility drugs[; i]n vitro fertilization or any other assisted reproductive 
technique[; or r]eversal of a tubal ligation, a vasectomy, or any other method of 
sterilization.”). This category is our most heterogeneous in that while Louisi-
ana, New York, and Ohio statutes are mandates to cover these other services, 
the California statute is merely a mandate to offer them. See CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10119.6(a) (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1036(A); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3221(a)(1)(C)(v) (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01(A)(1)(h) 
(LexisNexis 2009); Spar & Harington, supra note 97, at 52 & n.68 (2009). Still, 
we construct this category as a useful check on our methods, in that since 
these statutes explicitly exclude IVF they ought to have no statistically signifi-
cant effect on increasing IVF cycles. The effect on adoption one would predict 
from the introduction of these mandates is less clear: on the one hand, they 
might have some effect on adoption since they make some services for assisted 
reproduction more accessible; on the other hand, IVF is by far the most expen-
sive of the services, and it is the area in which we would expect to see the most 
substitution given subsidization. 
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Our categorization is broadly similar to other categoriza-
tions in the literature on the effect of insurance mandates cov-
ering IVF,187 although none of these studies has examined the 
effect of these mandates on adoption.188 Table 1 presents this 
categorization.189 It is also worth emphasizing that these in-
surance mandates often exclude single individuals or same-sex 
couples from coverage, implicitly or explicitly.190 
We use state and time variation as to where and when 
these mandates came into effect to examine the impact of sub-
sidization on IVF utilization and on adoption. Because complete 
mandates require the most generous coverage of IVF, if the 
substitution theory was correct we would expect these man-
dates to have the biggest positive impact on IVF utilization, 
and by that mechanism, the largest negative effect on adop-
tions (particularly domestic, nonrelated adoptions and interna-
tional adoptions). Thus, we focus on these complete mandates 
in our analysis, though we provide results for all forms of man-
dates. 
 
Table 1: State-Level Reproductive Technology Mandates 
and When They Were Introduced 
 
Mandate Type State Year 
Mandate for Complete  
Coverage 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
Illinois 
New Jersey 
1987 
1989 
1991 
2002 
 
 187. See Bitler & Schmidt, supra note 178, at 859; Hamilton & McManus, 
supra note 90, at 33; Henne & Bundorf, supra note 90, at 67; Jain et al., supra 
note 90, at 662; Schmidt, supra note 177, at 433, tbl.1. We discuss the diver-
gences in Appendix A. Appendix A, supra note 4. The text of all state man-
dates and their categorization was verified by one of this Article’s authors and 
by a research assistant. 
 188. As discussed in more depth below and set out in Appendix A, see su-
pra note 187, as a robustness check we reran our analyses using these other cat-
egorizations as well as reclassifying some “close calls,” but we found no changes 
in our core findings. 
 189. Except where otherwise noted, each of these was the first mandate 
covering IVF in that state. Where the two diverge we use the law’s effective 
date, not the enactment date. 
 190. See, e.g., Ellen Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Develop-
ment and Regulation of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 
16 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 89–90 (2006). 
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Mandate for Partial  
Coverage 
West Virginia 
Maryland 
Arkansas 
Hawaii 
Montana 
Ohio 
Connecticut 
1977 
1985 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1991 
2005 
Mandate to Offer Texas 
Connecticut 
1987 
1989 
Non-IVF Mandate California 
Ohio 
New York 
Louisiana 
1989 
1997 
1990 
2001 
191 
 
2. Data Description: IVF Utilization and Adoption 
Our data for the IVF utilization measures comes from clin-
ic-by-clinic data collected by the Centers for Disease Control 
 
 191. Three additional details are worth mentioning. First, Connecticut was 
originally a mandate-to-offer state, beginning in 1989, but in 2005 its mandate 
was changed so that it is now a partial-coverage mandate state. See CONN. 
GEN. STAT § 38a-509, -536 (2010). In our data analysis we code it accordingly, 
but here we list it in both categories. Second, there appears to be some contro-
versy about whether Ohio’s statute actually covers IVF. The actual statutory 
term “infertility services” is left undefined and there is an exclusion for “exper-
imental procedures.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01(A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 
2009). Until 1997, this was apparently interpreted as providing a mandate 
that covers IVF. See Schmidt, supra note 177, at 433 tbl.1, n.c. However, in 
1997 the Ohio Department of State interpreted the statute to cover “diagnostic 
and exploratory procedures . . . including surgical procedures to correct 
. . . disease . . . of the reproductive organs including but not limited to, endo-
metriosis, collapsed/clogged fallopian tubes or testicular failure,” but made 
clear that “in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote 
intrafallopian transfer are not essential . . . and are therefore not mandated 
benefits . . . .” OHIO DEP’T OF INS., BULLETIN 97-1 (1997), available at http:// 
www.insurance.ohio.gov/Legal/Bulletins/Documents/97-1.pdf, revised by OHIO 
DEP’T OF INS., BULLETIN 2009-07 (2009), available at http://www.insurance 
.ohio.gov/Legal/Bulletins/Documents/2009-07.pdf; see also Schmidt, supra note 
177, at 433 tbl.1, n.c. Therefore, we code Ohio as a partial mandate state from 
1991–1997 and a non-IVF mandate state from 1997 onwards, and we list it 
twice in the chart. Third, our auditing of the CDC data shows that Montana, 
despite having a mandate, does not have any IVF clinics. See 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). To be sure 
that this quirk did not create any problems with our analysis, we reran our 
results excluding Montana and found no differences in our core findings. 
Therefore, in what follows we include Montana as a mandate state.  
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and Prevention (CDC) since 1995.192 The data contains infor-
mation from the vast majority of clinics in the United States,193 
so we follow others in treating this data as exhaustive.194 We 
group this data by state. For our utilization measure, we use 
the number of fresh nondonor IVF cycles per 1000 women ages 
twenty-five to forty-four.195 This data is available from 1990 to 
2006. The 1995–2006 data was available in a ready-to-analyze 
form from CDC. For the years 1990–1994 we relied on hard-
coded data generously provided by Henne and Bundorf from 
their own work.196 
For adoption, our data comes from three sources.197 First, 
we obtain year-by-year adoption records from the National Da-
ta Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect Adoption and Foster 
Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) at Cornell 
University.198 States are required to report data to the system 
 
 192. The data are available at Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra 
note 191. The collection of these data was prompted by the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 
3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7), which requires all fertility clinics 
in the United States to report data. 
 193. See CDC, supra note 14, at 5 (noting its inclusion of 426 clinics and its 
belief “that almost all clinics that provided ART services in the United States 
throughout 2006 are represented in this report”). In each year’s report, the 
CDC also publishes a list of facilities that have closed or failed to properly re-
port data. In 2006, for example, there were fifty-seven clinics that failed to re-
port. See id. at 567–70.  
 194. See Hamilton & McManus, supra note 90, at 14; Jain et al., supra note 
90, at 662. 
 195. For the CDC’s definition of cycle, see CDC, supra note 14, at 4. We 
prefer to measure cycles rather than live births for two reasons. First, this is a 
standard measure used by others in the literature to determine IVF utiliza-
tion. See, e.g., Henne & Bundorf, supra note 90, at 69–70. Second, IVF is asso-
ciated with multiple births, e.g., Callahan et al., supra note 94, at 244, which 
we feared might complicate its use as a measure of a substitute for adoption, 
since individuals who receive IVF may only want one child but end up with a 
multiple birth.  
As we describe below, as a robustness check we reran our analyses using 
live births rather than cycles as a measure and found no change in our core 
findings. We also reran our analyses using information on cycles from frozen 
nondonor eggs and donor eggs and found no change in our core findings. 
 196. There are slight differences between the CDC and hard-coded data, 
but the differences do not affect our results since no state mandate change oc-
curred between 1994 and 1995 and our adoption data begins in 1995. 
 197. For each of our data sources, the “year” reported is the year the adop-
tion was completed. 
 198. For more on this data-set or to receive a copy, see AFCARS Details, 
NAT’L DATA ARCHIVE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, http://www.ndacan.cornell 
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on all children who are adopted through their child welfare 
agencies. This source includes detailed demographic data and 
information on the characteristics of birth and adoptive par-
ents.199 It breaks down adoptions by several types. Most useful-
ly for our purposes, it distinguishes adoptions by nonrelatives 
from other types of adoptions. As part of our empirical strategy, 
we look at the difference IVF mandate introduction has on dif-
ferent types of adoptions because it seems plausible that adop-
tions by nonrelatives should be more affected by improved 
access to IVF through state-level insurance mandates than 
should adoptions by relatives, on the theory that the availabili-
ty of an IVF alternative should be less influential in the moti-
vation to adopt a relative’s child than to adopt the child of a 
stranger.200 The AFCARS data is available from 1995 to 2006 
(but not available for every state in the early years).  
Since many of the changes in reproductive technology in-
surance mandates occur before 1995, we also use a second 
source of data from a study by Victor Flango and Carol Flango 
(later updated by them in their work for the Department of 
Health and Human Services), which covers the years 1987, 
1989–1992, 2001, and 2002, and which draws from several dif-
ferent data sources in an attempt to estimate all public and 
private adoptions for the years listed, including intercountry 
 
.edu/NDACAN/Datasets/Abstracts/DatasetAbstract_AFCARS_General.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 199. The AFCARS data also contains coding for each adoption as to wheth-
er a state or federal subsidy was given, as well as the size of the subsidy, id., 
although we do not make use of this coding in our analysis.  
 200. This approach is supported by work done using the aforementioned 
NSFG data-set, which suggests that while adoption of unrelated children is 
more common among women with impaired fecundity, the same pattern does 
not carry over for adoption of related children. William D. Mosher & Christine 
A. Bachrach, Understanding U.S. Fertility: Continuity and Change in the Na-
tional Survey of Family Growth, 1988-1995, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4, 8–9 
(1996). This result does not hold as strongly across all racial groups and so-
cioeconomic status (SES) levels in that “[b]lack families and families with low 
incomes and low levels of education are more likely than others to adopt a rel-
ative.” Id. at 9. To be sure, our assumption that if the substitution theory is 
correct IVF mandates should have a greater effect on related versus unrelated 
adoptions is not uncontestable, and confirming or disproving this assumption 
is a fruitful direction for further sociological or other work on the relation be-
tween adoption and IVF utilization. 
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adoptions.201 From this data-set we use their “total adoptions” 
measure, which we label “Public and Private” in all tables. 
Our third data-set comes from the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, which 
records the number of children (by year and by state) issued 
immigrant orphan visas in order to come to the United States 
for purposes of adoption.202 This data-set covers the years 1972 
to 2009 and overlaps with our IVF cycles data from 1990 to 
2006, and is labeled “Int’l” in all of our tables. 
In order to try to avoid omitted variables bias, we also col-
lected a number of control variables at the state level that vary 
by year and might be correlated with both insurance mandates 
and adoption rates. For example, if states that adopted insur-
ance mandates also had rising per capita income in the same 
period, an increase in IVF utilization that appeared after the 
enactment of mandates might reflect not the impact of the 
mandate but the increase in wealth. The solution is to control 
for changes over time in per capita income. We therefore con-
trol for a series of possible omitted variables, including the dis-
tribution of the female population in the ages most likely to use 
IVF (i.e., percentage of the population which is reproductive- 
age women ages twenty-five to twenty-nine, percentage of re-
productive-age women ages thirty to thirty-four, percentage of 
reproductive-age women ages thirty-five to thirty-nine), per ca-
pita personal income (inflation adjusted), distribution of the 
population based on race and ethnicity (i.e., non-Caucasian, 
non-Hispanic percentage of population, Hispanic percentage of 
population), and proportion of adults with a high school degree. 
Because the mandates only apply to workers with private in-
surance and are restricted to those with coverage from firms 
that do not self-insure,203 we also include proxies for the size of 
the population to which the mandates apply (i.e., unemploy-
 
 201. Victor Flango & Carol Flango, How Many Children Were Adopted in 
1992?, 74 CHILD WELFARE 1018 (1995); How Many Children Were Adopted in 
2000 and 2001?, supra note 45.  
 202. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (2009), available at http://www.dhs 
.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf. Data for the pe-
riod 2001–2009 are available from the DHS website. Data for the period 1972–
2000 are available at Immigrants Admitted to the United States Series, INTER-
U. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RES. (ICPSR), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00121 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 203. See supra note 79. 
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ment rate, percentage of working age adults with private in-
surance, and percentage of population employed in firms with 
over 500 workers). These data come from the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Current Population Survey, and U.S. government agen-
cies.204 
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 2.205 Figure 1 
displays yearly averages of our data on IVF utilization, total 
public adoption (AFCARS), public and private adoptions (Flan-
go and Flango), and international adoptions (all IVF and adop-
tion outcomes are measured per 1000 women ages twenty-five 
to forty-four). For example, the first graphical point for cycles 
in 1990 of “.5” means that the average state had 0.5 cycles un-
dertaken for every 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four in 
that year. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 Count Mean Sd Min Max 
Cycles 849 1.305 1.514 0.000 10.846 
Nonrelated 
(AFCARS) 
566 0.209 0.259 0.000 2.019 
Related (AFCARS) 566 0.211 0.266 0.000 1.328 
Foster (AFCARS) 566 0.633 0.535 0.000 3.800 
Stepparent (AFCARS) 566 0.011 0.078 0.000 1.018 
Total Public (AFCARS) 566 1.264 0.936 0.000 5.474 
Public and Private 357 3.441 1.177 0.925 8.742 
International 1938 0.310 0.233 0.009 1.549 
 
 204. We considered using as a control variable a classification based on 
how adoption-friendly each state was, see Christine Adamec, State Adoption 
Laws, in NAT’L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK III 365, 367 
(1999), to try to rule out bias resulting from the possibility that states which 
were more adoption-friendly to begin with passed IVF mandates. We ultimate-
ly decided not to use this classification because we were worried about the 
time-invariant nature of this categorization. In any event, in earlier iterations 
when we did use the classification we found little effect on our primary results.  
 205. These are the same variables used by Henne and Bundorf in their in-
vestigation of the effects of mandates on IVF utilization. See Henne and Bun-
dorf, supra note 90, at 69–70. Three explanatory notes are in order. First, be-
cause AFCARS did not report data from every state in the early years, Figure 
1 shows a slightly misleading jump because it shows total, not average, num-
bers of public adoptions; states not reporting data cannot contribute to the to-
tal number of adoptions. Second, Table 2 lists different numbers of observa-
tions because our data-sets are not wholly overlapping for the time period. 
Finally, our level of analysis is at the state-year level. 
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% of Reproductive-Age  
Women Age 25–29 1938 0.266 0.041 0.179 0.368 
% of Reproductive-Age  
Women Age 30–34 1938 0.257 0.019 0.196 0.325 
% of Reproductive-Age  
Women Age 35–39 1938 0.245 0.021 0.191 0.289 
Non-Caucasian, Non-
Hispanic % of Population 
1754 0.158 0.145 0.000 0.820 
Hispanic % of Population 1754 0.059 0.081 0.000 0.452 
% Working-Age Adults 
with Private Insurance 
1122 0.749 0.061 0.555 0.886 
% Adults with High School 
Degree 
1754 0.797 0.087 0.464 0.940 
Per Capita Personal In-
come (Thousands $) 
1754 22.940 4.305 13.798 39.377 
% Working-Age Women in 
Labor Force 
1754 0.686 0.075 0.370 0.858 
% Labor Force Employed 
by Large Firms 
1122 0.415 0.051 0.244 0.555 
Unemployment Rate 1734 5.920 2.023 2.300 17.400 
All IVF and adoption outcomes are measured per 1000 women ages 
twenty-five to forty-four. Cycles refer to Fresh Nondonor IVF cycles. 
Nonrelated, related, foster, and stepparent adoptions all refer to pub-
lic agency adoptions; not every state reports data. Public and Private 
adoptions are available from Flango and Flango. See Flango & Flan-
go, supra note 201. International adoptions are from the Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics (formerly entitled Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) and are available over the 
period 1972–2009. See supra note 202. Note our summary statistics 
Table has different numbers of observations for variables because our 
data-sets are not wholly overlapping for the time period, and our level 
of analysis is at the state-year level such that a count of “849” 
represents 849 state-years. 
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Figure 1: IVF Utilization and Adoption Rates 
3. Empirical Strategy 
We examine what effect the different types of mandates 
have on IVF utilization rates (measured by using the number of 
IVF cycles per 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four)206 
and on adoption of children through a number of different ap-
proaches. 
Our primary approach is a differences-in-differences 
framework, which (in nontechnical terms) compares the treat-
ment group after the treatment (IVF utilization and adoption 
in states with mandates) to the treatment group before the 
treatment (these same measures in these same states before 
the mandates were introduced) and to another control group 
(states without mandates).207 
To better understand this form of analysis, its benefits, and 
its drawbacks, we begin with what might be a simple way of 
studying our problem: we could just look at the experimental 
group (states that have mandates) before and after the treat-
ment (in our case IVF utilization and adoption rates before and 
 
 206. Previous studies that have also examined the effect of insurance man-
dates on IVF utilization rates include Jain et al., supra note 90; Hamilton & 
McManus, supra note 90; Henne & Bundorf, supra note 90. Schmidt examines 
the effect of insurance mandates on fertility. Schmidt, supra note 177. 
 207. See generally JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMETRICS 385–88 (2003) (explaining differences-in-differences framework). 
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after the introduction of mandates). One might worry, however, 
that there were a lot of things going on at the same time as the 
treatment that might cause the observed increase or decrease 
in adoptions. The advantage of a differences-in-differences 
analysis is that it uses the control group to subtract out other 
changes occurring at the same time so long as those changes af-
fect both the treatment and control groups. To give a tangible 
example, if we were worried about changes in federal tax 
treatment or national laws regarding adoption during the same 
time period as the insurance mandates skewing the adoption 
numbers, it would be misleading to compare the adoption rates 
in mandate states before and after the mandates are intro-
duced. So long as these tax or other law changes are national, 
though, and therefore affect both the mandate and the non-
mandate states, the differences-in-differences approach factors 
them out.208 
Because the analysis also compares an individual state—
for example, Massachusetts—before and after the mandate, it 
also factors out any particular attributes of the state of Massa-
chusetts that might affect IVF utilization or adoption, and lets 
us isolate how the mandate affected Massachusetts. That still 
leaves open the possibility of state-specific effects at a particu-
lar time. To return to the earlier example, suppose that the per 
capita income in Massachusetts increases precisely at the time 
its insurance mandate is introduced, such that what appears to 
be an effect of the introduction of the mandate is actually the 
effect of the change in income.209 To deal with this, as part of 
the differences-in-differences analysis, we control for variations 
over time with the series of control variables described above. 
 
 208. One commentator raised concern that our analysis on international 
adoptions might be affected by the overall decline in U.S. international adop-
tions since 2004 due to changes in policies of sending countries, a decline that 
was orthogonal to IVF access. See, e.g., Peter Selman, The Rise and Fall of In-
tercountry Adoption in the 21st Century, 52 INT’L SOC. WORK 575, 575–92 
(2009). As discussed above, most of our international data comes before this 
period of decline and, more importantly, one advantage of the differences-in-
differences approach, is that so long as declines in the number of children 
available for international adoption effect mandate and nonmandate states 
alike—and there is no evidence to the contrary—the approach factors them out. 
 209. In this way, differences-in-differences allows us to control for unob-
served variables, such as cultural attitudes toward adoption, which differ from 
one state to the next but do not change over time, as well as factors such as 
ease of obtaining adoptions, which vary through time but do not vary across 
states. See STOCK & WATSON, supra note 207, at 386 (explaining advantages of 
differences-in-differences analysis). 
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Of course, no list of omitted variables is ever perfect and with 
any econometric analysis there is the risk that the analysis has 
missed one, but because differences-in-differences analysis nar-
rows down potential omitted variables to those affecting specif-
ic states at particular times, it allows us to be more confident in 
the results.210 
To set out the analysis more formally, our estimating 
framework is: 
 
Outcomeit = a*Lawit + b*Xit+ tt+ si+ eit(1) 
 
where we consider different measures of Outcomeit such as IVF 
cycles per 1000 women and adoptions per 1000 women ages 
twenty-five to forty-four as the dependent variable in state i 
and year t. We examine several different measures of adoption, 
as discussed above. Lawit is a set of binary variables measuring 
whether a particular insurance mandate (complete, partial, of-
fer) exists in state i and year t. Our specifications control for 
state- and time-varying characteristics, Xit, listed above. Any 
remaining characteristics of states that are fixed across time or 
period effects that are fixed across state are captured by time- 
and state-fixed effects, tt and si. These are intended to control 
for fixed characteristics invariant across states or across years 
that may be correlated with both the insurance mandate and 
adoption rates. All standard errors are clustered at the state 
level to address correlation in errors over time within a state.211 
We weight by population of women ages twenty-five to forty-
four. Table 3 shows the results for this approach. We perform a 
differences-in-differences analysis of the effects of IVF insur-
ance mandates first on IVF utilization and then on adoption 
rates. 
One weakness of differences-in-differences analysis in this 
setting, discussed more fully below, is the relatively small 
number of states whose mandate status changed during the 
years for which we have data (although this is less of a concern 
with our analyses of international adoptions for which our da-
ta-set extends far back in time). For this reason, we initially al-
so conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the data as well, but 
for a number of reasons (including the suspicion that the cross-
 
 210. Id. 
 211. In doing so we follow Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We 
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 272–73 (2004). 
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sectional analysis’s assumption of a linear time trend in the da-
ta was problematic), we chose the differences-in-differences 
framework as our preferred method of analysis. Nevertheless, 
we report the results of the cross-sectional approach and dis-
cuss them in Appendix B, listing any differences that obtain 
from our preferred differences-in-differences analysis.212 As dis-
cussed more fully in Appendix B, on one finding (the effect of 
complete insurance mandates on nonrelated adoptions in the 
AFCARS data-set), the cross-sectional method is more suppor-
tive of the substitution theory.213 
To get a more complete picture we also directly analyzed 
the effects of IVF cycles on adoption. Under the substitution 
theory, we would expect to see an increasing number of cycles 
associated with a decreasing number of adoptions. We show 
both ordinary least squares (OLS) and the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimates of the effect of IVF cycles on adoption 
rates.214 
OLS analysis, in nontechnical terms, is a statistical tech-
nique that finds the best linear relationship between a depend-
ent variable and one or more independent variables.215 In our 
case, the dependent variable is adoption rates and the inde-
pendent variable is IVF utilization. Thus, this framework gives 
us a test of the substitution theory that is somewhat divorced 
from the effect of the mandates, measuring directly instead 
how the number of adoptions changes when IVF utilization 
changes. There are, however, several downsides to OLS analy-
sis, including omitted variables and simultaneous causality. 
Omitted variable bias can be addressed only if one has data on 
the omitted variable.216 When there is simultaneous causality—
say, if IVF utilization affects adoption rates and adoption rates 
affect IVF utilization—then OLS cannot eliminate the bias.217 
2SLS approach, also known as instrumental variables (IV) 
approach, uses a set of “exogenous” instruments to create, in a 
first stage regression model, predicted values for the outcome 
 
 212. See supra note 187, Appendix B, Table B-1. 
 213. See supra note 187, Appendix B. 
 214. See supra note 187, Table B-2. 
 215. See generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ch. 6 (3d 
ed. 1997).  
 216. See STOCK & WATSON, supra note 207, at 143–49 (describing omitted 
variable bias). 
 217. See id. at 251–53 (describing simultaneous causality). 
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measure, conceptually removing the bias.218 In our use, the in-
strumental variables (insurance mandates) isolate the move-
ments in IVF utilization rates that are not correlated with 
omitted variables or simultaneously affected by adoption rates. 
The downsides of this approach are that the instruments them-
selves must not be correlated with omitted variables that di-
rectly affect adoption rates, nor can they be caused by adoption 
rates, or else we face the same omitted variable bias problem 
that plagues OLS estimates. 
In more technical terms, for the 2SLS analysis our instru-
mental variable for IVF cycles is the insurance mandates, 
Lawit, that have a significant effect on IVF cycles. Table 5 dis-
plays these results. The specification that examines the rela-
tionship between IVF cycles and adoption is as follows. The 
first stage is displayed in equation 2 and the second stage is 
displayed in equation 3. 
 
IVFCyclesit = c*Lawit + d*Xit+ tt+ si + wit(2) 
 
Adoptionit = a*IVFCyclesit + b*Xit+ tt+ si + eit (3) 
 
Both of these approaches look at the effects of mandates on 
IVF usage and adoption. In Appendix B we also rerun the OLS 
and 2SLS analyses using a cross-sectional, rather than differ-
ences-in-differences, framework.219 
Thus, we essentially provide three analyses. First, using a 
differences-in-differences framework we study the effect of 
mandates on IVF utilization and the effect of mandates on 
adoption. Second, we examine the effect of IVF utilization on 
adoption rates using an OLS approach. Finally we evaluate the 
effect using a 2SLS approach (which uses the variation in IVF 
utilization coming from differences in insurance mandates). 
C. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
In this section, we present the results of our econometric 
analyses. We begin by presenting the differences-in-differences 
results for the effect of the mandates on IVF utilization and 
adoption. We then present the OLS and 2SLS approach results 
for the effect of IVF utilization on adoption rates. We then dis-
 
 218. See id. at 343–44 (describing the 2SLS approach). 
 219. See supra note 187, Appendix B, Table B-2. 
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cuss several robustness checks we ran to confirm our results, 
and close by discussing some limitations of our study.  
1. IVF Utilization 
A prior study by Henne and Bundorf using a cross-
sectional methodology finds that partial mandates have very 
little effect on IVF utilization, while complete mandates have a 
significant effect.220 Other studies have reached similar conclu-
sions.221 Using our differences-in-differences analysis, we too 
find a positive effect of complete insurance mandates on IVF 
utilization. However, partial, offer, and non-IVF mandates 
have statistically significant negative effects on IVF utilization. 
These results can be seen under the first four rows of the 
“Cycles” column in Table 3.  
Given the robust positive effect of complete mandates on 
IVF utilization, if individuals really do substitute IVF usage for 
adoption when it becomes more affordable through insurance 
coverage, under the substitution theory we would expect to find 
that complete mandates are associated with a significant nega-
tive effect on adoption rates. We examine that question in the 
next section, again employing both a cross-sectional and differ-
ences-in-differences approach.  
2. Adoption 
We now turn to the main contribution of this Article, em-
pirically examining for the first time the effect of state-level in-
surance mandates covering IVF on adoption rates. If the sub-
stitution theory is correct, we would expect that mandates 
should have more of an effect on nonrelative adoptions than on 
relative and stepparent adoptions, on the theory that the ten-
dency to adopt the children of relatives or one’s spouse should 
be less influenced by increased access to IVF.222 
 
 220. Henne & Bundorf, supra note 90, at 70–72. Small differences between 
our classification and Henne and Bundorf ’s classification of states by mandate 
type are discussed in Appendix A. See infra text accompanying notes 235–36; 
supra note 187, Appendix A. 
 221. Hamilton and McManus use a slightly different categorization 
scheme, as set out in Appendix A, but find a similar result using a differences-
in-differences analysis. See Hamilton & McManus, supra note 90, at 28; text 
accompanying notes 240–41; supra note 187, Appendix A.  
 222. As discussed above, we have three separate data-sets that we use for 
our adoption analyses. The AFCARS data-set groups adoptions into four cate-
gories: stepparent (adoption by a stepparent), other relative (adoption by 
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Table 3: The Effect of Insurance Mandates—Differences-
in-Differences Approach 
 
 Cycles Non- 
Related 
Related Foster Step-
Parent 
Total 
Public 
Public 
and 
Private 
Int’l 
Complete 
Mandate 
1.537*** 
(0.249) 
0.0798** 
(0.0346) 
-0.136** 
(0.0675) 
0.137* 
(0.0742) 
0.0292 
(0.0328) 
-0.0555 
(0.187) 
0.720*** 
(0.112) 
0.0204 
(0.0584) 
Partial 
Mandate 
-0.553*** 
(0.118) 
0.0240 
(0.0384) 
-0.0700 
(0.0673) 
0.357 
(0.216) 
-0.0509 
(0.0371) 
0.241 
(0.289) 
-0.169 
(0.160) 
-0.0839 
(0.0689) 
Offer 
Mandate 
-1.969*** 
(0.201) 
-0.625*** 
(0.0815) 
-0.282** 
(0.115) 
0.442** 
(0.206) 
-0.0813 
(0.0705) 
-0.748** 
(0.370) 
-0.893 
(1.061) 
0.0423 
(0.0444) 
Non-IVF 
Mandate 
-0.379** 
(0.163) 
0.000818 
(0.0273) 
-0.0637 
(0.0448) 
0.183 
(0.137) 
-0.00447 
(0.00903) 
0.0565 
(0.200) 
0.326* 
(0.175) 
-0.0155 
(0.0270) 
Observa-
tions 
849 566 566 566 566 566 306 1683 
R2 0.900 0.603 0.737 0.750 0.224 0.734 0.762 --- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All outcomes are 
measured per 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four. Cycles refer 
to Fresh Nondonor IVF cycles and are available from 1990 to 2006. 
Nonrelated, related, foster, and stepparent adoptions all refer to pub-
lic agency adoptions and are available from 1995 to 2006 from 
AFCARS; not every state reports data. The AFCARS Report, supra 
note 35. Public and Private adoptions are available from Flango and 
Flango and are available for 1987, 1989–1992, 2001, and 2002. See 
Flango & Flango, supra note 201. International adoptions are from 
the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (formerly entitled Statistical 
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service) and are 
available over the period 1972–2009 and overlap with our IVF data 
from 1990–2006. See supra note 202. All specifications include time-
varying demographic controls and state- and year-fixed effects. Ex-
 
another relative), foster (adoption by nonrelated individuals who previously 
served as foster parents to the child), and nonrelative (adoption by nonrelated 
individuals who did not serve as foster parents to the child). It also has a “total 
public” measure meant to capture all public adoptions in the data-set. We in-
itially hypothesized that foster adoptions would also be unaffected by the 
mandate, but one commentator suggested that, though national in scope, 
ASFA may have had state-specific effects making our finding as to foster adop-
tion less reliable—in that it is hypothetically possible the data for foster adop-
tion reflects state-specific effects of these statutes rather than the introduction 
of insurance mandates. In any event, due to this possible complication we place 
less reliance on our foster adoption data as compared to our finding on nonre-
lated adoptions, for which ASFA should have no effect, on what we are told by 
those knowledgeable in the field is the plausible assumption that individuals do 
not treat foster adoption as a substitute for other kinds of adoption or IVF use.  
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cept for the Flango data, all point estimates for offer mandates are 
not identified separately from the constant term since no offer man-
dates were implemented in the time frame for the IVF cycles or adop-
tion data in those columns. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
As reported in Table 3, we find that complete insurance 
mandates have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
(i.e., they are associated with an increase of) nonrelative and 
foster adoptions, but a negative effect on (i.e., they are asso-
ciated with a decrease of) relative adoptions. Complete man-
dates also have a positive statistically significant effect on the 
total “Public and Private” adoption measure from the Flango 
data-set, and a positive but not statistically significant effect on 
international adoptions (as can be seen in the last column). 
Partial mandates do not have statistically significant effects. 
Because there was no state that enacted an offer mandate 
after 1989 and our AFCARS adoption data do not extend that 
far back, we cannot say anything about the effect of offer man-
dates on adoption (i.e., the offer dummy is a constant, so the 
coefficient is the intercept) for these data-sets. The Flango data 
does extend far enough back but shows no statistically signifi-
cant effects for offer mandates. The international data-set does 
extend back and shows a positive but not statistically signifi-
cant effect from these mandates. Non-IVF mandates have a 
positive effect on total public and private adoptions in the 
Flango data-set, but otherwise produce no significant results.223 
In sum, the differences-in-differences analysis gives little 
support to the predictions of the substitution theory—in partic-
ular, complete mandates (which are associated with an increase 
in IVF usage) appear to be associated with a statistically signif-
icant increase rather than a decrease in nonrelated adoptions. 
We also do not see a statistically significant negative effect on 
international adoptions as the substitution theory would pre-
dict.224 
 
 223. See supra Table 3. 
 224. As discussed below, we examine the robustness of this finding as to 
international adoptions through a bootstrap test and find some reason to 
doubt it. See infra text accompanying notes 236–39.  
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3. IVF Utilization and Adoption 
To offer a more complete picture, we also examine the ef-
fect of IVF utilization on adoption rates. First, we use an OLS 
approach (shown in Panel A of Table 4). This provides a test of 
the substitution theory that is somewhat divorced from the ef-
fect of the mandates, and instead simply looks at how adoption 
rates change when IVF utilization changes. Using a differenc-
es-in-differences OLS approach, we find no correlation between 
IVF cycles and adoption rates for most adoption outcomes, as 
shown in Table 4.225 Other than a positive correlation between 
IVF cycles and public and private adoptions from the Flango 
data-set in Panel A (0.302**), no other results reach signifi-
cance on this analysis. Notably, we do not find a statistically 
significant decrease in nonrelative or international adoptions 
when IVF utilization increases, the finding that the substitu-
tion theory would predict.226 
Second, we use a 2SLS estimate, using complete insurance 
mandates as our instrumental variable for IVF cycles (with re-
sults shown in Panel B of Table 4). Essentially, this analysis 
assumes that complete mandates affect adoptions only through 
IVF utilization, and it calculates the effect of utilization on 
adoptions by making a ratio of the effect of mandates on adop-
tions and mandates on utilization. Using this method we find 
that IVF cycles have a significant negative effect on related 
adoptions, a positive effect on foster adoptions, a positive effect 
on total public and private adoptions in the Flango data-set, 
and that no other results reach significance.227 This analysis 
gives little support for the substitution theory. In particular, we 
do not see a significant negative effect on nonrelated adoptions 
or international adoptions; more specifically, we can rule out 
with ninety-five percent confidence a substitution effect of 
0.0132 nonrelated adoptions and a substitution effect of 0.1172 
international adoptions for each additional IVF cycle.228 
 
 225. In Appendix B, we also run an OLS analysis using a cross-sectional 
approach. See supra note 187, Appendix B, Table B-2, Panel A.  
 226. See infra Table 4. 
 227. See infra Table 4. 
 228. See supra note 187, Appendix B. The standard errors represent the 
statistical confidence regarding a particular estimate. The range represented 
by the point estimate plus or minus two times the standard error is the ninety-
five percent confidence interval. For any magnitude outside of this range, we can 
reject as being true with ninety-five percent confidence. The lower limit for this 
range was calculated from Table 4, Panel B, Column 1: 0.0468 – 2 * 0.0300. 
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Table 4: The Effect of IVF Cycles on Adoption—Ordinary 
Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates: 
Differences-in-Differences 
 
Panel A–OLS 
Cross-Sectional 
Non-
Related 
Related Foster Step-
Parent 
Total 
Public 
Public 
and  
Private 
Int’l 
Cycles 
-0.00305 
(0.0211) 
-0.0289 
(0.0434) 
-0.0499 
(0.0835) 
0.0114 
(0.00832) 
-0.111 
(0.157) 
0.302** 
(0.117) 
-0.00976 
(0.0155) 
Panel B–2SLS (IV) 
Differences-in-
Differences 
       
Cycles 
0.0468 
(0.0300) 
-0.105** 
(0.0489) 
0.113* 
(0.0590) 
0.0223 
(0.0248) 
-0.0511 
(0.142) 
0.781*** 
(0.135) 
-0.0445 
(0.0362) 
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 255 849 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All outcomes are 
measured per 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four. Cycles refer 
to Fresh Nondonor IVF cycles and are available from 1990 to 2006. 
Nonrelated, related, foster, and stepparent adoptions all refer to pub-
lic agency adoptions and are available from 1995 to 2006 from 
AFCARS; not every state reports data. The AFCARS Report, supra 
note 35. Public and Private adoptions are available from Flango and 
Flango and are available for 1987, 1989–1992, 2001–2002. See Flango 
& Flango, supra note 201. International adoptions are from the Year-
book of Immigration Statistics (formerly entitled Statistical Yearbook 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service) and are available over 
the period 1972–2009 and overlap with our IVF data from 1990–2006. 
See supra note 202. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
4. Robustness Checks 
In order to be more confident in the findings, we ran sever-
al robustness checks. 
First, other studies on the effect of state-level insurance 
mandates on IVF usage have divided the mandates into 
slightly different categories. These different categorizations are 
set out in Appendix A.229 The results from rerunning our anal-
yses using these other classifications are set out in Tables A-2 
and A-3 in the Appendices.230 To summarize those results, we 
 
The lower limit for international adoptions was calculated from Table 4, Panel 
B, Column 8: -0.0455 – 2 * 0.0362. 
 229. See supra note 187, Appendix A. 
 230. See supra note 187, Appendix A, Table A-2; Table A-3. 
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find that “universal” or “strong” mandates still have a strong 
positive and robust effect on IVF utilization.231 As to the effect 
of mandates on adoption, we find a broad pattern of mandates 
having statistically significant positive effects on many catego-
ries of adoptions.232 Whenever a negative effect can be found, 
another, often larger positive effect can be found for the same 
law for another adoption category, with the exception of partial 
mandates in the differences-in-differences approach. The most 
important take-away is that using any of these alternate cate-
gorizations fails to show a consistent pattern of statistically 
significant negative effects of these mandates on adoption; that 
is, they do not show the results one would expect under the 
substitution theory. 
Second, we examined whether lags and leads of the laws 
affect our results, as shown in Table 5.233 Doing this robustness 
check was particularly important for our adoption results be-
cause adoption is a drawn out process and it is plausible that 
any effect from these mandates might take some time to mani-
fest in actual recorded adoptions. In part, because we were un-
able to find agreed-upon estimates of the length of the adoption 
process (domestically or internationally) from inception to final-
ization, we chose to present results for one- to five-year lags. 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Insurance Mandates—Differences-
in-Differences Approach with Lags and Leads 
 
 Cycles Non-
Related 
Related Foster Step-
Parent 
Total 
Public 
Public  
and  
Private 
Int’l 
Complete 
(lead) 
1.443*** 
(0.204) 
0.0410 
(0.0252) 
-0.168* 
(0.0969) 
0.0950 
(0.101) 
0.0144 
(0.0127) 
-0.200 
(0.272) 
0.0410 
(0.0252) 
-0.0129*** 
(0.0349) 
Complete 
0.413 
(0.272) 
0.0466 
(0.0385) 
0.0569 
(0.0458) 
0.144 
(0.0935) 
0.0104 
(0.0203) 
0.305* 
(0.156) 
0.0466 
(0.0385) 
-0.0109 
(0.0195) 
Complete 
(lag1) 
-0.00956 
(0.209) 
0.0243 
(0.0253) 
-0.0169 
(0.0221) 
-0.301*** 
(0.0430) 
-0.0108 
(0.00747) 
-0.311*** 
(0.0782) 
0.0243 
(0.0253) 
-0.0033 
(0.0127) 
 
 231. See supra note 187, Appendix A, Table A-2, Column 1; Table A-3, Col-
umn 1. 
 232. See supra note 187, Appendix A, Table A-2; Table A-3. 
 233. Tables 5–7 show many missing values for estimates of the lag effects 
of offer insurance mandates. The reason is that the two states with mandates 
to offer, Texas and Connecticut, also enacted those statutes relatively early 
(1987 and 1989, respectively), such that we lack both IVF utilization and 
adoption data for those states before they enacted their mandates. 
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Complete 
(lag2) 
0.111 
(0.126) 
0.0232 
(0.0306) 
-0.0536 
(0.0405) 
0.256*** 
(0.0638) 
0.0138* 
(0.00801) 
0.172 
(0.136) 
0.0232 
(0.0306) 
0.0126 
(0.0165) 
Complete 
(lag3) 
-0.261 
(0.331) 
-0.0471* 
(0.0255) 
-0.0101 
(0.0292) 
0.0378 
(0.0454) 
0.00814 
(0.0152) 
-0.0295 
(0.0898) 
-0.0471* 
(0.0255) 
-0.0056 
(0.0236) 
Complete 
(lag4) 
0.177 
(0.199) 
-0.0897** 
(0.0367) 
0.0112 
(0.0359) 
-0.0617 
(0.0994) 
0.0224* 
(0.0131) 
-0.129 
(0.143) 
-0.0897** 
(0.0367) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0117) 
Complete 
(lag5) 
1.331*** 
(0.236) 
-0.104** 
(0.0448) 
-0.0961 
(0.0602) 
0.612*** 
(0.0598) 
0.0440 
(0.0365) 
0.316* 
(0.183) 
-0.104** 
(0.0448) 
0.1030*** 
(0.0359) 
Partial 
(lead) 
-0.0805 
(0.0987) 
-0.0672 
(0.0958) 
-0.251 
(0.191) 
0.327* 
(0.181) 
-0.0280 
(0.0627) 
-0.241 
(0.524) 
-0.0672 
(0.0958) 
-0.0510 
(0.0352) 
Partial 
-0.638*** 
(0.141) 
0.0559 
(0.0507) 
-0.0312 
(0.0631) 
0.205 
(0.183) 
-0.0236 
(0.0275) 
0.198 
(0.264) 
0.0559 
(0.0507) 
-0.0137 
(0.0177) 
Partial 
(lag1) 
0.122 
(0.111) 
0.0753 
(0.0595) 
0.0166 
(0.0525) 
0.220** 
(0.0912) 
-0.0278 
(0.0261) 
0.328* 
(0.168) 
0.0753 
(0.0595) 
0.0163* 
(0.0086) 
Partial 
(lag2) 
0.127** 
(0.0588) 
-0.00121 
(0.0686) 
-0.0183 
(0.0582) 
-0.0428 
(0.0761) 
-0.0445 
(0.0418) 
-0.0805 
(0.182) 
-0.00121 
(0.0686) 
-0.0118 
(0.0114) 
Partial 
(lag3) 
0.145* 
(0.0824) 
-0.0310 
(0.0411) 
0.0258 
(0.0771) 
-0.206** 
(0.0912) 
0.0170 
(0.0176) 
-0.185 
(0.230) 
-0.0310 
(0.0411) 
-0.0177** 
(0.0072) 
Partial 
(lag4) 
0.0120 
(0.0594) 
-0.0872 
(0.0563) 
0.131 
(0.106) 
-0.0846 
(0.157) 
0.0381 
(0.0484) 
0.0892 
(0.318) 
-0.0872 
(0.0563) 
0.0029 
(0.0090) 
Partial 
(lag5) 
0.0694 
(0.168) 
-0.105 
(0.0668) 
-0.202 
(0.150) 
0.0333 
(0.127) 
-0.0256 
(0.0252) 
-0.475 
(0.374) 
-0.105 
(0.0668) 
-0.0754** 
(0.0568) 
Offer 
(lead) 
-1.296*** 
(0.228) 
0.0939 
(0.117) 
-0.258 
(0.223) 
0.410** 
(0.183) 
-0.0496 
(0.0956) 
-0.0124 
(0.600) 
0.620 
(1.291) 
-0.0234 
(0.0370) 
Offer 
-0.433*** 
(0.160) 
-0.837*** 
(0.0615) 
-0.240*** 
(0.0868) 
0.162 
(0.212) 
-0.0275 
(0.0347) 
-1.156*** 
(0.321) 
0 
. 
0.0065** 
(0.0167) 
Offer 
(lag1) 
-0.935*** 
(0.163) 
0.293*** 
(0.0743) 
0.0201 
(0.0659) 
0.301** 
(0.123) 
-0.0475 
(0.0308) 
0.634*** 
(0.231) 
-0.245 
(0.217) 
0.0193 
(0.0135) 
Offer 
(lag2) 
0.0505 
(0.0803) 
0.599** 
(0.255) 
-0.232 
(0.352) 
-0.838 
(0.554) 
0.262 
(0.239) 
-0.704 
(1.185) 
0.532* 
(0.300) 
0.0507*** 
(0.0171) 
Offer 
(lag3) 
0.462** 
(0.205) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0.0134 
(0.0153) 
Offer 
(lag4) 
-0.0673 
(0.105) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0.0207 
(0.0130) 
Offer 
(lag5) 
-0.102 
(0.167) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
-0.0324 
(0.0270) 
Non-IVF 
(lead) 
-0.0820 
(0.0885) 
-0.0359 
(0.0487) 
-0.0587 
(0.0543) 
0.163** 
(0.0711) 
0.0163 
(0.0164) 
0.00999 
(0.166) 
-0.834*** 
(0.307) 
0.0174 
(0.0306) 
Non-IVF 
-0.634** 
(0.281) 
0.0445 
(0.0329) 
-0.0622 
(0.0503) 
0.0797 
(0.130) 
-0.0184 
(0.0165) 
-0.000210
(0.195) 
0.272 
(0.172) 
0.0356*** 
(0.0119) 
Non-IVF 
(lag1) 
0.191 
(0.181) 
0.0107 
(0.0346) 
0.0216 
(0.0374) 
-0.0230 
(0.0886) 
0.00729 
(0.0159) 
0.0309 
(0.137) 
0.440* 
(0.235) 
0.0118 
(0.0083) 
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Non-IVF 
(lag2) 
0.248* 
(0.136) 
0.0135 
(0.0452) 
0.0115 
(0.0440) 
-0.0357 
(0.0617) 
-0.0223 
(0.0219) 
0.000734
(0.126) 
0.353 
(0.239) 
-0.0435*** 
(0.0117) 
Non-IVF 
(lag3) 
0.0363 
(0.103) 
-0.00283 
(0.0294) 
0.0159 
(0.0358) 
0.00667 
(0.127) 
0.00722 
(0.0109) 
0.0357 
(0.179) 
0.300 
(0.240) 
0.0153* 
(0.0083) 
Non-IVF 
(lag4) 
0.150** 
(0.0682) 
-0.0296 
(0.0386) 
0.0990 
(0.0898) 
0.0455 
(0.0864) 
0.0276 
(0.0291) 
0.214 
(0.243) 
-0.487 
(0.661) 
-0.0109 
(0.0091) 
Non-IVF 
(lag5) 
-0.187 
(0.165) 
-0.0699* 
(0.0412) 
-0.119 
(0.102) 
0.121 
(0.119) 
-0.0282 
(0.0183) 
-0.187 
(0.269) 
-0.550 
(0.653) 
-0.0654*** 
(0.0190) 
Observa-
tions 
849 566 566 566 566 566 306 1377 
R2 0.919 0.609 0.739 0.760 0.228 0.738 0.796 --- 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All outcomes are 
measured per 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four. Cycles refer 
to IVF cycles and are available from 1990 to 2004. Nonrelated, re-
lated, foster, and stepparent adoptions all refer to public agency adop-
tions and are available from 1995 to 2004 from AFCARS; not every 
state reports data. The AFCARS Report, supra note 35. Public and 
Private adoptions are available from Flango and Flango and are 
available for 1987, 1989–1992, 2001, and 2002. See Flango & Flango, 
supra note 201. International adoptions are from the Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics (formerly entitled Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) and are available over the 
period 1972–2009 and overlap with our IVF data from 1990–2006. See 
supra note 202. All specifications include time-varying controls and 
state- and year-fixed effects. Coefficients we are unable to estimate 
for lack of data are shown as 0s. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
How do lags and leads change the picture as to IVF utiliza-
tion? We find that both leads and lags of the laws affect IVF 
cycles (as can be seen by the results in the Cycles column of 
Table 5). In other words, five years after the state law intro-
duces an insurance mandate, IVF cycles are still higher in 
states that passed complete mandates; one year before the law 
is passed, IVF cycles are also higher.234 This phenomenon can 
be more clearly seen in Figure 2, which shows year-by-year 
changes in IVF utilization for the states that changed their in-
surance mandate status during the time frame of our data. It 
shows that IVF utilization is higher the year before complete 
mandates pass. This raises an endogeneity problem where the 
 
 234. It appears that Henne and Bundorf did not examine lags in their ear-
lier work on the effect of mandates on IVF utilization. See Henne & Bundorf, 
supra note 90. 
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increase in IVF cycles might be attributable to the continuation 
of a trend that predated the introduction of the mandates. That 
is, an increase in IVF cycles would be consistent with a theory 
predicting that states with large numbers of IVF cycles are the 
states most likely to pass insurance mandates for IVF. 
To address this problem, we use a specification that con-
trols for state-specific time trends, the results of which are dis-
played in Table 6. In this specification, we see that complete in-
surance mandates are not correlated with IVF utilization in the 
year before complete insurance mandates are passed, but they 
are correlated in the years after the complete insurance man-
dates are passed, suggesting that endogeneity is somewhat ad-
dressed by this specification. Endogeneity is not completely ad-
dressed because offer and non-IVF mandates appear to be 
correlated with IVF utilization in the year before offer and non-
IVF mandates are passed, which is another reason we empha-
size our findings as to complete mandates rather than the other 
possible mandates. 
 
Figure 2: Changes in IVF Utilization and Insurance 
Mandates 
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Table 6: The Effect of Insurance Mandates—Differences-
in-Differences Approach with State-Specific Time 
Trends 
 
 Cycles Non-
Related 
Related Foster Step-
Parent 
Total 
Public 
Public  
and 
 Private
Int’l 
Complete 
(lead) 
0.254 
(0.156) 
0.103** 
(0.0424) 
-0.0179 
(0.0431) 
0.414** 
(0.158) 
-0.0313 
(0.0231) 
0.481** 
(0.201) 
-0.0625 
(0.141) 
0.0030 
(0.0134) 
Complete 
0.365 
(0.364) 
0.0700 
(0.0498) 
0.0439 
(0.0461) 
0.229*** 
(0.0844) 
-0.0103 
(0.0112) 
0.386** 
(0.157) 
0.946*** 
(0.307) 
0.0033 
(0.0149) 
Complete 
(lag1) 
-0.227 
(0.210) 
0.0419* 
(0.0241) 
0.0456 
(0.0350) 
-0.192*** 
(0.0327) 
-0.0132 
(0.00806) 
-0.0584 
(0.0975) 
-0.195 
(0.190) 
-0.0126 
(0.0149) 
Complete 
(lag2) 
-0.0301 
(0.194) 
0.0176 
(0.0326) 
-0.0170 
(0.0466) 
0.299*** 
(0.0861) 
-0.00404 
(0.0145) 
0.282* 
(0.156) 
0.277 
(0.400) 
0.0061 
(0.0132) 
Complete 
(lag3) 
-0.334* 
(0.185) 
-0.0289 
(0.0325) 
0.0247 
(0.0266) 
0.107** 
(0.0426) 
-0.00706 
(0.00666) 
0.127 
(0.0964) 
-0.581** 
(0.246) 
0.0004 
(0.0258) 
Complete 
(lag4) 
-0.00712 
(0.163) 
-0.109* 
(0.0569) 
0.0454 
(0.0483) 
0.0252 
(0.0779) 
-0.0121 
(0.0174) 
0.00739 
(0.169) 
-0.621** 
(0.270) 
-0.0334* 
(0.0187) 
Complete 
(lag5) 
0.517*** 
(0.144) 
-0.0713* 
(0.0383) 
0.0189 
(0.0389) 
1.422*** 
(0.0736) 
0.0186 
(0.0227) 
1.388*** 
(0.152) 
0.749*** 
(0.193) 
0.0450 
(0.0392) 
Partial 
(lead) 
-0.0466 
(0.334) 
0.153 
(0.125) 
0.175 
(0.154) 
0.574* 
(0.296) 
0.0126 
(0.0553) 
1.077* 
(0.557) 
-0.223 
(0.191) 
0.0101 
(0.0221) 
Partial 
-0.176*** 
(0.0574) 
0.136** 
(0.0677) 
0.137 
(0.0974) 
0.354 
(0.260) 
-0.0173 
(0.0269) 
0.764* 
(0.393) 
-0.152 
(0.208) 
-0.0124 
(0.0140) 
Partial 
(lag1) 
-0.0403 
(0.0343) 
0.178** 
(0.0669) 
0.161* 
(0.0908) 
0.387*** 
(0.140) 
-0.0168 
(0.0276) 
0.887*** 
(0.273) 
-0.565 
(0.343) 
0.0185** 
(0.0085) 
Partial 
(lag2) 
0.0626 
(0.0378) 
0.00569 
(0.0956) 
0.0415 
(0.0762) 
0.0419 
(0.110) 
-0.0425 
(0.0420) 
0.131 
(0.249) 
-151.1 
(565.9) 
-0.0125* 
(0.0119) 
Partial 
(lag3) 
0.00117 
(0.101) 
0.0176 
(0.0709) 
0.175 
(0.149) 
-0.0501 
(0.176) 
-0.0188 
(0.0284) 
0.318 
(0.434) 
0.726 
(0.613) 
-0.0046 
(0.0060) 
Partial 
(lag4) 
0.0199 
(0.0415) 
-0.0514 
(0.0946) 
0.188 
(0.121) 
0.146 
(0.192) 
-0.0129 
(0.0264) 
0.471 
(0.396) 
-0.606 
(0.942) 
0.0089 
(0.0160) 
Partial 
(lag5) 
-0.347 
(0.235) 
-0.0553 
(0.0846) 
-0.0631 
(0.0698) 
0.0615 
(0.160) 
-0.00829 
(0.0232) 
-0.120 
(0.255) 
-0.669** 
(0.272) 
-0.0186 
(0.0303) 
Offer 
(lead) 
-0.696* 
(0.347) 
0.668*** 
(0.153) 
0.150 
(0.152) 
0.847*** 
(0.311) 
0.00214 
(0.0755) 
1.816*** 
(0.565) 
129.4 
(448.5) 
0.0091 
(0.0310) 
Offer 
0.309*** 
(0.101) 
-0.649*** 
(0.0806) 
-0.0338 
(0.104) 
0.351 
(0.302) 
-0.00851 
(0.0295) 
-0.365 
(0.431) 
0 
. 
0.0073 
(0.0108) 
Offer 
(lag1) 
-0.858*** 
(0.0959) 
0.543*** 
(0.104) 
0.170 
(0.104) 
0.568*** 
(0.166) 
-0.0103 
(0.0464) 
1.450*** 
(0.337) 
0.0477 
(0.203) 
0.0377** 
(0.0167) 
Offer 
(lag2) 
-0.172*** 
(0.0574) 
-128.2* 
(74.62) 
32.51 
(63.58) 
105.2 
(157.2) 
-1.530 
(22.62) 
42.05 
(232.7) 
0.387 
(0.479) 
0.0475*** 
(0.0140) 
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Offer 
(lag3) 
-0.347*** 
(0.126) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0.0204 
(0.0211) 
Offer 
(lag4) 
0.0160 
(0.0511) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0.0461** 
(0.0178) 
Offer 
(lag5) 
-0.0148 
(0.0543) 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
0.0123 
(0.0251) 
Non-IVF 
(lead) 
0.339*** 
(0.0937) 
0.152*** 
(0.0564) 
0.202** 
(0.0869) 
0.402** 
(0.165) 
0.0249 
(0.0242) 
0.957*** 
(0.305) 
-2.013* 
(1.128) 
0.0133 
(0.0103) 
Non-IVF 
-0.0538 
(0.0808) 
0.0884 
(0.0547) 
0.0473 
(0.0503) 
0.160 
(0.151) 
-0.0206 
(0.0190) 
0.343 
(0.222) 
0.0352 
(0.327) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0115) 
Non-IVF 
(lag1) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0531) 
0.0851* 
(0.0441) 
0.118** 
(0.0520) 
0.0599 
(0.0932) 
-0.00233 
(0.0109) 
0.381** 
(0.182) 
0.283 
(0.399) 
0.0118 
(0.0078) 
Non-IVF 
(lag2) 
0.0753* 
(0.0413) 
0.0286 
(0.0652) 
0.0375 
(0.0513) 
0.0483 
(0.0592) 
-0.0390 
(0.0352) 
0.152 
(0.167) 
0.415 
(0.316) 
-0.0291*** 
(0.0088) 
Non-IVF 
(lag3) 
-0.130 
(0.114) 
0.0299 
(0.0470) 
0.138 
(0.0857) 
0.0459 
(0.139) 
-0.00898 
(0.0228) 
0.351 
(0.259) 
0.0606 
(0.291) 
0.0182** 
(0.0069) 
Non-IVF 
(lag4) 
0.0163 
(0.0654) 
-0.0155 
(0.0689) 
0.128 
(0.0890) 
0.238** 
(0.117) 
-0.0282 
(0.0194) 
0.478 
(0.288) 
-0.812 
(1.046) 
-0.0067 
(0.0053) 
Non-IVF 
(lag5) 
-0.392** 
(0.167) 
0.0109 
(0.0571) 
0.00429 
(0.0601) 
0.0910 
(0.131) 
-0.000701 
(0.0120) 
0.110 
(0.205) 
0.671 
(1.837) 
-0.0315* 
(0.0161) 
Observa-
tions 
849 566 566 566 566 566 306 1377 
R2 0.975 0.727 0.863 0.838 0.493 0.842 0.908 --- 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All outcomes are 
measured per 1000 women ages twenty-five to forty-four. Cycles refer 
to IVF cycles and are available from 1990 to 2004. Nonrelated, re-
lated, foster, and stepparent adoptions all refer to public agency adop-
tions and are available from 1995 to 2004 from AFCARS; not every 
state reports data. The AFCARS Report, supra note 35. Public and 
Private adoptions are available from Flango and Flango and are 
available for 1987, 1989–1992, 2001, and 2002. See Flango & Flango, 
supra note 201. International adoptions are from the Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics (formerly entitled Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) and are available over the 
period 1972–2009 and overlap with our IVF data from 1990–2006. See 
supra note 202. All specifications include time-varying controls and 
state- and year-fixed effects. Coefficients we are unable to estimate 
for lack of data are shown as 0s. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
How do lags and leads change the picture of the effects on 
adoption? As reported in columns 2–8 of Table 5, the lags of in-
surance mandates show effects that change signs and signifi-
cance on a yearly basis. On net, when comparing the aggregate 
  
562 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:485 
 
effect of five years of lags, the lag results are not inconsistent 
with the earlier results in Table 3. Figure 3 focuses on interna-
tional adoptions and provides a visual summary of the interna-
tional adoption data. It plots estimated international adoptions 
in mandate states relative to nonmandate states at yearly in-
tervals in the four years prior through the five years following 
the passage of a particular mandate. The dashed lines in each 
figure represent robust ninety percent confidence intervals for 
each yearly point estimate. As the figure shows, the effect of 
mandates on international adoptions is not clearly visible for 
any of the mandates. The figure thus corroborates our inference 
from statistical analyses that there is no strong evidence for a 
negative effect of these mandates on international adoption.  
When it comes to leads, we see that adoption rates are 
sometimes higher (e.g., foster adoptions) before the passages of 
these laws (as displayed in the “Partial (lead)” or “Offer (lead)” 
rows in Table 5). An increase in adoptions would be consistent 
with a theory that states that have large numbers of adoptions 
or IVF cycles are the states most likely to pass insurance man-
dates for IVF. In particular, an increasing trend in adoption 
rates predicts the passage of insurance mandates. That is, IVF 
insurance policies might be endogenous to recent adoption 
rates, which might suggest that increasingly high adoption 
rates reflect a pent-up demand for IVF subsidies.  
To address this problem, we again use a specification that 
controls for state-specific time trends, the results of which are 
shown in Table 6. Even in this specification, we find no consis-
tent pattern of decreases in adoption rates, and in the few in-
stances where we find insurance mandates decrease adoption 
rates, they also decrease IVF cycles, which is inconsistent with 
a substitution theory. For example, the final column shows that 
complete mandates reduce international adoptions in the 
fourth year, but the first column shows that complete mandates 
reduce IVF cycles in the third year after the passage of com-
plete mandates. Partial mandates have a more consistently 
negative effect, though sometimes again displaying negative 
correlations before the mandate is passed. Non-IVF mandates 
appear to have little robust effect, with the international coeffi-
cients changing signs from year to year. Thus, again, we find no 
strong evidence supporting the substitution theory. 
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Figure 3: International Adoptions Before and After 
Passage of Insurance Mandates: Yearly Lags and Leads 
from Four Years Before to Five Years After Passage 
 
Complete Mandates 
 Partial Mandates 
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 Offer Mandates 
Non-IVF Mandates 
Third, one possible reason that adoption rates do not de-
crease and may even increase in response to insurance man-
dates for infertility treatments is that individuals may attempt 
to use IVF, fail, and then try to adopt instead. That is, attempts 
at IVF that lead to failure reinforce the desire for children, 
leading individuals to then turn to adoption. By contrast, as 
discussed above, a mechanism identified by Bartholet and 
Neumann by which expansion of IVF access decreases adoption 
is precisely the opposite: their theory is that individuals try 
l 
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IVF, fail after repeated attempts, and then for financial, emo-
tional, or age reasons are unwilling to try adoption.235 
The data-sets we have available allow us to investigate 
these dueling hypotheses to some extent. The CDC data-set has 
a measure of IVF cycles that led to live births, and by using 
this metric we can measure the effect of insurance mandates on 
successful IVF cycles. Insurance mandates increase successful 
IVF cycles, but not surprisingly, they also increase the number 
of failed IVF cycles. Without data on the IVF history of adopt-
ing parents or separate variation that makes some states have 
higher failure rates than others, we are unable to go much fur-
ther in ascertaining whether attempting IVF, but not succeed-
ing, is associated with increased adoptions. A different way of 
getting at this issue, though, is through our lag analysis. If the 
mechanism identified by Bartholet and Neumann is in place, 
we should see increased diminutions of adoptions only after the 
mandates have been in effect for several years. As Table 6 
shows, we do not find substantial evidence that complete man-
dates have delayed negative effects on international adoptions. 
Fourth, and relatedly, we checked to see whether any of 
our core findings changed if we used live births from fresh 
cycles (i.e., cycles using fresh embryos, a measure of IVF out-
comes) instead of cycles (a measure of IVF utilization). Our key 
findings remain largely unchanged. In the differences-in-
differences framework we continue to see that the complete 
mandates have a positive effect on the number of live births 
and that there is no strong evidence of live births crowding out 
adoptions. In the OLS specification, we continue to only see a 
positive effect on public and private adoptions. In the instru-
mental variables specification, we see a negative effect of live 
births on related adoptions and a positive effect on public and 
private adoptions; the only finding that changes when using 
live births is that the weakly significant increase in foster 
adoptions in the 2SLS framework disappears. 
Fifth, to partially address the problem of few mandates ac-
tually changing in the period for which we have data (an issue 
discussed further in the next section), we conducted bootstrap 
randomization tests in which we randomly assigned the law 
changes to the fifty states and reran our basic regression speci-
fication with clustering to account for serial correlation across 
 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 110–14. 
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time within states.236 With very few states that changed their 
mandate status, the differences-in-differences approach can 
frequently overestimate the statistical significance of any find-
ing.237 To address this problem, randomization inference asks, 
when the laws are randomly assigned, how likely it is that our 
actual estimate is indistinguishable from these random esti-
mates. We reran our basic regression 5000 times and observed 
where our actual estimated differences-in-differences coeffi-
cient falls into the 5000 placebo estimates. We find that only 
four estimates pass this randomization inference test: the posi-
tive effect of complete mandates on IVF cycles is statistically 
significant at the five percent level, the negative effect of offer 
mandates is statistically significant at the ten percent level, the 
negative effect of offer mandates on nonrelated adoptions is 
statistically significant at the five percent level, and the nega-
tive effect of partial mandates on international adoptions is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level. However, if we 
adjust the p-values to account for the fact that we conduct mul-
tiple related hypothesis testing for each outcome, using the 
simplest and most conservative approach, the Bonferroni ad-
justment, we find that none of the effects are statistically sig-
nificant at the ten percent level, with one exception: the effect 
of complete mandates on IVF cycles is still statistically signifi-
cant at the ten percent level.238 The coefficient for each of the 
other mandates and other categories of adoptions are not sta-
 
 236. We considered clustering for serial correlation across states within 
years, but the correlation pattern implied by two-way clustering currently 
used in some applications allows for essentially unrestricted time dependence 
within cells and unrestricted cross-sectional dependence across cells within 
time periods, and imposes zero correlation across cells in different time pe-
riods. For example, CA in Period 1 is arbitrarily correlated with CA in Period 
2. NV in Period 1 is arbitrarily correlated with NV in Period 2. CA and NV are 
arbitrarily correlated in Period 1. CA and NV are arbitrarily correlated in Pe-
riod 2. However, CA in Period 1 is somehow uncorrelated with NV in Period 2, 
which is unnatural given the assumptions of this approach. Given that the da-
ta does appear serially correlated across time within states, we employ our 
chosen method for clustering in this bootstrap procedure. 
 237. See Bertrand et al., supra note 211.  
 238. See Esther Duflo et al., Using Randomization in Development Econom-
ics Research: A Toolkit, in 4 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 3895, 
3947 (T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss eds., 2007). The Bonferroni adjust-
ment multiplies the p-values by the number of tests in the family; in this case 
we are multiplying by four because we have four mandates in each family of 
tests. Id. Figure 2 suggests why the randomization inference test passes for 
IVF utilization. The control states to which the placebo laws are assigned are 
on average close to zero; but this is not the case for the adoption data. 
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tistically significant; therefore, we cannot reject the null hypo-
thesis that the mandates had no effect on adoptions. This anal-
ysis gives us more reason to be confident about our finding that 
complete mandates increase the number of IVF cycles, and fur-
ther undermines the (admittedly weak) evidence of a substitu-
tion toward domestic or international adoptions.239 
Sixth, one might worry that because our analysis covers 
the entire population of adopters in age terms, it may mask 
substitution of particular age groups. The AFCARS data set 
contains information on the age of adopters. To examine this 
question, we looked to see whether there was evidence of sub-
stitution in a particular age band, adopters over the age of for-
ty.240 We found no evidence that increased IVF-utilization sub-
stitution leads to a diminution in adoption rates of women or 
men over forty. This result holds even when we restrict the 
sample to nonrelated adoptions rather than all adoptions.  
Seventh, we had a parallel concern about age of adoptees: 
that grouping together adoptees of all ages might mask substi-
tution as to particular age bands of adoptees. Perhaps, for ex-
ample, we would see substitution away from the youngest set of 
adoptees since they are most similar in age to the newborns 
that come from IVF usage. We used the age of adoptees listed 
in the AFCARS data set and divided the sample into age bands 
of ages three and under, four to seven, eight to eleven, and old-
er than twelve. In our differences-in-differences framework, we 
did not find any significant effect related to the introduction of 
any of the mandate types after dividing by age bands in this 
way, ruling out this concern about our results. 
 
 239. We have focused on complete mandates because they are the only 
mandates that significantly and consistently increase IVF utilization. See su-
pra Part III.C. But a careful reader of our results would notice that offer man-
dates have a significant negative effect on IVF cycles and that they have a 
significant positive effect on international adoptions (both with and without 
state-specific time trends). One might interpret this result as some (albeit un-
expected and indirect) evidence supporting the substitution theory in that 
mandates which decrease IVF utilization seem to increase international adop-
tions. As we have said before, because there are only two states that adopted 
offer mandates in our data period, and the changes occurred relatively early in 
our data period (1987 and 1989), we do not put a lot of stock in this result as to 
offer mandates. See supra note 192. However, to be safe, we did another boot-
strap randomization of the kind described in the text as to this result and 
found that offer mandates do not have a statistically significant effect on in-
ternational adoptions in this analysis. 
 240. We chose this age band on the idea that adopters over forty were more 
likely to have tried infertility treatments first. 
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Although our focus in this Article is not racial patterns in 
adoption, we were concerned that our population-wide analysis 
might also mask substitution toward adoption by a particular 
racial group; that is, that IVF subsidization might lead to a 
substitution away from children of other races. Our data-set 
and empirical methods do not allow us to perfectly answer this 
question, but we did a few analyses to try and get at it. Most of 
the results we found were not robust to both the differences-in-
differences and cross-sectional analyses (reported in Appendix 
B), but there were a few findings that were qualitatively the 
same on both analyses: offer mandates reduce the number of 
white parents adopting white children and reduce the number 
of Hispanic parents adopting Hispanic children; complete man-
dates reduce the number of Hispanic parents adopting white 
children; and offer mandates reduce the number of black par-
ents adopting Hispanic children.241 These findings are merely a 
preliminary cut at what is an empirically and politically com-
plex question, and one that merits more attention in future 
work. 
Finally, we examined whether the fact that the source of 
our IVF cycles data changes in 1995 affects our analyses of the 
relationship between IVF cycles and international adoptions, 
whose data coverage overlaps both types of IVF data. If we 
break out the two data-sets we see that the relationship is posi-
tive when we just use 1990–1994 data and negative when we 
just use 1995–2006 data.242 It is possible that this is a function 
of the two slightly different data sources, but it could also re-
flect a number of other possible explanations such as changes 
in behavior. One partial check we ran was to linearly extrapo-
late the CDC data backwards from 1995 and average that 
extrapolation with the hard-coded 1990–1994 data. In that 
analysis, we did not see the relationship between IVF cycles 
and international adoptions becoming significant at conven-
tional levels.  
5. Limitations 
There are several limitations to our study.  
First, we examine only one form of subsidization of IVF, 
state-level insurance mandates—the major form currently in 
 
 241. See supra note 187, Appendix B, Table B-1. 
 242. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 202; supra note 
173 and accompanying text. 
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place in the United States. Other proposed solutions to increase 
IVF availability, such as tax deductions for IVF expenses, may 
have different effects on adoption.  
The second and most serious limitation to our study is that 
many of the mandates were introduced in the 1980s, such that 
for some of the mandates some of our data-sets do not extend 
far enough back to capture years before their introduction (for 
details, see Table 1). For IVF utilization, our data extends only 
back to 1990 capturing the change in mandate status of only 
six states (two complete mandate states, two partial mandate 
states, and two non-IVF mandate states). On the adoption side, 
the AFCARS data goes back to 1995 allowing us to capture 
change in mandate status of only four states (one complete 
mandate state, one partial mandate state, and two non-IVF 
mandate states). This limitation—unavoidable given the avail-
able data-sets and the dates of mandate introduction—should 
lead one to be somewhat cautious about the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the analyses we conduct. To be sure, as to 
this data limitation we are in good company, in that all the 
studies in the oft-cited literature on the effects of IVF state-
level insurance mandates on IVF utilization and the rate of 
multiple births suffer from the same problem.243 Indeed, the 
most-cited paper on this subject, published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine,244 merely examined IVF utilization data 
from one calendar year in reaching its conclusions. But the fact 
that this problem is unavoidable does not mean it is not real. 
The problem is somewhat mitigated by our OLS analysis, 
which offers a test of the substitution theory that depends only 
on the effect of IVF utilization on adoption rates and is thus di-
vorced from the mandates, but that is not a complete solution 
since many of the factors that influence IVF utilization may in-
fluence adoption rates as well. The randomization test dis-
cussed in the previous section also partially addresses this 
problem as to the domestic adoption results, but the limitation 
still remains and will persist as a challenge in this literature 
unless more states change their mandate status going for-
ward.245 
 
 243. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (listing and discussing these 
studies). 
 244. See Jain et al., supra note 90. 
 245. A different data-set limitation was suggested by one commentator on 
the paper who mentioned that the Flango and Flango data-set may underes-
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For other data-sets, by contrast, this is less of a problem. 
The Flango data-set, which starts in 1987, allows us to capture 
the change in mandates of nine states (three complete mandate 
states, two partial mandate states, one mandate to offer state, 
and three non-IVF mandate states), but it provides data only 
for intermittent years.246 The international data-set fares the 
best on this score, since it starts in 1972 and thus allows us to 
capture mandate changes in all sixteen states that have im-
plemented mandates, spanning all four of the mandate catego-
ries.247 
Third, we lack detailed individual-level information about 
IVF users that would shed more light on our results. In particu-
lar, we are unable to distinguish between first versus repeat 
IVF users, and so we cannot determine to what extent our re-
sults are driven by a handful of individuals. We are also unable 
to observe people moving to states in order to take advantage of 
these mandates, a form of intranational medical tourism to 
take advantage of insurance differences. If people did move, 
however, then the delayed effect should be picked up in our 
lagged measures of the effect of these mandates. It is theoreti-
cally possible that such movement could explain why adoptions 
did not decrease upon the introduction of these mandates: new 
entrants try IVF, fail, and adopt instead. This would be consis-
tent with our finding that both total IVF cycles and failed IVF 
 
timate the number of private adoptions. Many others have relied on this data-
set in the literature. Even if the data-set makes this measurement error, as 
long as that error is uncorrelated with the introduction of the man-
dates themselves, then the potential measurement error would make it more 
difficult to detect any effect. The estimates we find would be a lower bound of 
the true effect. In addition, we note that it is possible that a high proportion of 
domestic private adoptions are interstate. As a robustness check for the possi-
bility that interstate adoptions are in fact correlated with insurance man-
dates, we at one point controlled for the friendliness of state laws toward 
adoptions (as discussed supra note 204), but found it did not affect our results. 
Indeed, if mandate and nonmandate states are equally likely to have inter-
state adoptions, and these interstate placements are uncorrelated with 
the mandates themselves, then our estimates provide a lower bound when us-
ing the Flango data-set (our AFCARS data measures public adoptions). In ac-
tuality, complete mandates are negatively correlated with being most friendly 
toward adoptions. If there are any omitted variables associated with higher 
interstate adoptions but not captured by the friendliness of state laws varia-
ble, we should find a negative relationship between complete mandates and 
adoptions, but we do not. 
 246. See Flango & Flango, supra note 201, at 1021–22, tbl.1. 
 247. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 202. 
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cycles increase in response to the insurance mandates, but with 
our existing data it is nothing more than a hypothesis.  
Fourth, we have some reason to question whether insur-
ance mandates are exogenous to adoption rates. An obvious 
concern in examining the impact of insurance mandates, espe-
cially through differences-in-differences approaches, is whether 
they are correlated with unobservable variables that might be 
driving both insurance mandates and the outcome in question. 
In their work on IVF utilization, Hamilton and McManus in-
vestigate this possibility and conclude that insurance mandates 
are exogenous to IVF usage. They find that states with and 
without IVF-specific insurance mandates are not different in 
observable characteristics, such as female labor force participa-
tion, female educational attainment, average family size, and 
median household income, factors that might influence the de-
cision to undergo infertility treatment.248 The main observable 
difference between states with and without IVF subsidies ap-
pears to be residents’ preferences for government intervention 
in medical markets.249 IVF subsidies come in a package of other 
laws, but Hamilton and McManus conclude that there is no 
evidence that this package includes specific differences in pref-
erences for children. They further examine possible unobserva-
ble differences between states with and without IVF insurance 
mandates by estimating a “preprogram” regression of the num-
ber of patients receiving treatment at reproductive clinics in 
1987 as a function of future regulatory status along with other 
contemporary control variables, but they do not find a signifi-
cant effect.250 We replicate this finding in our examination of 
whether IVF utilization rates are predicted by future regulato-
ry status (our leads analysis) when we include state-specific 
time trends. That is, we do not find that states that passed 
complete insurance mandates had different trends on IVF 
usage before passing the mandates as compared to the states 
that did not pass these insurance mandates. 
When the question shifts from whether IVF mandates are 
exogenous to utilization to the question of whether they are ex-
ogenous to adoption, things look different. A finding that in-
creases in adoptions are positively correlated with future regu-
latory status would cast doubt on the exogeneity of insurance 
 
 248. Hamilton & McManus, supra note 90, at 17–18.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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mandates to adoptions. That is, it may be possible that while 
IVF use does not precede insurance mandates, adoption rates 
could plausibly reflect pent-up demand for IVF use. We find 
that when state-specific time trends are included, the catego-
ries that are increasing before the introduction of complete in-
surance mandates are the following: nonrelated adoption, pub-
lic adoption, and foster adoption. This gives us some reason to 
question whether our estimates of the effect of mandates on 
adoption rates, at least in these categories, are really independ-
ent of other supply and demand shifts in adoptions during the 
relevant time period that we cannot observe. In future re-
search, we hope to use other research designs to address this 
possible endogeneity issue.251 
Fifth, the fact that we see mandates associated with an in-
crease in foster adoptions (and sometimes foster adoptions 
alone) in some of the specifications is troubling because we 
have no theoretical explanation for why mandates should have 
this effect. One speculative possibility is that the number of fos-
ter adoptions has been increasing rapidly in recent years in 
part due to the law changes discussed above (ASPA). It is poss-
ible that the effect of these law changes on foster adoption has 
not been uniform across all states, and some states have in-
creased foster adoptions more than others such that these re-
sults actually reflect state-specific effects of these law changes 
that coincide with insurance mandate changes, but are not the 
result of the mandates themselves.252 It is for this reason that 
we are more cautious about our findings as to foster adoption 
than the other subcategories of domestic adoption. Sixth, while 
one of our data-sets contains both public and private domestic 
 
 251. Building on a design one of this Article’s authors has employed in the 
context of sexual harassment, see Daniel L. Chen & Jasmin K. Sethi, Insiders 
and Outsiders: Does Forbidding Sexual Harassment Exacerbate Gender In-
equality? (June 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1119968, one possible strategy may be to use the random assignment 
of appellate judges expanding or decreasing the scope of IVF mandates to ex-
amine the issue, on the theory that this random assignment will be indepen-
dent of other supply and demand shifts in adoptions.  
 252. A different hypothetical possibility would be that since these laws 
have changed, individuals who try IVF and fail are increasingly switching to 
foster adoption rather than other forms of adoption. However, there is no rea-
son to believe individuals would specifically substitute to this type of adoption; 
indeed, everything we know about the sociology of adoptive foster parents (i.e., 
they are often individuals who are already giving foster care on a temporary 
basis) suggests they are unlikely to be the population for whom IVF access 
makes a difference.  
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adoptions, we have been unable to find a data-set containing 
only private domestic adoptions. Thus, we cannot specifically 
speak to the effect on private domestic adoptions of complete 
mandates. However, the fact that on two of our econometric 
frameworks we find statistically significant effects in the oppo-
site direction of the substitution theory in the data-set compris-
ing both private and public domestic adoptions suggests that 
substitution on this margin is unlikely. 
A final limitation goes not to our study itself, but to the 
limits of quantitative research designs more generally. Study-
ing human behavior through data on behavior is a useful com-
plement, but not a substitute to more qualitative methods. 
Thus, this Article’s empirical approach to the reproductive 
technology-adoption tradeoff should be seen as one piece of the 
puzzle, not a complete answer. One advantage of this kind of 
research is that it allows us to examine the ways in which self-
reported data and answers to qualitative interview processes do 
or do not translate into actual behavior, the gap between atti-
tudes and outcomes. In this regard, our findings are particular-
ly striking because they produce an answer quite different from 
that which one would expect based only on the existing qualita-
tive data, which, as discussed above, suggests that most indi-
viduals only turn to adoption when reproductive technologies 
are unavailable. Again, our analysis fails to find much effect on 
international or domestic adoptions when IVF becomes more 
available. We thus see this project as furthering the dialogue 
between quantitative and qualitative methods, in the hope of 
better understanding what actually is occurring. To this end, 
qualitative research designs focused directly on the effect of 
these mandates seem like the logical next step for those inter-
ested in the issue.  
Most of our discussion has been at the level of statistical 
significance, finding no statistically significant negative effects 
on adoption from complete insurance mandates for nonrelated 
or international adoptions, contrary to what the substitution 
theory would have predicted. As we discussed above, however, 
significance is only a part of the story, for even if there was a 
statistically significant effect in the direction predicted by the 
substitution theory (contrary to what we found), the size of that 
effect would matter a great deal for public policy decisionmak-
ers. To put the point less technically and in a mode of speaking 
we used in Part II when discussing the normative premises of 
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the substitution theory: a public policy decision maker might 
feel quite differently about a world where every additional IVF 
birth reduced the number of children adopted by one (a 1:1 ra-
tio) than a world where every one hundred additional IVF 
births reduced the number of children adopted by one, especial-
ly on a utilitarian welfare account where parental welfare gains 
(as well as the potential welfare of the new children who come 
into existence) from IVF usage due to the mandates is balanced 
against the welfare losses of children waiting for adoption. 
Having found no statistically significant effect, we cannot di-
rectly talk about effect size, but we can calculate the bounds of 
our confidence intervals in a way that illuminates the question. 
We can rule out with ninety-five percent confidence a substitu-
tion effect of 0.0132 fewer nonrelated adoptions and of 0.1172 
international adoptions for every additional IVF cycle.253 That 
is, we can be very confident that one hundred additional IVF 
cycles will result in thirteen or fewer reduced adoptions,254 a 
conclusion that again shows how tough a normative case the 
substitution theory must make to be convincing.  
  CONCLUSION   
A number of leading scholars have suggested that the neg-
ative effects on adoption that stem from the introduction of in-
surance mandates covering IVF provide a good reason to op-
pose those mandates. In this Article, we have put pressure on 
that claim in two ways.  
First, we have exposed some of the controversial underly-
ing normative premises on which the argument depends: the 
relative size of the interests of to-be-adopted children and 
would-be genetic parents and the numbers on each side; the 
normative criterion by which they are to be traded-off; whether 
it is just for the burden to help these children to fall primarily 
 
 253. The standard errors represent the statistical confidence regarding a 
particular estimate. The range represented by the point estimate plus or mi-
nus two times the standard error is the ninety-five percent confidence interval. 
For any magnitude outside of this range, we can reject as being true with ninety-
five percent confidence. The lower limit for this range for nonrelated adoptions 
was calculated from Table 4, Panel B, Column 2: 0.0468 – 2 * 0.0300. The low-
er limit for this range for international adoptions was calculated from Table 4, 
Panel B, Column 8: -0.0455 – 2 * 0.0362.  
 254. To be precise, 13.04 children, that is (0.0132 + 0.1172) * 100. Indeed, 
even that claim is too generous to the substitution theory because it does not 
factor in the positive effects from these mandates on foster adoption. 
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on the infertile rather than all of society; whether our concep-
tion changes if we view the demand for assistance with infertil-
ity as a health need and, if so, the propriety of considering indi-
rect benefits in allocating health care; and how our obligations 
to children living abroad differ from our obligations to those 
within the nation-state. We have not attempted to offer a full 
condemnation of the normative claim that diminutions in adop-
tion are a good reason to oppose expanding access to reproduc-
tive technologies, but rather to make explicit the large number 
of difficult and contestable assumptions that appear to sub si-
lentio stand behind the claim. 
Second, we have challenged the intuitive empirical as-
sumption made by the proponents of the argument that in-
creased reproductive technology access through state-level in-
surance mandates covering IVF has diminished adoption. 
Contrary to an assumption of some leading scholars in this 
area, we fail to find strong evidence for that claim.  
These results are admittedly preliminary—we have noted 
some limitations in our study, and this is the first empirical ex-
amination of an issue that deserves much more scholarly atten-
tion—but assuming our conclusion is correct, what explains the 
lack of an effect? That is, why do complete mandates not reduce 
nonrelated domestic or international adoptions? More empirical 
work is needed to answer this question, but with an eye toward 
advancing the field let us offer two speculative possibilities that 
might be investigated in further work, econometric or other. 
First, whatever negative effects increased IVF utilization 
has on adoption are outweighed by the positive effect it has 
through the peer effects mechanism we alluded to earlier, or 
because undergoing IVF and failing confirms the desire for a 
child. Indeed, because even the most complete mandates usual-
ly have set limits on the number of cycles covered, it may be 
that the point at which the mandated coverage runs out (and 
individuals have to start paying out of pocket) becomes a choice 
point where the individual is forced to reevaluate her IVF use 
and consider switching to adoption. In this way, those with 
mandated coverage may somewhat avoid the gambler’s fallacy 
and other types of mistaken reasoning that besets IVF users.255 
 
 255. See Pratt, supra note 6, at 1194–95 (“For example, patients may as-
sume that, with a twenty percent per cycle success rate for IVF, the odds of 
success after four unsuccessful cycles would be much higher than twenty per-
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A conflicting hypothesis would suggest that IVF insurance 
mandates lead to increased IVF utilization because now an ad-
ditional number of cycles are covered by insurance rather than 
paid for out-of-pocket and thus are almost “free” from the point 
of view of the user. Our findings that complete mandates do in-
crease IVF utilization measured by number of cycles seems to 
favor the latter hypothesis, although the negative relationship 
between partial mandates and IVF cycles might suggest some 
evidence for the former “choice-point” hypothesis. In any event, 
this is an area where qualitative data from IVF users in 
mandate versus nonmandate states would be useful in further 
examining these possibilities. 
Second, there may be what we will term a “two solitudes” 
effect: individuals have preferences for or against domestic 
adoption that are independent of IVF’s availability such that 
they will either adopt or refuse to adopt regardless of whether 
or not they have a substitutive method of having children. This 
suggestion, however, is in tension with much of the qualitative 
empirical literature reviewed earlier on adoption decisionmak-
ing. These studies suggest that many individuals turn to adop-
tion only after exhausting IVF. A more subtle variation on this 
theory might suggest an interplay between who benefits from 
these mandates and who adopts. That is, although these man-
dates increase IVF utilization overall, they may not increase 
utilization among particular groups who are most likely to 
adopt domestically.256 Much more work should be done to ex-
amine these (and other) possibilities, but we are hopeful that 
this Article will help scholars and policy makers rethink the 
 
cent in their next IVF cycle. In fact, the chance of success may remain the 
same . . . .”). 
 256. For example, some literature suggests that there are nonprice-based 
barriers to reproductive technology use that affect African Americans and oth-
er racial minorities, even in states with mandated benefits. See DAAR, supra 
note 8, at 38–43; Tarun Jain & Mark D. Hornstein, Disparities in Access to In-
fertility Services in a State with Mandated Insurance Coverage, 84 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 221, 223 (2005) (listing multiple nonprice barriers to minority 
IFV use); Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preim-
plantation Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 313 
(2008) (“Cultural and educational factors can also inhibit access . . . .”). It is 
hypothetically possible that these groups both benefit least from the insurance 
mandates and are the most likely to adopt, which could explain why the man-
dates do not have more of an effect on adoption. This hypothesis would in turn 
generate a series of interesting research questions: for example, are there dif-
ferences in the sociology of those who adopt domestically versus international-
ly that might make this hypothesis more or less plausible? 
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possibility (or at least the parameters) of a reproductive tech-
nology versus adoption tradeoff. 
 In closing, we return to the policy and normative questions 
that animated this project. On a number of normative theories 
there are strong reasons to favor state intervention to make re-
productive technologies more affordable and therefore accessi-
ble. One fear expressed by those otherwise committed to this 
goal is that increased access to reproductive technology would 
decrease adoption, and we would thus fail in our duties of jus-
tice to those waiting to be adopted. We have shown that such a 
tradeoff, if it exists, would foist on us some very difficult ques-
tions of political theory. Using the best available data, however, 
our analysis suggests that at least as to one particularly power-
ful state intervention currently used to increase the availability 
of IVF (state-level insurance mandates), there is no strong evi-
dence that decreases in adoptions are associated with the in-
troduction of these mandates. Of course, as discussed, the con-
cern about effects on adoption is but one reason to oppose these 
mandates, and we leave full examination of other possible rea-
sons to oppose these mandates for further work. 
